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This dissertation is a social constructivist analysis of the ideational foundations 
of West European defense industrial cooperation. Traditional analytical approaches 
within International Relations theory, namely structural realism, do not highlight the 
role that social identity may play in shaping state behaviorexcept to regard it 
conceptually as predetermined, as methodologically unapproachable, or as 
epiphenomenal. The study of European armaments collaboration, however, demands 
that scholars consider identity as both official elite rhetoric and mass surveys maintain 
that an emergent, transnational European identity not only exists within the member 
societies of the European Union (EU), but it may also shape certain areas of state 
activity. This thesis uses social constructivism as an explanatory framework in order to 
ascertain the degree that this regional identity facilitates the Europeanization of 
defense production within the EU.  
  This dissertation explores five episodes of multinational European defense 
industrial collaboration conducted between 1967 and 1997: Tornado, Eurofighter, 
Field Howitzer 70, Self-Propelled Howitzer 70, and the Anglo-French Reciprocal 
Purchasing Agreement. Further, these cases are divided into high-technology and low-
technology categories, with Tornado and Eurofighter forming a high-tech dyad, while 
the others denote examples of low-tech industrial and market-oriented cooperation. I 
hypothesize that the production of high-tech military equipment is bound to 
conceptions of self and of self-interest that promote nationalist behavior and thus  
restricts the potential for multinational procurement collaboration. Low-tech weapons, 
on the other hand, do not challenge national identity and thus may reveal the influence 
of an emerging, cross-cutting transnational identity. This identity subsequently can be 
manifest in the potential willingness of states to rationalize intra-regional production 
and to integrate national defense equipment markets. I find, however, that while a 
distinct European identity exists, its effects do not extend far into the procurement 
field regardless of the level of technology involved within a given collaboration. 
Weapons procurement in the European Union remains intrinsically national in 
orientation. iii 
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 1 
CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
 
 
The idea of Europe is inseparable from the idea of defense 
-François Mitterrand1 
 
Ideas are important. For two generations, we have seen the "idea of Europe"—
the drive toward West European integration embodied first in the European Communi-
ties (EC) and later in the European Union (EU)—progress from promise, to crisis, to 
rejuvenation and renewed dynamism.2 Decades of incremental change have produced 
"reinterpretations" of national interest and of autonomy that differ considerably from 
past periods.3 Today, Western Europe is closer to economic union and political con-
federation than at any other time. Multiple, overlapping institutions make this 
environment possible, influencing European affairs in almost every issue area. Yet as 
the idea of Europe has broadened and deepened to embrace a new collective identity 
and symbolize "pooled sovereignty," the idea of European defense stands unfulfilled 
and theoretically under-explored.  
Defense cooperation in Western Europe is both considerable and long-lived, 
predating the formal creation of the regional integration movement.4 Regional militar-
                                                 
1 Cited in Marthias Jopp, Reinhardt Rummel, and Peter Schmidt, Integration and Security in Western 
Europe (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 16. 
2 See Dorette Corbey, "Dialectical functionalism: stagnation as a booster of European integration," In-
ternational Organization 49 (Spring 1995); Stanley Hoffman, "The European Community and 1992," 
Foreign Affairs 68 (Fall 1989): 26-34. 
3 See Ulf Hedertoft, "The State of Sovereignty in Europe," in National Cultures and European Integra-
tion, ed. Staffan Zetterholm (Oxford, UK: Berg, 1994), 23, 27. 
4 Josef Joffe and David Calleo, for example, argue that the institutional regional presence of the United 
States through NATO mitigated traditional enmity between Western European states. Moreover, it pro-
vided an informal security guarantee that permitted the integration movement to begin via NATO and  
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ies have been denationalized and harmonized under an integrated command structure 
formed forty-nine years ago, and have been bound together in increasingly sophisti-
cated ways through a tapestry of interlocking alliances and policy-coordination 
groups. Nonetheless, the goal of regional security remains fundamentally incomplete, 
nationalized and fragmented in the critical area of arms procurement.  
Indeed, as Western Europe has become a place of receding internal borders and 
diminished economic barriers, military production is the last great refuge of national 
preference—formally excluded from the integration processes sweeping through every 
industrial sector in the EU.5 The region thus finds itself with the paradox of a common 
defense without a common defense industrial base. Even as European armies combine 
into multinational units, the means for equipping these forces remains predominantly a 
collection of disparate national procurement schemes. Long-held state conceptions of 
sovereignty and of national advantage clash with competing notions of efficiency and 
of European "community"—a process producing procurement outcomes most often 
regarded as "second-best" or worse.6 As long as this tension exists and the "idea of 
defense" in Europe is unmet, then borrowing the logic of François Mitterand, the "idea 
of Europe" will remain unrealized. 
Yet one cannot ignore the potential for the “idea of defense” to arise, nor dis-
miss the possibility that it may be already underway. To understand European 
integration, one must understand and appreciate change: changing state behavior, 
                                                                                                                                             
the ECSC. Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," Foreign Policy 54 (Spring 1984); David Calleo, 
Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of American Hegemony (Brighton, UK: Wheatsheaf, 1987). 
5 Article 223 in the 1957 Treaty of Rome, officially recognizes the primacy of national preference and 
national sovereignty in defense procurement, and consequently denies any supranational competence in 
this area. Moreover, defense remains formally outside common market process. This treaty stipulation 
has stood untouched even as the Community has evolved through the 1985 Single European Act (SEA) 
and the 1991 Treaty of European Union (Maastrict).  
6 Ethan Barnaby Kapstein, "International Collaboration in Armaments Production: A Second-Best So-
lution," Political Science Quarterly 106 (1991-92).  
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changing interests, and importantly, changing conceptions of state identity. Just as 
other forms of military cooperation have evolved, so too have efforts in arms produc-
tion collaboration. Defense production collaboration has been a feature of the 
European security landscape since the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation (NATO) in 1949.7 Since then, procurement cooperation has evolved in a steady, 
if piecemeal and largely ad hoc, fashion to involve increasingly complex interactions 
and to touch upon nearly every kind of military hardware from bridging machines to 
combat aircraft. Given this considerable regional legacy, as well as emergent political 
and economic trends that significantly reduce the potential for procurement autarky 
both within and outside the EU, we can expect even greater collaboration in the com-
ing years.  
The issue explored in this dissertation, however, involves more than changes in 
levels of procurement cooperation. I posit that the conduct of this collaboration is far 
more significant, because it could denote integration hereto unanticipated and unad-
dressable in mainstream International Relations theory. Indeed, important qualitative 
changes have emerged since the late 1980s in Western European weapons production. 
Cross-border mergers of defense firms and permanent international joint-venture 
agreements have slowly taken shape and by century’s end a few notable examples 
have coexisted alongside traditional partnership initiatives such as licensing, co-
development or international subcontracting.8 As analysts, moreover, we must look 
beyond the forms collaboration may take, to the motives driving the behavior. The 
                                                 
7 The NATO signatories established the Military Production and Supply Board (MPSB) within months 
of initiating the defense pact. This first institutionalized effort to harmonize alliance militaries focused 
on standardizing ammunition and simple subsystems and components, like truck parts. Keith Hartley, 
NATO Arms Co-operation (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), 33. 
8 Richard A. Bitzinger, "Customize Defense Industry Restructuring," Orbis, Vol. 38 (Spring 1994): 
273; Trevor Taylor, "Defence Industries in International Relations," Review of International Relations 
Vol 16 (1990): 65-66; François Heisbourg, et. al., European defence: making it work, Chaillot Paper 42 
(Paris: Institute for Security Studies-Western European Union, 2000), 106-107.   
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mainstream International Relations literatures view procurement collaboration through 
a strictly rationalist and materialist lens. Realist and liberal institutionalist approaches 
portray cooperation as a process dominated by egoistic, utility-maximizing state ac-
tors. These entities engage in production partnerships to capture the tangible gains of 
defense production: creating security and/or protecting national economic interests. 
While these theoretical approaches differ in their appraisal of the likelihood of col-
laboration, the importance of coordinating institutions, the relevance of relative versus 
absolute gains problem, or the tension between autarky and efficiency in state calcula-
tions, they share a critical similarity. Identity and interest are exogenous to social 
interaction. Observable phenomena simply reflect actor behavior without in anyway 
affecting the nature of the actor itself.9 Propelling both models, as Alexander Wendt 
notes, is the a priori assumption of the "self-interested state."10 
  
European Identity 
Henry Nau argues, rightly, that before we can use self-interest as a frame of 
reference however, we must first define the "self."11 In Western Europe, as in no other 
region, conceptions of the self, of sovereignty, of interest are in flux. By the early 
1990s, a discernible European identity had assumed measurable proportions and coex-
isted with fifteen separate national identities. The idea that a collective European 
identity is both a product and a cause of the integration movement has become an arti-
                                                 
9 Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 
International Organization 46 (Spring 1992): 392. 
10 Wendt, " Anarchy," 392. 
11 See Henry Nau, “Identity and International Politics: An Alternative to Neorealism,” Paper presented 
at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2-5, 1993.  
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cle of faith for many in the social sciences.12 These scholars share Karl Deutsch’s 
stance that regional integration is a function of a “sense of community:”  
 
a matter of mutual sympathies and loyalty, of ‘we-feeling,’ trust and 
mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of self-images 
and interests; of mutually successful predictions of behavior.13  
The reality of this “we-feeling” as a part of the European socio-political land-
scape is not in doubt. While affective support for European integration and for the 
expansion of European policy-making beyond low politics has waxed and waned over 
time collectively and within individual member states, such support has existed at 
measurable levels since the early 1970s.14 This phenomenon has been evidenced in 
regional Eurobarometer surveys conducted on behalf of the European Commission. 
These polls indicate that large segments of each national public within the EC/EU 
identify with the idea of Europe, manifested either as an ideal or as the existing 
institutions of European integration. For example, in those states with the most overt 
popular enmity toward the EC/EU, the United Kingdom and Denmark, support for the 
common market averaged 38% and 37%, respectively, between 1975 and 1990.15 
                                                 
12 See for example, John Keane, "Questions for Europe," in The Idea of Europe: Problems of National 
and Transnational Identity, eds. Brian Nelson, David Roberts and Walter Veit, (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1992), 59; Thomas M. Wilson, "An Anthropology of the European Community, in Cultural 
Change and The New Europe, eds. Thomas M. Wilson and M. Estellie Smith (Boulder , CO: Westview 
Press, 1993),  11. 
13 Karl Deutsch, et. al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1957,) 36. 
14 Fluctuations in support notably correlate to the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 and its resulting impact 
on national economies. Additionally, popular uneasiness with the increased competence of European 
institutions following the Maastrict Treaty in 1992 led to momentary dips in average net support for 
unification. Richard Eichenberg and Russell Dalton, “Europeans and the European Community: the 
dynamics of public support for European integration,” International Organization 47 (Autumn 1993): 
519; Karlheinz Reif, “Cultural Convergence and Cultural Diversity as Factors in European Identity,” 
European Identity and the Search for Legitimacy, ed. Soledad Garcia (London: Pinter, 1993), 144. 
15 Brigid Laffan, Integration and Co-operation in Europe (London: Routledge, 1992), 124.  
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While these figures pale in comparison to levels of support found in more pro-
Europe  polities such as France and Italy, with 61.5% and 73% positive respectively, 
they denote a reservoir of support for the procedural and institutional aspect of the in-
tegration project that cannot easily be dismissed anywhere in the region. What is 
perhaps more telling to the strength of the European ideal are those instances in which 
surveyors attempt to ascertain the affective territorial connections of their subjects. 
When asked in a 1990 Eurobarometer poll as to “the degree of attachment to their 
town or village, to their region, to their country, to the EC, and to Europe as a whole,” 
48% of respondents identified with the Communities and 47% “Europe as a whole.”16 
The national and sub-national responses exhibited greater levels of interviewee loy-
alty, with 88% claiming attachment to their states and 85% to their towns and 
villages.17 Strong support for these established political and social communities, how-
ever, does not diminish what is an emergent identification with the European ideal. 
Indeed, a subsequent Eurobarometer survey in 1992 noted that while half of all que-
ried EC citizens still did not perceive themselves to be both “European” and their 
given national identity, 62% of respondents claimed that a European identity would be 
compatible with their national identities.18  
This phenomenon has been supported, and arguably sustained, by ongoing ef-
forts of both the States and the Community to promote a European identity since the 
early 1970s. From 1973 to 1985, there were three Heads-of-State summits—
Copenhagen, Stuttgart, and Milan—in which the States, and thus the Community—set 
out to establish a “People’s Europe,” accompanied by a Commission-led regional so-
                                                 
16 When disaggregated on the national level, there is again considerable variation. For example: UK 
(35 percent and 34 percent), Netherlands (28 percent and 31 percent), France (54 percent and 50 per-
cent), and Italy (61 percent and 59 percent). Reif, “Cultural Convergence,” 138. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Brigid Laffan, “The Politics of Identity and Political Order in Europe,” Journal of Common Market 
Studies 34 (March 1996): 99.  
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cialization campaign in which Europeans would be prepared “for Citizenship which 
involves the Community dimension in addition to their national, regional and local 
affiliations.”19 Economic and institutional advances on the ground have complemented 
this process: the creation of the single market, the rapid growth in cross-border labor 
mobility through the 1980s, and the establishment of a common judicial space through 
the 1990 Schengen Agreement. Of course, these efforts pale in comparison to the crea-
tion of a European citizenship through the 1992 Treaty of European Union, and the 
complementary “promotion” of quasi-national European symbols: a flag, an anthem, 
and a common currency. 
Admittedly, a series of generational replacements will be required before this 
new identity becomes pronounced. Indeed, recent scholarship indicates that only a 
small percentage of Union citizens—less than 10 percent of the population in all states 
except Luxembourg—perceive themselves to be entirely European.20 One can safely 
say, however, that a discernible European identity coexists along with fifteen separate 
national identities.21 This identity is certainly not hegemonic and will probably pose 
no serious challenge to either nationalism or intra-national regionalism for the fore-
seeable future. It nonetheless exists as a weaker identity within a hierarchy of 
identities.22 The percentage of respondents reporting both European and national iden-
tities in the 1999 Eurobarometer survey however—with the latter identity constituting 
                                                 
19 Cited in Henk Dekker, “European Identity: How European Are Young Europeans Expected To Be 
and How European Are They in Fact?” in Reconceptualizing Politics, Socialization, and Education: 
International Perspectives for the 21st Century, ed, Russell F. Farnen (Oldenburg: Bibliotheks- und 
Informationssystem der Universitat, 1993): 523. 
20 Stefan Höljelid, “European Integration and the Idea of European Identity: Obstacles and Possibili-
ties,” ECPR Joint Sessions/Workshop 19: Identity Politics, 2001, 14. 
21 For a focus review of popular attitudes concerning "European" solutions toward national security 
issues see Werner J. Feld, The Future of European Security and Defence Policy, (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 1993), ch. 5, 11. 
22 Laffan, “The Politics of Identity,” 99.  
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the primary identity—ranged from a low of 24 percent in the United Kingdom to 56 
percent in Ireland in 1999.23  
This phenomenon of an evolving transnational identity that is entrenched and 
diffused throughout the Union is the primary driver of this research effort. My interest 
lies not in the existence of this identity but rather in its effect. Given that national 
identities have remained predominant, and as I hypothesize that identity shapes inter-
est which then guides action, we can assume that most state behavior in this 
environment will continue to privilege national priorities over the communal good; 
self-interest over “other-interest.” What we still must discern, however, is exactly 
when narrow, national interest is likely to be the deciding factor for any given issue-
area in the presence of a transnational identity. 
European defense is one such domain in which official discourses and popular 
attitudes denote a willingness to redefine national problems as common concerns with 
communal solutions. First, in past Eurobarometer surveys that have gauged popular 
support for collective defense efforts, significant percentages of Western European 
mass publics report that they no longer see their national security as best served 
through national means but rather through European initiatives. Successive polls since 
the mid-1970s note that sizable pluralities, and occasionally small majorities up to 
55%, of respondents in region-wide samples favor placing defence issues under 
EC/EU control, and even support the creation of a common European army.24 By the 
                                                 
23 Höljelid, “European Integration,” 15. 
24 Moreover, although considerable national diversity exists on this issue, national publics most op-
posed to completely unifying regional defenses still hold significant minorities in favor of such 
proposals. For example, Danish and Greek respondents exhibited the greatest resistance to the surren-
der of national security autonomy to the EC-EU. Nonetheless, 37 percent and 38 percent of each 
respective national sample supported the idea. Philippe Manigart and Eric Marlier, "European Public 
Opinion on the Future of Its Security," Armed Forces and Society 19 (Spring 1993): 399-443.   
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Spring 1999 Eurobarometer survey, respondents were evenly split between those who 
supported national solutions to defense issues versus those favoring European ones.25 
One must note, however, that past surveys have not always inquired as to the 
saliency of defense issues. Consequently, one cannot determine if claimed positions 
were strongly held.26 Further, they have not always specified exactly how the 
collective defense should be pursued, e.g., intergovernmental multinationalism à la 
NATO, supranationalism, etc. Europeans may desire more collaboration, but not 
outright integration; or possibly, may embrace integration “in name only,” so as to 
render the concept meaningless with escape clauses and empty symbolism. Whatever, 
the case, it is clear that over fifty years of defense harmonization under NATO and the 
WEU, among other institutions, have led Europeans to see such cooperation as 
normal, and to expect more of it.  
Second, official debates within Europe about the conduct and future of defense 
industrial policy are often “presented in an European rather than a national context.”27 
Increasingly over the last thirty years, this has become commonplace, as the regional 
good is at least rhetorically emphasized over the welfare of any of its national compo-
nents, e.g., the creation of an European aerospace industry through multinational 
collaboration, or the building of an advanced European defense industrial base. Mi-
chael Heseltine exemplified this discursive trend while serving as the United 
Kingdom’s Secretary of State for Defense in 1985. Asked about British and Allied ef-
forts to promote greater and more efficient weapons collaboration, he claimed: 
I am fighting for Europe. Neither I nor my ministerial colleagues, I be-
lieve, are fighting purely for national interests. . .If Europe wants to be 
                                                 
25 Höljelid, “European Integration,” 16. 
26 Manigart and Marlier, "European Public Opinion,” 336. 
27 Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, The Economics of Defense (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), 229.  
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in the first rank of industry in the 21st Century it must act this way and 
this is the principle of European procurement. The defense ministries 
are the biggest customers, we are the only people who can lead it. It is 
in the long-term advantage of Europe that we should do so.28 
Here, the minister speaks not of Britain’s status and well being; instead the 
stated justification for action is one of self-redefinition in which the status of the re-
gional community transcends state interest. Heseltine’s language epitomizes the 
constructivist perspective as to how Western Europe should function: 
. . .[Decades] of cooperation [that] may have transformed positive in-
terdependence of outcomes into a collective "European identity" in 
terms of which states increasingly define their "self" -interest. Even if 
egoistic reasons were its starting point, the process of cooperating tends 
to redefine those reasons by reconstituting identities and interests in 
terms of new intersubjective meanings and commitments.29 
One can find sentiments of this type echoed in every capital in NATO Europe. 
We must never assume, however, that proclamations of “visionary belief” and of a 
European worldview mean that the issue of European defense has become a sea of al-
truism and prosocial behavior in which states share empathetic bonds with each 
other.30 What matters, as Regina Cowen in her study of German procurement policy 
notes, is not what states (and especially their publics) say, but rather what they do.31 
Indeed, Minister Heseltine also noted in the same interview that in the area of military 
procurement:  
. . .[W]ithin each country nationalist feelings are aroused and there 
emerges a fear of selling out national interests. . .the fact is that all 
Governments will pursue what they see as their legitimate state interest 
in the field of arms procurement. There are enormous pressures to per-
                                                 
28 Michael Heseltine, “I am fighting for Europe,” Military Technology IX (1985): 74 
29 Wendt, “Anarchy,” 417 
30 Jonathan Mercer, “Anarchy and Identity,” International Organization 49 (Spring 1995): 234. 
31 Regina Cowen, Defense Procurement in the Federal Republic of Germany (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1986), 290.  
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suade governments to buy the maximum amount of their defense 
equipment in their own countries.32 
State egoism remains strong in an environment where, as I shall soon show, 
most of the cooperation that does occur is very much self-regarding. Further, this is an 
environment in which even countries with limited defense industries, such as The 
Netherlands, continue to insist upon the domestic supply of a majority of its military 
requirements.33  
There is an instrumental quality to the notion of a European defense identity. It 
has been used either to propose or to justify action that is subsequently better ex-
plained as the pursuit of narrow, national self-interest. It is conceivable that a marginal 
social identity, such as a collective European one, would at best be more symbolic 
than practicallimited to statements of purpose and to the declared acceptance new 
possibilities in European collective action. Constructivists remind us, however, that 
identities are relational both to a given issue or activity, and to other actors.34 The 
causal leverage of a relatively weak European collective identity might well be limited 
to an issue-area of comparably marginal importance.35 In this perspective, arms pro-
duction may seem a poor candidate for Europeanization, given its innate connection 
                                                 
32 Michael Heseltine, “I am Fighting for Europe,” 74. 
33 The larger and more capable national defense markets have been naturally more autarkic. In the 
1990s, 90 percent of UK procurement contracts were awarded to UK firms. The comparable figure for 
Germany and Italy stood at 80 percent. At the extreme, 98 percent of French defense procurements 
since 1992 were supplied by French firms working either in national programs or in multinational col-
laborative schemes. United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Secretary of Defense, 
Defense Trade: European Initiatives to Integrate the Defense Market (GAO/NSIAD-98-6, October 
1997), 13-14. 
34 Wendt, “Identity and Structural Change in International Relations,” 52. 
35 Indeed, Eurobarometer data indicate, for example, that support for deepening cooperation and ex-
panded Union competences is greatest in those areas of social and political activity that are deemed 
relatively inconsequential to the security and well-being of individuals and their communities, for ex-
ample, environmental protection, international humanitarian aid, and poverty alleviation. Höljelid, 
“European Integration,” 16.  
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“with the very essence of the sovereignty of the nation-state.”36 As previously men-
tioned, however, it is the relationship between defense and state interest that makes the 
study of procurement collaboration an excellent test for the influence of a developing 
supranational identity. Further, as European states have at least claimed to differentiate 
between essential security interests and their general equipment needs, there has been 
a potentially widening window for countries to pursue denationalized procurement 
strategies. Thus, a study of European defense procurement promises to shed light on 
the broader question of whether European identity is now a reality.  
 
The Technology-Identity Hypothesis 
In this dissertation, I explore whether an identifiable European identity is 
manifest in arms procurement collaboration. Given the "internationalization" of mili-
tary production globally, and the evolutionary Europeanization of procurement within 
the EU, we can no longer assume that the status quo of predominately national pro-
curement punctuated by episodes of limited cross-border cooperation will endure.37 
We can ask, under what conditions will weapons production cooperation no longer 
serves narrow, national interests but perhaps reflects a transformation in identity that is 
indicative of the larger, European community? 
                                                 
36 François Heisbourg, “Public Policy and the Creation of a European Arms Market,” in The European 
Armaments Market and Procurement Cooperation, eds. Pauline Creasey and Simon May (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1988), 86. 
37 The history of collaborative procurement in Western Europe can be seen as both a part of and an 
impetus for defense industrial globalization that has been evolving since the 1950s. This globalization 
occurs as “mature” states, such as those in NATO, diffuse technology among themselves and to the 
Third World via directs sales and industrial cooperation in order to recoup (or share) development 
costs. As armaments have become more complex, and as export markets have declined as new competi-
tors have emerged, even developed states may find themselves unable continue “independent defense 
industrialization.” In the European context, this has been manifest in increasing pressures on states to 
increase North-North defense cooperation and to become aggressive in securing markets in the devel-
oping world. See Richard Bitzinger, Towards A Brave New Arms Industry, Adelphi Paper 356 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 29. See also William Keller, Arm in Arm (New York: Basic 
Books, 1995).  
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I hypothesize that the nature of military procurement cooperation is changing 
and that orthodox conceptions of the links between national identity, national interest 
and military technology need to be reassessed. A focus on technology, and state atti-
tudes toward it, allows us to conduct a nuanced test of the role of identity as I contend 
that military technology is an intervening variable between identity and state behavior. 
High-tech military hardware is bound to conceptions of self, and of self-interest, that 
limit collaboration. The manufacture of such goods historically holds both material 
and symbolic benefits for state actors for many reasons. Domestic weapons production 
provides states with autonomy in military supply and political independence; it offers 
potential economic spin-offs in research and development and national labor markets; 
it legitimates state-actors in a world-system where a prevailing "culture of modernity" 
equates greatness with the sophistication of one's economic and military industrial 
base;38 and finally, an advanced national defense industrial base (DIB) produces cul-
turally-valued artifacts that become components of national identity and vehicles for 
national prestige.39  
Not all weapons possess the same value on either economic or political-
symbolic terms. An air-superiority fighter, for example, is a symbol of power and an 
instrument that both demands and supports a sophisticated industrial foundation. We 
can conceive of defense technology—tanks, ships, strategic bombers, etc.—as sym-
bols of a corporate state identity. The possession of such devices and/or the means to 
produce them becomes "emblems of the nation." Robert O'Connell argues they may 
                                                 
38Alexander Wendt and Michael Barnett, "Dependent state formation and Third World militarism," 
Review of International Studies Vol 19, (1993): 337; Dana Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, "Military Pro-
curement as Rational Myth: Notes on the Social Construction of Weapons Proliferation," Sociological 
Forum vol. 7 (March 1992): 150-151. 
39 Robert O'Connell, "Putting Weapons in Perspective," Armed Forces and Society 9 (Spring 1983): 
450; William Bloom, Personal Identity, National Identity, and International Relations (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 52.  
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represent a cultural "fetishism" with technological progress as in the case of high-
performance combat aircraft; or perhaps they may convey images of strength and "ar-
mor-plated" invulnerability of the kind embodied in tank manufacture. In any event, 
once these symbols have been internalized by members of the national community, we 
can expect state action either to preserve or enhance these emblems of the state.40  
The same cannot be said, however, for a broad range of military hardware 
based on older technologies, often mass-produced and regarded as near-commodities. 
Just as the ability to possess and produce an advanced aircraft provides tangible secu-
rity and economic benefits, so to do low technology weapons. The crucial difference, 
however, is that high tech items also become part of state self-perception in the inter-
national system, and importantly, how that state wants to be regarded by others. As a 
symbol of modernity, this kind of "value-added" hardware is different from a mortar 
tube or of an artillery shell. This difference will shape how far states are willing to go 
to monopolize the "sophisticated" over the "commonplace."  
I hypothesize that high-end technologies will invoke a self-centered, national-
ist response and thus limit the potential for meaningful (i.e., economically and 
militarily efficient) procurement collaboration. States will attempt to accrue and 
maximize gains from procurement for themselves. Low-end technologies, on the other 
hand, are not crucial to national identity, and therefore we can expect countries not to 
engage in narrow, self-interested behavior. Collaboration at this level may reflect a 
reinterpretation of state interests in which the "self" embraces the larger community. 
Consequently, countries might surrender national competence and national capability 
in favor of a regional solution. This phenomenon could manifest itself in several ways: 
collaborating states may permit open competition between partners for certain items; 
                                                 
40 O'Connell, "Putting Weapons in Perspective," 450.  
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states could embrace the true rationalization of production, allowing comparative ad-
vantage to determine the regional location of supply for their individual or group 
needs,41 or they could possibly allow for the creation of multinational corporations 
without "distinctive national affiliations"—"Eurocompanies"—and rely upon them for 
procurement.42 At the very least, collaboration in low-tech military goods should re-
flect market forces over parochial political concerns.  
I do not claim that low-tech armaments cooperation represents the ultimate 
measure of identity shift. Given the symbolic and material importance of high tech-
nology weapons, the emergence of rational collaborative schemes in that area would 
be a considerably better indication of how much states see their identities (and inter-
ests) interlocking with each other. Nonetheless, meaningful cooperation in low 
technology manufactures is still important because the structural economic forces 
driving post-war cooperation are less prominent in that domain. Whereas cost and 
technological weakness may demand collaboration for high technology goods even 
when autarky is most desired, most nations still possess the ability to satisfy their low 
technology needs autonomously. Consequently, an identity/interest shift offers ex-
planatory leverage for efficient de-politicized cooperation in low-tech procurement 
should it exist. A European identity will most shape behavior in areas that are rela-
                                                 
41 I must apologize for the conceptual fuzziness here. By "source of supply" I mean a recognition that a 
single national producer within the community may be the most effective supplier for a given item (e.g. 
rifle ammunition, mortar tubes, widgets, etc.). Other members, therefore, either abandon or signifi-
cantly reduce their own capability and supply their needs from this cross-border source. This relates to 
the previous point where procurement decisions are based on fair bidding and are awarded according to 
price and efficiency. Rationalized "collaborative production," on the other hand, refers to states pooling 
resources for a common project but then basing final production on "techno-economic" merits (e.g., 
single production lines or administrative center) instead of national political imperatives, such as the 
desire to protect domestic labor markets or national access to technology. On this point see, Andrew 
Latham, "Conflict and Competition over the NATO Defence Industrial Base: The Case of the European 
Fighter Aircraft," in The Defence Industrial Base and the West, ed. David G. Haglund (London: 
Routledge, 1989),  112. 
42 William Walker and Philip Gummett, "Future Options for the European Defence Market," Seminar 
Paper, April 29-30, 1993, 28.   
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tively less critical to traditional conceptions of the self. Over time, this collective iden-
tity might spread across technological domains. Thus, low-tech weapons collaboration 
represents an excellent starting place to investigate this issue.  
By problematizing both identity and technology we can create a deductive 
model of weapons collaboration from which we can predict state behavior. It permits 
us to hypothesize and explore possible shifts in interest and identity away from state-
centrism and toward a more Gemeinschaft, or community, framework where distinc-
tions between the self and the other (i.e., the group of potential partners) blur. I posit 
that identity shifts will produce transformations in state interest that emerge in new 
behaviors. Thus collaboration may not only change its intensity but also its type. Col-
laboration is thus the model's dependent variable, given that the goal is to explain 
changes in procurement cooperation through the end of the 1990s. Unfortunately, the 
test for this hypothesis—exploring both the degree and the means of rationalization in 
Western Europe's transnational defense industry—has not yet been done. This disser-
tation attempts to fill this gap. 
 
Dissertation Structure 
I will evaluate changes in European defense industrial cooperation by analyz-
ing five discrete cases of intra-regional collaboration from the late 1960s to the mid-
1990s: the Tornado Multi-role Aircraft, Eurofighter, the Field Howitzer 70 (FH-70) 
program, the Self-Propelled Howitzer 70 (SP-70) program, and the Anglo-French Re-
ciprocal Purchasing Agreement. The aircraft and howitzer cases are technology dyads 
in which we can compare changes in state behavior over time within high- and low-
technology domains, and moreover, do so in a way that controls the number and iden-
tity of participating states over a thirty-year period. I shall be particularly sensitive to 
shifts in state behavior and interaction that might signal an emergent, coalescing trans- 
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national identity that promotes interdependence, and significantly, the denationaliza-
tion of the procurement process. In the following chapters, I shall look for the telltale 
signs of such a transformation. Chapter 2 is a discussion of the theoretical foundation 
of this dissertation in which I assess how a Social Constructivist analysis might pro-
vide a comprehensive picture of the possible shifts in collaborative activity than that 
attainable through more mainstream approaches. Chapter 3 provides a broad historical 
overview of the evolution of cooperative procurement in NATO Europe. Here, I also 
present a theoretical discussion of the forms that cooperation notionally could assume 
and the significance of these alternate “pathways” for an analysis of shifts in state in-
terest. Chapter 4 introduces the case studies with an evaluation of Europe’s first major 
collaborative venture, the Tornado Multi-Role Aircraft. We then turn immediately to it 
successor, the Eurofighter in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 provides a short assessment of the 
so-called “Euro-howitzer” projects, the FH-70 and the SP-70. The analytical work 
concludes with the Anglo-French Reciprocal Purchasing Agreement in Chapter 7. Fi-
nally, Chapter 8 summarizes and revisits our principal findings. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Foundations of a Constructivist 
Analysis 
 
  Armaments collaboration within NATOwhether the emphasis is North 
American, intra-European, or transatlantichas been a key feature of Alliance rela-
tions for much of the last forty years. Within some policy-making circles, the goal of 
collaborative defense procurement has ranked a tight third next to the goals of collec-
tive defense and security policy harmonization. For these elites, cooperation in arms 
production represents the ultimate expression of economic and political reason over 
myopic nationalisman act that if properly executed, would make the Alliance 
stronger, wealthier, and more cohesive. Advocates of European integration have per-
ceived even grander ramifications, arguing that at a minimum, defense industrial 
cooperation provides the symbolic promotion of community solidarity through bi-, or 
multilateral schemes; and at a maximum, cooperative armaments production functions 
as a continuation, and indeed a completion, of the regional project toward economic 
and political union.  
  Whatever the proclaimed rationale, procurement collaboration has always in-
volved much more than the joint production of discrete commodities or a 
multinational quest for economic efficiency. This cooperation touches upon core is-
sues of international relationssubjects that animate international relations as a field 
of study and shape some of its most contentious debates: the value of institutions in 
promoting interstate cooperation; the limits of regional integration; the interplay be-
tween concerns for relative gains and the desire to enjoy the welfare-benefits of 
collaboration; the problems of anarchy and its varying effects within certain regional 19 
environments; and finally, the role of state identity in shaping the potential for inter-
state cooperation. 
  This chapter addresses these issues and others through the filter of interna-
tional relations (IR) theory and attempts to integrate them into an understanding of 
armaments cooperation. The purpose here is not to merely revisit and expand upon the 
deductive model of identity effects and multinational weapons procurement collabora-
tion that I presented in the introductory chapter. Instead, I seek to justify how we 
should to study this activity and to demonstrate what this investigation contributes 
both to international relations research and to the more circumscribed area of regional 
integration theory.1 Within IR, there are two theoretical paradigms that are relevant to 
any discussion of interstate cooperationand particularly so when the area of interest 
includes the singular case of post-war defense industrial collaboration in the North 
Atlantic area: realism, which enjoys the oldest intellectual tradition in the field and is 
correspondingly the most widely applied; and social constructivism, which is one of 
the newer and less thoroughly developed IR paradigms, but which nonetheless shows  
potential in its ability to hypothesize beyond materialistic rationalist analyses and to 
explore the ideational foundations of state behavior. Each of these paradigms takes 
well-defined stands on the nature of and propensity for interstate cooperation. Each 
offers some insight as to the conduct of armament collaboration, both past and current, 
though arguably neither fully explains the process as it has evolved.  
  Multinational weapons procurement sits uncomfortably between the desire for 
national autonomy and the commonly proclaimed need for mediating international in-
stitutions; between the demands of political-economic integration and the lingering 
mistrust among partners and allies; and lastly, among North Atlantic states, between a 
                                                 
1 I am grateful to David Leheny for this phrasing. 20 
nascent, but often invoked, regional identity and established, deep-seated, national 
prejudices. In this environment, any single worldview would be hard-pressed to pro-
vide a comprehensive explanation of the sources and aspirations of defense industrial 
collaboration. Nonetheless, the task remains for scholars to discern which one might 
offer the best available theoretical “fit.”  
  This chapter has four sections. First, I begin with a discussion of the paradig-
matic foundations of both realism and social constructivism, detailing their particular 
approaches to understanding states and state behavior, notably international coopera-
tion. Second, I  look at the role of armaments production in the interstate system. This 
section shows how defense technologies are both functionally and symbolically con-
nected to the exercise of statehood. Their acquisition and possession is, in fact, 
indicative of varying conceptions of state identity. I argue that the ideational signifi-
cance of armaments is too often underemphasized in mainstream security studies. The 
symbolic, intersubjective component of weapons procurement can have a determining 
impact on state behavior that is equal, or even greater, than any objective material cri-
terion. Third, I offer a synthesis that applies realist and modernist constructivist logics 
to defense procurement, and detail the expectations of each toward the propensity and 
conduct of multinational arms collaboration. Given the dominance of realism in secu-
rity studies and within international relations research, there is a vast literature of 
realist critiques of single- and multi-state arms production arrangements which I can 
draw upon. Unfortunately, there is no comparable body of constructivist texts. None-
theless, a number of constructivist scholars have either addressed this issue directly, or 
discussed the problems inherent in complex cooperation of the type that now occurs in 
Western Europe, and their insights will allow for an “ideal” constructivist conceptuali-
zation.  21 
  Finally, this chapter describes the research plan of this dissertation. I employ a 
process-tracing methodology in which I analyze the discursive environments that both 
affected and were generated by defense procurement decision-makers in the five cases 
of armaments collaboration analyzed within this dissertation. The purpose here is to 
test the hypothetical expectations of European procurement collaboration that drive 
this study. If sentimentdefined here as shifting conceptions of identity and of chang-
ing norms of appropriate state behavior regarding certain classes of defense 
technologyhas a determining impact on the conduct of cooperation, process-tracing 
should highlight shifting attitudes. This strategy should illuminate the possible validity 
of the key alternative explanation for collaborative behavior: namely that presented by 
realist interpretations, which hold that any behavioral changes in the conduct or scope 
of multinational defense industrial collaboration are limited, functional responses to 
structural economic forces and have no real connection to the ideational factors ex-
plored within this dissertation. 
 
Theoretical “Fit” 
Realism 
  Realism represents an obvious point of departure in any discussion of Interna-
tional Relations theory. As the theoretical tradition with the longest intellectual 
history, it isrightly or wronglythe benchmark to which all alternative approaches 
are compared.2  The strength and longevity of the realist paradigm lies in its analytic 
parsimony and in an implicitly conservative worldview. To realists, specifically the 
dominant, “modified structural” variety of realists, abstraction is the cornerstone for 
                                                 
2 Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics,” European Journal of 
International Relations 3 (1997): 320. 22 
successful predictive and generalizable theories.3 They regard states as the only salient 
political actors in an anarchic international environment. States are portrayed as ra-
tional, unitary actors possessing hierarchies of interests, which are assumed to be 
given and identical for all countries in all contexts. Countries seek to advance their 
material condition and ensure their physical securitythis latter concern being viewed 
by realists as paramount, given the absence of any supranational power to either adju-
dicate or defend states in the international arena. Whatever the goal, however, states 
always strive to maximize their self-interest and will do so in a predictable manner 
using cost-benefit calculations that select the most appropriate strategy within as-
sumed information limits. 
  The realist preoccupation with rationalismbehavior driven by the “logic of 
consequences” based upon ends-means reckoningis complemented by a strong bias 
toward materialism. States are utility maximizers with clear, fixed preferences, whose 
conduct, however, is limited to the pursuit of material causes within an equally clear 
material reality shaped by the international distribution of relative capabilities.4 All 
countries covet the pursuit of power and wealth as being among their essential inter-
ests, and they are concerned with their status relative to others in the interstate system. 
Differences in capabilities among states create asymmetries in strength that in turn 
raise the possibility that a state may find its existence threatened in some indetermi-
nate future.  Consequently, material concerns drive state behavior to an extent that 
overshadows other possible motivators and reduces them to epiphenomenal influ-
ences. 
                                                 
3 Stephen G. Brooks, “Dueling Realisms,” International Organization 51 (Summer 1997): 455; Robert 
Keohane, “Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond,” in Neorealism and its Critics, 
ed. Robert Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 193. 
4 Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground,” 324; Joseph Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A 
Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Con-
temporary Debate, ed. David Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 127. 23 
  Within the realist worldview, as Jeffrey Checkel asserts, “perceptual, idea-
tional, and cultural factors” are at best “parasitic upon [the] material base.”5 Emanuel 
Adler notes that within this paradigm “ideas do not construct and structure social real-
ity, but only reflect the material world.”6 No realist would deny that culture, pride, 
belief, values and other non-material influences shape state decision-making or at 
times can appear to be quite salient. Nonetheless, all these can be reduced to questions 
over the aggregation and dissaggregation of power.7 Atavistic state belief systems, for 
example, do not arise from evolving national discourses but rather from an absence of 
natural resources, possibly coupled to a lack of defensible natural borders, and the 
presence of strong predatory neighbors who might meet weakness with invasion and 
subjugation.  States that subscribe to such values, as Germany arguably did before 
1945, do so because of the constraints and opportunities present in their peculiar inter-
national environments.8 The exaggerated need for relative advantage vis-à-vis 
potential adversaries and victims creates a national political culture that both reflects 
perceived state interest and justifies its existence. In such a case, all that truly matters 
for understanding and prediction is an appreciation of the material bases of state be-
havior, measured in terms of resource profiles, military capabilities, technological 
competences, extractive potentials, and so on.  
  Issues of state identity are similarly circumscribed in realist analysis. The an-
archic nature of the international system forces states into a zero-sum competition for 
security in which all aspire to enhance their security relative to others, and yet doing 
                                                 
5 Jeffery Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,” World Politics 50 
(January 1998), 329. 
6 Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics,” 324. 
7 Henry Nau, “Identity and International Politics: An Alternative to Neorealism,” Paper presented at the 
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2-5, 1993,   29. 
8 See John Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,” International 
Security 15 (1990): 22-26. 24 
so adds to the insecurity perceived by their neighbors. This is an environment that can 
be brutal and is always shaped by strife and the possibility of war. States not only op-
erate within it, but they are also ultimately defined by it. As Ole Wæver writes, among 
Realists “the only purpose for being in the political system is to defend oneself, [to] 
claim one’s sovereignty [italics in the original].”9 The only identity of any importance 
to states, and specifically to understanding state behavior, is the identity that they all 
theoretically share as security-seeking, self-interest maximizers. Labels such as “revo-
lutionary,” “liberal,” or “Egyptian” all have value as identity categories, and are 
important to historians and to comparativists. Nonetheless, the practical study of inter-
national relations requires only acknowledging the “irreducible minimum” of 
diplomacy, defined by Hans Morgenthau as the desire to protect one’s national institu-
tions and integrity with “adequate power.”10 
  Simplifications and idealizations about the interstate system such as this deny 
realist analyses a great deal of their potential descriptive detail. The influences of real 
processes such as intragovernmental politics or interest change are dismissed in an 
effort to, as Kenneth Waltz asserts,  
find the central tendency among a confusion of tendencies, to single out 
the propelling principle even though other principles operate, to seek 
the essential factors where innumerable factors are present.11 
The intellectual ideal of structural realism is not merely to rehash known histories that 
are invariably cluttered with confounding influences and unclear causal trajectories. 
Instead, it aspires to find that irreducible minimum that can create internally consistent 
                                                 
9 Ole Wæver, “European Security Identities,” Journal of Common Market Studies 34 (March 1996): 
110. 
10 Hans Morganthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace  5th ed. (A. Knopf, 
New York, 1978),  553. 
11 Kenneth Waltz, “Laws and Theories,” in Neorealism and its Critics, ed. Robert Keohane (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1986),  38. 25 
theories that satisfactorily explain past and present conduct and predict future action. 
International anarchy, the relative distribution of interstate power resources, and the 
pursuit of national self-interest are those guiding principles; and although they consti-
tute a somewhat opaque lens through which to observe reality, they nonetheless create 
a number of intellectually appealing and durable suppositions about state behavior, 
particularly those involving the propensity and nature of interstate cooperation. Multi-
national weapons procurement is a subset of that behavior. 
  As noted, the nature of international anarchy presents countries with an ever-
present security dilemma. Because the sincere intentions of either allies or adversaries 
are rarely known and could change, countries are forever vigilant against the possibil-
ity that others may physically attack them, or at the very least seek to undermine their 
political autonomy. The interstate system thus is a self-help system in which lasting 
trust is unattainable and countries can rely only upon their own resources to satisfy 
their interests. States, consequently, are self-regarding defensive positionalists for 
whom political sovereignty is an inviolable right and for whom military and economic 
autarky are desired goals.   
  In this environment, cooperation is possible but tenuous. Kenneth Waltz argues 
that “states do not willingly place themselves in situations of increased dependence.” 
Further, “no state” seeks to “participate in” or a create “a structure by which it and 
others will be constrained.”12 Nonetheless, complete autarky and isolation have rarely 
been possible in the modern state system. At a minimum, countries disadvantaged by 
geography, economic capacity, or technological prowess and unable to ensure their 
security against stronger states must ally themselves with others and balance against 
                                                 
12 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 107; Cited 
in Holly Wyatt-Walter, The European Community and the Security Dilemma, 1979-92 (New York : St. 
Martin's Press, 1997),  58. 26 
the perceived threat. On a more banal level, interstate cooperation can be quite lucra-
tive, capable of enhancing national welfare through trade and the creation of 
institutions that reduce transaction costs and protect property rights.13 The benefits 
that can arise from such collaboration can easily exceed anything possible through au-
tarkic development or even through military conquest. 
  Cooperation poses a significant dilemma for states.  On the one hand, it can be 
highly desirable, and in many cases unavoidable, if countries truly seek to expand 
their power and security. On the other hand, cooperation creates the potential for de-
pendence and vulnerability, and thus can generate insecurity. Realists contend that 
states do not enjoy the luxury of probabilistic thinking. In a self-help system, the pos-
sibility that countries can transmute welfare gains into military power, or exploit a 
partnership as a means of imposing political and economic leverage on others will be 
always considered with the utmost care. States who fail to do so not only risk their 
autonomy but their existence as states. Cooperative relationships that enrich can also 
be used to enslave, since all cooperation between countries regardless of scope, con-
tent or purpose, implicitly undermines national independence. 
  Consequently, Realists posit that states will handle any and all of their collabo-
rations with each other cautiously. First, because of the extensive security competition 
present in the international system, states will always privilege short-term security 
considerations over long-term welfare aspirationseven at the potential expense of 
non-security goals. While considerations of security “subordinate economic gain to 
political interest” and thus lead to a discounting of the future, the intensity of these 
concerns will be shaped by the nature of relations between the states involved in a 
given situation.14 Allies may enjoy longer time horizons in their collaborations than 
                                                 
13 Stephen G. Brooks, “Dueling Realisms,” International Organization 51 (Summer 1997): 462. 
14 Brooks, “Dueling Realisms,” 450; Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 107. 27 
rivals.  Nonetheless, even these partnerships will be tempered and temporary as states 
strive to prevent lasting and pronounced cooperation-induced security imbalances. 
   Second, countries fixate upon concerns for relative gains, and seek to prevent 
partners from accruing greater benefits through collaboration. Because states view 
their security in terms of the relative distribution of resources, any shift in balances 
poses a potential threateven if that shift arises from consensual and mutually bene-
ficial collaborative relationships. Consequently, states will structure their partnerships 
so as ensure maximum payoffs to themselves while simultaneously attempting to pre-
vent others from gaining greater benefits. This will often assume a form in which the 
conduct and returns of cooperation mirror the existing distribution of power between 
partners.15 States with similar capabilities will strive for symmetry in their collabora-
tions such that all gain equally. Relationships between states of disparate strength will 
reflect arrangements that mirror the bargaining power of the various parties, such that 
none gains disproportionate rewards from their collaboration.  
  Third, countries will avoid relationships that directly compromise their auton-
omy. Where international institutions are required to mediate and adjudicate between 
parties, their powers will be expressly circumscribed. Indeed, they will be tolerated 
only as far as they minimize losses in state power in relationships that otherwise ne-
cessitate some compromises in national autonomy.16 The conduct of such bodies will 
be intergovernmental, ad hoc and punctuated by a distinct absence of supranationalism 
that might undermine the ultimate sovereignty that states seek to protect. Institutions, 
much like the cooperative outcomes that they are created to oversee, will also reflect 
the distribution of power among states. Indeed, they are “arenas for acting out power 
                                                 
15 John Mersheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19 (Win-
ter 1994/95): 13.  
16 Andrew Moravcsik, “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovern-
mentalist Approach,” Journal of Common Market Studies 31 (December 1993): 507. 28 
relationships.”17 The behavior of mediating institutions will reflect the preferences of 
strong states. In the worst case, countries may actually compete for control of these 
organizations in order to further their own parochial interests. Weaker states, for their 
part, will craft explicit rules within these regimes that preserve their influence and 
limit their domination by stronger actors.18 
  The unreconstructed Realist expects considerable state resistance to complex 
forms of international cooperation. The more that a cooperative relationship restricts a 
state’s freedom of action and affects those areas of essential state interestbeginning, 
of course, with military security and moving outwards into areas of economic security 
the less likely that that state will enter such an association. No matter how firm the 
commitments between partners to allay fears over cheating and exploitation, states 
will not tolerate binding partnerships, meddlesome institutions, and the deliberate di-
lution of sovereignty. Indeed, the legacy of failed regional integration movements 
around the globe, including the European Union’s own history of cyclical stagnation 
and revival, are often highlighted as examples of the strength of these assumptions.  
  Nonetheless, there are islands of collaboration within the interstate system 
where realist precepts concerning the significance of sovereignty and self-interest in 
shaping the potential for international cooperation falter. In these regionswhere de-
spite even its troubled history the EU remains the example par excellencesets of 
states have formed deepening relationships that can encompass nearly every area of 
political and economic activity, ranging from monetary union to the joint production 
of artillery shells. While we must not exaggerate the significance of phenomena such 
as these, the fact remains that these behaviors occur, and moreover, may become more 
                                                 
17 Cited in Mersheimer, “The False Promise,” 13. 
18 Joseph Grieco, “Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal 
Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory,” in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contempo-
rary Debate, ed. David Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 331. 29 
complex and integrative over time. Indeed, within the North Atlantic area notions of 
sovereignty and self-interest are contested to a degree rarely found elsewhere. Realist 
scholars such as Stanley Hoffman grudgingly accept that in the case of the European 
Union, despite its many faults and often hollow promises, the integration project in 
Western Europe has produced a zone of peace and prosperity through pooled sover-
eignty and economic interdependence which will likely persist for the foreseeable 
future.19 
  The scope of cooperation that has occurred in the European case presents real-
ism with a number of predictive and analytical challenges. Realism avoids theorizing 
upon the significance of state identity and interest shifts, regarding both as constants 
and thus theoretically exogenous. Yet cooperation among states, as we see in Europe 
and to a much lesser degree in North America, can move beyond transaction relation-
ships, beyond behavioral cooperation. The varied collaborations that form the base of 
the European Union serve to protect the state as a viable political entityto rescue it, 
to borrow the language of Alan Milward, from structural pressures that all advanced, 
post-war states face and that some cannot withstand without external coordination 
with others.20 These same acts, however, have created a series of unintended conse-
quences, both political and ideational, which have weakened state autonomy. As Paul 
Pierson notes, the “grand interstate bargains” that established complex European co-
operation, ranging from the Treaties of Rome and Maastrict to the Brussels treaty, and 
the Single European Act, were all initially conducted in good realist fashion: launched 
by the member-states to deepen their cooperation while preserving their control over 
their domestic affairs. Nonetheless, as issue density has increased with ever larger 
                                                 
19 Stanley Hoffman, “Europe’s Identity Crisis Revisited,” Daedalus 123 (Spring 1994): 16. 
20 See Alan Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (Berkley: University of California 
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ranges of decisions made at the European level and state decision-making limited by 
time-constraints and asymmetrical access to information between national and euro-
pean bureaucrats, European institutionsspecifically the European Commission 
have not only achieved a level of independence from the states, but they also hold 
real power in policy formation in areas in which they have been empowered by the 
states.21 Moreover, as “Europe” has become a distinct and effectual actor, the affective 
attachments of both elites and mass publics are shifting and expanding to include 
Europe and its institutions alongside existing notions of state, nation, and province. 
The end result of both these processes has been a gradual “hollowing out” of national 
institutions such that many decisions of state are now conducted in coordination with 
others or by supranational actors.22 
  In this environment, where power is willingly delegated away and conceptions 
of self are increasingly contested at the regional level, the notion of self-interest be-
comes quite slippery. One must ask who is the self and whose interests are being 
promoted: The State? A nascent community of states?  The organizations that they 
have empowered? These questions become even pressing once one realizes that the 
discursive foundation of the European integration is one of self-redefinition in which 
the status and well being of “Europe” transcend parochial state interest. This dis-
coursethis idea of Europecould serve a “strictly instrumental function”23 in order 
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to justify self-oriented cooperation, as some Realist observers contend; or it could 
have real meaning among collaborating countries, such that their very identities are 
transmuting from that of sovereign, self-regarding states to something grander than 
themselves and in which being “European” brings obligations and expectations unlike 
any other state in the international system. In either case, the question cannot be an-
swered by models that view the self and self-interest as constants, and divorce the 
concept of identity from any ideational foundation outside the behavioral pursuits of 
sovereignty.24  
  Even those realist approaches that explicitly address the politics of regional 
integration, such as liberal intergovernmentalism with its softened stance on anarchy 
and the centrality of state actors, do not speak to this issue.25 While liberal 
intergovernmentalism acknowledges a larger universe of preferences and complex 
state decision-making processes that addresses the competing interests of subnational 
and supranational actors, it refuses to consider how preferences arise and how interests 
may change. Further, as with all realist analyses, its limited focus on transaction costs 
and power distribution avoids consideration of the ideational foundations of state be-
havior.  
  Yet all state behavior is ideationally laden, and in ways that cannot be mapped 
through a dogmatic focus upon “material existing observable objects,” as Realists 
otherwise insist.26 Multinational cooperation, for example, is shaped both by the social 
relations between countries and by the social significance that they ascribe to those 
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objects and goods for which they collaborate. It is a process driven by self-
understanding and the shared understandings “between selves and others,” such that 
even prominent Realists like Stephen Walt must confess that relative power is a sub-
jective concept. In other words, fears about power imbalances between countries hold 
less sway over state action than the identity and disposition of others.27 States do not 
solely pursue material objectives; they also work to achieve ideational goals, such as 
meeting certain norms of statehood, or perhaps even, in the case of West European 
states, the symbolic representation of a “collective Europeaness.”28 That states can 
possibly do so and thus render obsolete orthodox conceptions of sovereignty and anar-
chy further necessitates a move beyond realist parsimony. To argue, as do all Realists, 
that ideas matter but simply not enough to warrant analysis, is to sacrifice both de-
scriptive detail and explanatory power in the name of “good” social science. This is 
particularly true in environments such as Western Europe in which the conduct and 
aim of international relations is extraordinary; where, as Brigid Laffan notes, interstate 
cooperation has moved from issues of “instrumental problem-solving” to “fundamen-
tal questions” of identity convergence and Europe’s “nature as a part-formed polity.”29 
  While enduring regional integration movements pose a challenge to Realist 
analyses generally, and certainly in the European case, the existence of complex coop-
eration within specific political or economic domains can be equally problematic. The 
acquisition of defense technologies is one area in which state conduct, either within 
single state or multinational settings, does not fall easily into realist conceptions of 
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“appropriate” behavior. As we shall see, the politics of armaments production and pro-
curement collaboration highlight the non-material components of state behavior. 
These technologies touch upon those core issues that define states as states: their pro-
curement creates security, and they establish the basis of sovereignty. Their 
importance, however, extends far beyond the provision of defense and autonomy. De-
fense technologies are symbols of power and of self in the international system whose 
value exceeds any functional need and whose acquisition cannot be understood in 
terms of a narrow utilitarianism.  Instead, this process maybe better grasped through 
models that consider how ideas may shape reality. 
  
Social Constructivism 
  Social Constructivism offers scholars an alternative toolkit through which to 
explore these questions. With roots in sociology, it has rarely been applied to the study 
of regional integrationand even less to issues of security and defense economics.30 
Nonetheless, it is well suited to addressing interstate collaboration in all its forms be-
cause it acknowledges the power of ideas in shaping state behavior. Like realism, 
modernist, constructivist logic as pioneered by Alexander Wendt, Emanuel Adler, Pe-
ter Katzenstein and others, recognizes the primacy of state actors in the international 
system and the anarchic nature of that system. Constructivism, however, offers a so-
cialized view of the interstate system, one that posits that the state system is a social 
construct existing ontologically prior to the material realities that orthodox interna-
tional relations theory regards as constituting the international system.31 Norms, 
cognition, and shared understandings arising from social interaction form the basis of 
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this system, endowing its constituent actors with meaning, shaping their perceptions of 
themselves and of others, defining their tastes, either legitimizing or proscribing their 
aspirations, and finally, bestowing significance on those material artifacts for which 
they compete. The material sources of power and wealthfor example, a technologi-
cally advanced economy or a blue-water navyare only as important to states, as 
Adler argues, as is established by “human agreement  and the collective assignment of 
meaning and function to physical objects.”32 
  Unlike its post-modernist consititutivist variant, modernist constructivism does 
not reject the objective existence of the material world.33 Modernists do not disavow 
materialism, but rather acknowledge that the ideational world coexists with material 
one; and both “affect and [are] affected by” each other.34 It is a relationship that is dy-
namic, but is nonetheless biased in favor of conceptual factors.  
  The principal goal of modernist Constructivist scholars, as Wendt notes, is to 
move beyond the economism of materialist, and indeed rationalist, theories that seek 
to explain behavior only in terms of the constraints and costs that the actors face.35 
The international system, is a normative environment populated by social agents (i.e., 
states), who are interconnected and embedded within layers of symbol and conven-
tion. This ideational foundation, according to Peter Katzenstein 
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[does] not merely constrain actors by changing the incentives their 
behavior. [It does] not simply regulate behavior. [It] also help[s] to 
constitute [those] actors. . ..36 
 Constructivists oppose rationalist biases toward the role and effect of structure 
in the interstate system. While they naturally see structure as being primarily social in 
nature, defined in terms of collective understandings and expectations, they do not dis-
miss it as an epiphenomenal artifact.37 Among rationalist approaches, however, and 
certainly within realism, analysis is explicitly agent-centered. Actors are regarded as 
pre-given and as possessing pre-determined interests. Whatever environmental struc-
tures they confrontin this case, international anarchyonly affect behavior in that 
these structures “define opportunities and constraints” that states can either exploit or 
yield to according to cost-benefit calculations.38 Anarchy may influence how states 
order their preferences and pursue their interests, but it does not create or change ei-
ther. Interest- and preference-shift are exogenous to structural effects. 
  Constructivists, on the other hand, regard structure and agents as existing 
within a mutually reinforcing relationship. Structure not only shapes actor behavior, it 
also defines actors, endowing them identity and interest.39 Conversely, actors can in-
fluence and change structure as their common understandings of appropriate behavior 
within the system changes as a result of social learning and attitudinal shift. 
   For example, a security communityof the type that exists in Western Europe 
and North Americais a social structure in which security competition among con-
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stituent states has been effectively eliminated due to shared expectations of peaceful 
change and the renunciation of violence as a tool of statecraft. The norms that define 
these communities, however, often extend beyond shared ideas over the appropriate 
forms of conflict resolution among select states. These also include expectations of 
social and political partnership, coupled to high levels of trust and of mutual respon-
siveness. Through prolonged interaction within this cognitive environment, member 
states begin to identify with each other in so far as they recognize their common inter-
ests and values. Behaviorally, the effects can be striking: unfortified borders; military 
grand strategy that does not account for the possibility of betrayal by one’s partners; 
and the creation of international institutions that reflect and codify the normative 
bonds between states with the establishment of consensual, multilateral decision-
making and policy-enforcing mechanisms.40  
  Life within a security community can do more than just change state security 
calculations or highlight similarities of interest among countries. This social struc-
turethis dense network of norms and perceptioncan, in certain circumstances, 
change the interests of states, and possibly change their identities as social entities as 
well. Interstate transactions that support peaceful relations and cooperative behavior 
can also lead to increased cognition of one’s partners, not of only their political dispo-
sitions, but also their “interpretations of society, economics, and culture.”41 As these 
interpretations become shared throughout the community, a collective identity can 
arise, born out of what Karl Deutsch noted as a sense of “we-feeling” based upon both 
practice and the convergence of symbols, sympathies, and self-images.42 Conse-
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quently, conceptions of self may become blurred. The community may remain a trans-
national “region” of sovereign states; but their interests have become re-defined such 
that it may be extremely difficult to discern national interest from community interest. 
Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett argue that in such cases, states may only be able 
to express agency “insofar as they meet and reproduce the epistemic and normative 
expectations of the community.”43  
  States may continue to frame and act upon their own preferences, but only as 
these preferences reflect communal attitudes of appropriate behavior. Consequently, 
behavior can change so that states cease to simply be advocates of the “national good” 
as they conventionally aspire, but embrace a larger set of obligations as “agent[s] of 
the various wants of the community.”44 Identity, or rather identity appropriation and 
convergence, is the driving force behind all these shiftsin preference, in interest, and 
in action. As states become enmeshed in the web of collective understandings that 
form the basis of communities, they identify with the group and are identified by oth-
ers as belonging to it. It is this identity, defined by communal norms and shared by all 
it members that creates new conceptions of statehood, and consequently, new expecta-
tions, new obligations, and new ideas to appropriate state behavior.45  
  The concept of community and its attendant effects upon state identity is criti-
cal in any constructivist analysis of defense procurement collaboration in the North 
Atlantic Area. For now, however, let us return to our overview. As I have asserted, a 
security community is a cognitive structure, and one that has a constitutive effect on 
those actors operating within it. Constructivists argue that all forms of interstate activ-
itywhether cooperative or conflictualare, in fact, ideational structures that contain 
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and give meaning to material resources. These “social” structures comprise three cen-
tral elements: shared, or intersubjective, understandings; identity; and social practice. 
  In my preceding example, I touched upon all of these factors without ade-
quately defining their importance within constructivist ontology. Conceptually, they 
are all somewhat slippery and even harder to grasp empirically: What is state identity 
and how can one measure it? How does one know if knowledge is both shared and sa-
lient? Exactly how long should interaction occur before it sparks changes in the 
normative environment?46 Finally, what is the relationship between these concepts? 
While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to answer all of these questions in de-
tailand indeed, some are not adequately addressed even within constructivist 
scholarshipI shall nonetheless sketch the meaning and significance of these three 
pillars of modernist, social constructivism.   
  First, the notion of intersubjectivity is critical to constructivist analyses. 
Individuals, nations, firms, defense ministries, etc., all may exist physically; if so, they 
invariably have a matching social existence measured in “symbols, practices, institu-
tions, and discourses.”47 The degree to which these elements are shared will determine 
how actors relate to each other and toward objects. Applied within an international 
relations theory framework, constructivism stresses the “sociality” of the international 
system in which ideas have determinacy.48 Ideas, however, are only social if they are 
shared.49  Once they are collectively held, ideas become elements of social structure. 
More precisely, as they may also have prescriptive effect, they become norms. Norms 
come in two “flavors.” They are either regulative, in that they establish rules of behav-
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ior for an existing identity; or constitutive, defining identities. Norms “establish 
expectations about who the actors will be in a particular environment and how these 
actors will behave.”50 
  Given that norms set standards of behavior and of identification within the in-
terstate system, they form the basis of the structures that comprise that system. Some 
of these can be quite specific. To take a familiar example, the nuclear inventories of 
China and the United Kingdom possess similar destructive potentials, yet the United 
States regards only the Chinese weapons as threatening. This is so because these par-
ticular arms are part of a “structure of shared knowledge” in which both China and the 
United States perceive their relationship to be militarily confrontational. These states 
exist within a security dilemma in which they expect high levels of security competi-
tion. As antagonists, they both cling to shared ideals of enmity that generates a 
specific behavior set that generates mistrust and the anticipation of zero-sum relations. 
51 “Appropriate” state conduct in this situation will likely involve a certain defensive 
positionalism involving balancing behavior and a hostile appraisal of the material ca-
pabilities of the other. 
  The role of intersubjectivity in interstate affairs, however, extends far beyond 
dyadic relationships and security dilemmas. The institution of sovereignty, as Wendt 
writes, “exists only in virtue of intersubjective understandings and expectations.”52 
The principles that define sovereignty as a norm non-interference, territoriality, ex-
clusive employment of violence and political autonomycould not be advocated by a 
single state or clique of states and have any systemic value. The interstate system, as it 
has existed for nearly four centuries since the Peace of Westphalia, could not endure 
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without the mutual recognition of state actors that all of the agents within the system 
claiming statehood possessed those rights. Without these principles structuring state 
behavior and perception, the anarchical nature of the international system would as-
sume a darker meaning. Despite the absence of any supranational authority and the 
persistent possibility of war, sovereign states rarely have been rendered extinct. In-
stead, new states have entered the system and have remained therein, no matter their 
size or their ability to effectively function. Wendt writes that the large and successful 
have only rarely destroyed the small and ineffectual because sovereignty norms have 
thoroughly diffused throughout the system and been internalized by its constituents. 
Indeed, this has occurred to the extent that: 
. . .[R]estraint is not primarily because of the costs of violating sover-
eignty norms, although when violators do get punished (as in the Gulf 
War) it reminds everyone of what these costs can be, but because part 
of what it means to be a “sovereign” state is that one does not violate 
the territorial rights of others without “just cause.”53 
  In one sense, sovereignty regulates agent behavior within the international sys-
tem. It establishes standards of conduct and creates the basis of orderly coexistence. 
This regulative effect, however, functions only insofar as the sovereignty norm is re-
garded as given. It has existed for so long that the existence of sovereign states is 
perceived to be a natural component of political reality. Nonetheless, sovereignty is 
not an act of God. In order to be sovereign one must act sovereign. These norms do 
not simply shape state behavior but also define state identity, such that if countries 
stopped adhering to these shared ideals they would cease to be sovereign  even 
though they might still continue to exist as “states” measured by as organized fusion 
of territory and authority.54 Sovereignty is thus a contingent identity that states can 
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possess. It is constituted by a web of collectively held beliefs concerning the appropri-
ate internal functions of statehood and a minimalist standard of external relations.  
  Configurations of intersubjective knowledge, whether they are sovereignty 
norms or the mutual expectations underlying a security dilemma between countries, 
can create state identities. Identity is the second element of social structure envisioned 
by Constructivists as shaping international relations. Defined as “sets of meanings that 
an actor attributes to itself taking the perspectives of others,” the social identities of 
states can assume either a primary or intermediary effect on state behavior.55 These 
categories are best understood in terms of the level of analysis at which one ap-
proaches the issue. Those identities that pose primary effects are in a sense primordial, 
arising from domestic, societal factors relating to nationhood: ethnicity, national cul-
ture, parochial national symbols. As such, these are largely exogenous to the 
international system.56 State identities that create intermediary influences are of 
greater concern to Constructivistsparticularly among the IR-mindedbecause they 
emerge from intersubjective conceptions of statehood and are thus systemically en-
dogenous. 
  State identities of this type are important because they inform an actor as to 
who and what it is, and moreover, they allow others to categorize it. In fact, because 
they are founded upon shared understandings, like the attribute of sovereignty, they 
“are ontologically dependent on relations to others.”57 Concepts such as European or 
hegemon only have meaning insofar as they are social categories, each with its own 
set of conventions and rules, and each acknowledged by others as legitimate within 
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the social and material structures of a given environment. Because identities are 
intersubjective, they provide a modicum of certainty and predictability in the interstate 
system. They do this by classifying and categorizing actors, and more significantly, 
because state identity is the most “proximate” generator of state interest. As Ted Hopf 
writes, 
In telling you who you are, [state] identities strongly imply a particular 
set of interests or preferences with respect to choices of action in par-
ticular domains, and with respect to particular actors.58   
  Every identity generates its own particular array of obligations and expecta-
tions that any country aspiring to possess it must enact, and once having done so,  
continuously pursue, since failure “to understand and act on identity needs will lead to 
a loss [of that identity].59 This, in turn, provides both self- and external definition. 
States that are “modern,” for example, establish science ministries and create the in-
frastructure of knowledge production because of systemic cultural ideals as to how a 
“modern” state should behave and as to what attributes signify its existence.  Simi-
larly, a “civilized” state may disavow specific forms of warfare or weapons 
technologies because of prevailing norms within international society that defines 
such conduct as being incompatible with that identity.60 Countries that possess more 
specific role identities such as that of Mercusor member, will have interests relating to 
in-group trade liberalization and dispute resolution that may generate certain expecta-
tions of behavior on the part of other states asserting that same identity.  
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   Like individuals, states can possess multiple identities, all of which may vary 
in prominence over time and in relation to each other. A country can be both sovereign 
and European, for example, or both civilized and Mercusor. The interests that these 
identities generate, however, may or may not be compatible with each other. To be 
both European and sovereign, for instance, can produce policy conflicts because the 
former may call for levels of authority transfer that are untenable by existing concep-
tions of sovereign statehood.61 While one can agree with Wendt that the resolution of 
such conflicts cannot be predicted a priori, I share his view that identities exist within 
hierarchies in which some may be critical to an actor’s “self concept,” and others may 
be considerably less significant.62 I contend that the more salient the identity among a 
group of identities, the greater the likelihood that a state will strive to satisfy the be-
havioral norms of that dominant identity. A state may become more “European,” for 
example, as political and social conditions change over time. As this identity displaces 
existent identities, e.g., sovereign and Belgian, the country will more tightly embrace 
whatever actions and ideals are collectively defined as constituting Europeaness. 
   Ideational changes such as this can occur and, indeed, are occurring as states 
reappraise existing identities and embrace new ones.63 Change, however, is not simply 
a function of time, or even of environmental shifts. Identities are not static phenom-
ena, having been created, are then left to age. They are instead constantly produced 
and reproduced through social practice, the third and final core theoretical assumption 
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within modernist social constructivism.64 The existence of enmity between states, for 
example, neither arises as a preordained condition nor does it endure from a one-time 
declaration or act. It emerges and persists through an expanding web of discourse and 
actions that signals hostility and the absence of trust. Adversarial relations are, in the 
words of Wendt, are “an ongoing accomplishment of practice.”65 Iterated interaction 
between states reduces uncertainty within the international system, or in any sub-set 
social “community,” because it demonstrates conclusively that certain identities and 
beliefs are sincerely held, and thus increases “confidence that what actions one takes 
will be followed by certain consequences and responses from others.”66 
  State identities are thus maintained and manifested by social behavior. States 
are sovereign, or civilized, or European because they adhere to the constitutive norms 
that define those identities. Compliance, however, is more than the internalization of 
rules and belief. It requires action and interaction: sovereigns defend their territories, 
Europeans pool sovereignty (or at the very least engage in discursive projects in which 
they talk about doing so). Practice, as Hopf writes, bounds interpretations of reality, 
delineating what is acceptable for a given structure of intersubjective knowledge, and 
cementing shared understandings.67  
  While identity establishes the parameters of practice, and practice consolidates 
identity, state behavior may also redefine existent identities and possibly create new 
ones. This assumption is an important facet of constructivist thought and is key in its 
application to issues of interstate cooperation. Social practice creates learning through 
communication and conduct. As intentions are conveyed and “presentations of self” 
are broadcast, connections are established between actor and observer in the form of 
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collective expectations.68 Wendt suggests that the underlying behavior can, in turn, 
affect identity and interest, as actors reconstruct both in terms of "shared commitments 
to [newly created] socio-political norms."69 Indeed, interaction leads states to appreci-
ate how they are identified by others, and moreover, to alter their own beliefs as to 
who and what they are as an agent based on the dynamics of its relations, as both actor 
and observer may actually identify with each other as a “‘we’ bound by certain 
norms” and situations.70 
  Constructivists contend that the creation of such “positive identifications” are 
most likely to occur within cooperative relationships. Cooperation can create reinforc-
ing interdependencies, both intersubjective and material, in which countries frame 
norms establishing partnership and also reap whatever welfare/security benefits that 
collaboration may provide. As these interdependencies increase, the scope of coopera-
tion will change should expectations of cooperative behavior also grow. As norms of 
reciprocity, transparency, and consensual coordination develop, among others, identi-
ties can be redefined such that the "self" expands to embrace the others in the 
partnership.  
  Behavior may even become other-regarding once a collective identity emerges.  
The development of this kind of identity can lead to radical transformations in state 
conduct and perception. Countries may eschew instrumental cooperation, in which 
states act solely for self-gratification with expectations of immediate reciprocity, in 
favor of more communal relations. These would be characterized by diffuse reciproc-
ity as the shared values of their members lead to a sense of intertwined interests, and 
of mutual “obligation and responsibility.”71 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett note 
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that this level of partnership would not necessarily preclude the continuance of some 
self-interested behavior and rivalry; it would, however, produce “collective definitions 
of interest,” which arise from shared sentiments of solidarity and intra-group loyalty.72 
  The development of such collective identities may bring about more complex 
and altruistic forms of relations, but it is neither unproblematic nor irresistible. Con-
structivists posit that pre-existing role identities are not completely submerged by 
every episode of behavioral change, or even systemic changes. State actors possess 
vested interests in maintaining stable role identities. States derive interests from the 
“desire to minimize anxiety, manifested in efforts to confirm beliefs about the social 
world.”73 Moreover, states also wish to avoid “breaking commitments” to others, no-
tably domestic constituents. Some identities will thus produce considerable resistance 
to social change.74 As Wendt writes, 
Collective identity formation among states takes place against a cul-
tural background in which egotistic identities and interests are initially 
dominant. . .Collective identities are rarely perfect or total. In most 
situations, the best that can be expected is concentric circles of identifi-
cation, where actors identify to varying degrees with others depending 
on who they are and what is at stake, while trying to meet their individ-
ual needs as well. On the other hand, the fact that states will resist 
collective identity formation does not mean it can never be created.75 
  Indeed, while theoretically anticipated resistance to identity change suggests 
that any grand redefinition of state identity into some communal, transnational model 
is hardly a forgone conclusion from international cooperation, collaboration may 
nonetheless produce gradual reinterpretations of partnership that facilitate less self-
regarding forms of cooperative behavior. This idea has clear implications for a study 
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of political and economic integration in the North Atlantic area, and it may also be 
relevant to our narrow focus on defense industrial cooperation. Particularly in Western 
Europe it is possible that: 
. . .four decades of cooperation may have transformed positive inter-
dependence of outcomes into a collective "European identity" in terms 
of which states increasingly define their "self" interest. Even if egoistic 
reasons were its starting point, the process of cooperating tends to rede-
fine those reasons by reconstituting identities and interests in terms of 
new intersubjective meanings and commitments.76  
If this is true, one should expect not only more nuanced forms of cooperation over 
time, but that this cooperation will also reflect and drive an emergent transnational 
identity.  
  Realist analyses can offer nothing on this issue, for the reasons that I outlined 
earlier. Social constructivism, on the other hand, permits us to address the linkages 
between interstate collaboration and identity shift. Moreover, because this paradigm 
acknowledges the social character of material goods and of technology, it allows us to 
explore why defense procurement is a singular activity among states, one that can pre-
sent considerable limitations to interstate cooperation, as well as important 
implications for IR theory when it does occur. Defense technology’s special connec-
tion to traditional conceptions of state identity ensures that whatever process or forum 
used to procure it will be ideationally charged. In the political environments addressed 
within this dissertationthe European Unionthis problem is possibly exacerbated 
by effects of diverging state and supranational identities. In order to better understand 
what these pressures are, or rather how they may be triggered by collaborative weap-
ons procurement, I shall now discuss the relationship between arms production and the 
state. 
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Armaments and The State 
  The relationship between military technology and the modern state system is a 
complex one. Weapons provide the means of violence within an international system 
still largely characterized by anarchy and the ever-present potential for violence. 
Moreover, the national states that inhabit this system, are themselves the products of 
this brutality, as much as they are its perpetuators and its victims. Charles Tilly argues 
that the one simple and undeniable truth in international affairs, both today and 
throughout history, is that “coercion works.”77 States exist as they now do principally 
because of their considerable success at bending restive publics and local elites to cen-
tralized rule, defending their territory, and plundering their neighbors.78 They are the 
products of bloody, and in some respects still ongoing, processes of extraction, deter-
rence, concentration, and compellence thatwhile displaying considerable variation 
in intensity over time and between regionshave helped create the militarized global 
order that now exists.79  
  The utility of violence in the pursuit of statecraft produces three system-wide 
effects that are readily recognizable by the astute observer. First, states give primacy 
to their physical security. For scholars such as Kant and Hobbes, the justification of 
state sovereignty arises from its function as a protector of national societies from in-
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ternal and external sources of violence.80 Even as the scope of security has expanded 
over the centuries to include micro-economic and socio-cultural concepts, the provi-
sion of an armed defense against “violent attack” remains, as Trevor Taylor argues, 
“the most established and widely accepted function of the state.”81  
  The second systemic effect arising from the propensity of violence in interstate 
relations is militarization, or the expansion and persistence of military institutions 
within national states and their ability to procure substantial resources from their re-
spective societies.82 This phenomenon attains its logical extreme in the existence of 
praetorian states; but it is more commonly manifest in the ubiquitous nature of mili-
tary structures within the international system. Every state, regardless of its strategic 
circumstance, possesses a territorial defense force in some form, e.g., army, air force, 
or gendarmerie. Typically, states carry this logic a step further and possess all these 
organizational features and others. Hence, even landlocked countries such as Ecuador 
and Switzerland possess “navies.” During the Cold War, there are 44 separate armed 
services among just 15-armed states in NATO. 
   The third feature of this international “order,” and one that is of primary con-
cern to this dissertation, relates to the non-material drivers for weapons procurement.83 
In an interstate system without guarantees of protection or of adjudication, armaments 
are a nation’s “insurance policy,” providing the ultimate means for states to safeguard 
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their political autonomy and to ensure their territorial integrity. Little wonder then, 
that organized arms production has been “coterminuous” with the evolution of the na-
tional state.84 Anthony Giddens writes that even before the emergence of nationalism 
and the nationalization of polity, “it was war, and preparations for war, that provided 
the most potent energizing stimulus for the concentration of administrative resources 
and fiscal reorganization” that consolidated state power and established its bureau-
cratic and territorial form that endures to this day.85 
   The process began in Europe with the emergence of royal armies and navies 
commissioned to provide absolutist monarchs with internal control and external secu-
rity. In time, the crowns of Europe bolstered their military prowess with state-funded 
armories that provided goods ranging in complexity from saltpeter to frigates. Euro-
pean states have engaged in a process of progressive control over arms production 
since the fifteenth century. This occurred through the extension of state supervision 
over the arms production process, gradually transforming defense technology manu-
facturers into state functionaries, and often bringing them under outright national 
control.86 Edward Kolodziej writes that European states, consequently, have been in 
the “war-making, war implementing, and arms transfer business for centuries.”87 As 
such, weapons production has become ingrained in both state institutions and practice 
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as a normative good, seen as the basis of national independence and of advancing state 
interests.  
  Those national states more recently founded following European colonization 
and contact have continued this link between polity and armaments. Indeed, they are 
the products of a global culture of weapons production in which the politics of weap-
ons production is often perceived as inseparable from the very existence of the state 
itself. Throughout the Developing World, for example, armaments are coveted with 
the same intensity as that found in the West.88 At one level, it is arguably a “rational” 
response by the emergent and the weak to, as Ken Waltz writes, “imitate the military 
innovations contrived by the countr[ies] the greatest capability and ingenuity.”89 It is 
also, however, a recognition that the benefits of weapons production are not limited to 
territorial defense or to any other perceived security effect. 
   Armaments procurement can and does, as Luckman notes, often “displace the 
proper goals of defense.”90 States procure arms not simply because they must, but also 
because they canthat is to say, the acquisition of military technology in the interna-
tional system is both a means to an end, and an end in itself. Defense industrial issues 
are the most visible expression of the non-security connection between weapons pro-
duction and state power. Armament industries sit at the nexus between security and 
economicsbetween power and plenty.91 While the former attributemilitary 
strengthis most readily appreciated, the latter is no less significant, as André 
Giraud, the former French Minister of Defense, affirmed in 1987 when he asserted: 
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Armaments programs create employment. They irrigate most of mod-
ern industries, their laboratories, their proto-type workshops, their 
plants, feed research and innovation, intellectual competition with other 
countries. It is a true locomotive of economic development.92 
The potential material benefits from a domestic defense industrial base (DIB) and de-
fense technology base (DTB) are enormous, not only for a country’s force posture but 
for its economic well-being as well. A national production capacity offers secure, de-
pendable access to the means of defense without reliance on foreign sources of supply, 
which may either deny the availability of war goods or perhaps use a dependence rela-
tionship as a source of political leverage. Defense industries also provide economic 
side-benefits: jobs for the civilian labor market through direct employment as well as 
the potential technological spin-off into the non-military sectors of national econo-
mies. Indeed, until the 1970s and 1980s, technology development in defense among 
developed weapons-producing states exceeded the rate of advance in civilian fields 
due to higher levels of military demand and military R&D financing.93 Policy-makers 
in the West and elsewhere regarded military technological innovation as an engine for 
growth that could pull an entire national economy with it, particularly in high-return, 
"sun-rise" sectors based on emerging technologies.94  
  Edward Kolodziej, for example, in his survey of French arms production notes 
that French attitudes during the initial years of the Fifth Republic reflected the widely 
accepted idea that technological progress was a vehicle for sustainable economic ex-
pansion.95 Given defense imperatives for qualitative superiority, the perception 
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quickly arose that the "modernization" of the military would bolster the "renovation" 
and growth of the overall national economy. The advanced electronics, metallurgical 
skills, chemical engineering and other products of the post-Second World War “mili-
tary-technical revolution”96 would be channeled toward civilian pursuits. The same 
processes and breakthroughs that created Mirage fighters and AMX tank fire control 
systems could, with considerable tweaking, lead to the development of Airbus com-
mercial jets and Bull personal computers. State elites believed, with some justification, 
that the promotion of an indigenous and advanced DIB/DTB would thus insure suc-
cess in an "increasingly competitive world economy" where winners are defined by 
their capacity for production and development.97 These attitudes persist in France and 
throughout the international system, even as the balance of innovation has shifted 
from the military to civilian fields since the late 1980s.98  
  Even for defense goods for which there is no credible “techno-nationalist”99 
rationale, such as trucks and light munitions, states can continue to reap some eco-
nomic gains from their production: employment, tax revenue, foreign exchange from 
exports, and retention of traditional industry and industrial capacity in the face of post-
industrial change. This rationale has been employed throughout NATO at various 
times to justify the maintenance of broad techno-military competencies. Indeed, 
throughout the post-War period, most of these states either created or attempted to cre-
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ate diversified arms industries, dabbling in everything from side-arms to look-down 
radars. Moreover, policy makers purposely shielded the bulk, if not all, of their pro-
curement effort from market forces so as to better shape and nurture themand thus 
erect a whole industrial sector "jealously guarded and generously protected" through 
R&D subsidies, nationally discriminatory procurement policies and the transference of 
capital to contractors under terms relatively unfettered by concerns over cost-
efficiency.100  
  That states such as Canada or France explicitly shape their arms procurement 
polices to achieve economic goals is perhaps as unremarkable an observation as that 
others, such as Greece and Turkey, privilege their security requirements.101 The notion 
of defense procurement-as-industrial policy has found considerable support among 
defense decision-makers since Jean-Baptiste Colbert championed the idea in late sev-
enteenth century France.102 In practice, most states follow mixed-motive strategies in 
arms procurement as they strive to balance tangible security and economic needs. It is 
rarely appreciated by either International Relations scholars or security analysts, how-
ever, that arms also have a discernible, yet intangible quality that cannot be readily 
linked to simple questions of force posture or macro-economic policy. States procure 
arms not simply to defend their territories or protect their labor markets: weapons also 
have socio-cultural value. In order to understand fully why states procure weap-
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onsand thereby have a better grasp as to why they may seek to collaborate in their 
design and productionone must understand this non-material value no less than the 
omnipresent security and economic incentives that are constantly appealed to within 
rationalist ontologies. 
  States covet defense technologies because they can protect, enrich, and no less 
importantly, definedefine what the state is, what its values are, and what its is place 
is within the international system. Dana Eyre, Mark Suchmann, and Victoria Alexan-
der assert that: 
technology is never just technology. . .every machine has a socially 
constructed meaning and a socially oriented objective and the incidence 
and significance of technological developments can never be fully un-
derstood or predicted outside their social context.103 
Armaments resemble other artifacts in that their utility is socially determined. Taken 
as a whole, however, defense technology is indeed unlike any other, uniquely defined 
by its lethality and by an almost elemental tie to state identity as the "distinguishing 
emblem of the modern nation."104 Armaments are positional goods: they convey status 
and prestige in an international system, in which a country’s “membership in moder-
nity” is outlined by the sophistication of its force posture.105 All states are bound in a 
world "armaments culture" that defines national grandeur by the possession of objects 
that are themselves regarded as "the supreme achievements of modern science and 
technology."106 This phenomenon is perhaps most evident among newly industrializ-
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ing states where procurement decisions often arise less from the functional needs of 
security or industrial policy, but rather  as reflections of ideas about the nature of the 
state.107 State legitimacy within the international system is bound to normative defini-
tions of what constitutes appropriate state behavior: states must  possess health 
ministries, postal services and well-rounded armed forces. 
  In the Third World, these objects and institutions provide a form of “symbolic 
self-completion.”108 Alexander and Michael Barnett argue that developing countries 
often perceive their identities as sovereign states as being inadequate 
[b]ecause their autonomy is not respected by the Great Powers, because 
they are unable to assert their control in all areas of the country, be-
cause their governments are corrupt or inefficient, or simply because of 
their relative youth.109 
Consequently, they embrace those attributes that have become standards of efficacy 
and of modernity.110 These are symbols of equality, denoting a functional sameness 
between the developing and the developed. Some symbols, however, are more potent 
than others. In the armaments field, the emphasis internationally is not just the posses-
sion of weapons, but also the ability to design and to locally produce themand 
furthermore, not just any weapons, but sophisticated, high-technology goods.111 For 
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states facing normative incentives to modernize their economies, a high tech weapons 
capacity denotes both great nation status and the achievement of a great national 
economy capable of considerable technological innovation. These weapons are conse-
quently “loaded with meaning,” symbolizing sovereignty, technological advancement, 
strength, and political efficacy.  
In the early 20th century, the battleship epitomized how technology of this type 
can become tightly embedded in a state’s self-perception, and importantly how that 
state wished to be regarded by others. Michael Howard writes: 
The Battleship was indeed a symbol of national pride and power of a 
unique kind; one even more appropriate to the industrial age than ar-
mies. It embodied at once the technological achievement of that nation 
as a whole, its worldwide reach and, with its huge guns, immense de-
structive power. It was a status symbol of universal validity, one that no 
nation conscious of its destiny could afford to do without.112 
  Today, other technologies fill this role: the air-superiority fighter, the chob-
ham-armored main battle tank, and the ballistic missile submarine among others. 
These platforms embody levels of sophistication and of lethality that separate those 
who can produce them from all others. Their symbolic status is such that they help 
constitute a state’s identity as a great power. The social value of these technologies is 
tightly intertwined with their material attributes. In many cases, however, symbolism 
can outweigh any objective criterion. For example, defense-seeking states that pursue 
power-projection strategies require both offensive weapons systems to conduct opera-
tions, and transport platforms needed to move personnel and materiel into a given 
theater.  Battleships, to borrow Howard’s observation, are impressive tools of state-
craft, but they are quite literally “dead in the water” without the freighters and the 
tankers that are necessary to replenish them at sea with fuel, spares, and munitions.  
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Indeed, victorious campaigns are not so much a function of imposing one’s will upon 
the enemyto use Clausewitzian languageas they are the successful management 
of logistics: procuring and delivering the boots, the bullets, the spares, and the multi-
tude of other items that militaries must possess if they are to function effectively.113  
Nonetheless, it is not the freighter, or the tanker, or even the 16-inch naval shell that 
traditionally assumes an important place in the popular and elite imaginations; rather, 
it is the battleship that becomes a vehicle for national ambitions and a symbol of 
techno-industrial prowess. 
  This is not to say that states do not value mundane military technologies, but 
rather that they value them differently, as expressed in either statement or action.  No 
sane defense decision-maker would contend that her armed forces should disavow ar-
tillery shells in favor of ground attack aircraft.  An effective, modern military requires 
both.  However, because the latter is a greater symbol of modernity than the former, 
states will tend to devote greater attention and energies toward its procurementeven 
though artillery is a far more effective means of killing or disrupting enemy forces, as 
seen through the historical record.  The social incentives for weapons production can, 
and sometimes clearly do, outweigh the material incentives to procuring those items. 
This difference can have an impact upon the conduct of national procurement policy if 
states truly privilege certain technologies over others and divert limited resources to 
meet these goals.  
  That states can and often do invest considerable levels of treasure and of min-
isterial attention to certain weapons is uncontroversial. Gold-plating of already 
sophisticated weapons has been a feature of Western arms procurement since the late 
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th century.114 The question that is critical to this dissertation, however, asks if the 
incentives to acquire certain defense technologies are different, then will the methods 
that states use to acquire those technologies also be different? Further, are some 
technologies more ‘suitable’ to collaborative procurement, and if so, what drives such 
collaboration in light of the ideational nature of armaments?  
  As we have seen, national arms procurement is a far more complex matter than 
simply kitting one’s own troops to guard the frontier or to take some distant hill. As 
Robin Luckham writes, “weapons themselves have become ideologies.”115 Their ac-
quisition and possession form the basis of a kind of technologism in which certain 
technologies are regarded as constituting modern statehood. While all arms may in 
some way stand apart from other commodities, it is the advanced weapons technolo-
gies that are uniquely placed within the international system.  They are not only 
perceived as the “preferred means” of achieving state security, but also as an appropri-
ate representation of state-ness.116  
  This ideational function of arms procurement poses varying hurdles to Interna-
tional Relations theory and any effort to frame viable hypotheses of state behavior in 
this area. On the one hand, rationalist approaches such as realism are not concerned 
with the symbolic baggage coupled to defense technologies. It is enough that weapons 
are the source of security and wealth in an interstate system in which the only mean-
ingful differences between states are their relative power capabilities. Sociological 
paradigms, on the other hand, place great importance on the social value of such tech-
nologiesespecially because they so closely intersect with formulations of state 
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identity. Constructivists see procurement in just this way, as an identity project: either 
reflecting existing state identity demands, or denoting new identifica-
tionsparticularly in situations where collective identity formation is both possible 
and salient, and generated through collaborative behavior. 
 
Synthesis 
  So far, our discussion of theory has been confined to analytical foundations 
and to suppositions about the nature of international cooperation. I shall now apply 
our two paradigms to weapons procurement, specifically as it occurs through multina-
tional collaboration. The purpose here is not to provide a detailed exploration of 
interstate defense industrial cooperation in any given region.  I seek instead to high-
light the theoretical expectations concerning the nature of this activity, its promises 
and its limitations as perceived through these disparate frameworks.   
  Realists regard defense technologies with a certain awe. They are the instru-
ments that give form to international affairs, shaping and reshaping it with each new 
innovation. The possession of arms, particularly those that are superior to one’s 
neighbors, lowers the cost of conquest and political manipulation, and thus heightens 
the incentives for the fortunate to exploit their advantage and revise the international 
system. 117 Robert Gilpin notes that the development of iron metallurgy and siege en-
gines aided in the development of the Assyrian Empire and made possible the havoc 
that it wrought; Constantinople endured as it did because of its relative advantage in 
fortification; and finally, the introduction of gunpowder and artillery in fourteenth cen-
tury Europe produced a period of offense dominance in interstate military affairs that 
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“opened a new era of territorial consolidation and introduced a new form: the nation-
state.”118 
  Given their role in ordering interstate relations, Realists contend that arma-
ments are a commodity that no state can do without, and moreover, one that all states 
should ideally procure autonomously. Defense technologies provide the most benefit 
when they are held alone, providing the possessor with advantages not readily over-
come by potential opponents. Sharing production with others hastens the diffusion of 
potentially sensitive technologies through collaboration; purchasing equipment out-
right from foreign sources imposes political and military vulnerabilities through 
dependence upon foreign designs that may be substandard or withheld under condi-
tions of crisis.119  
  Armaments procurement security is only truly attainable under conditions of 
defense industrial autarky in which maximum state control and independence can be 
assured. Nonetheless, such conditions have been rarely achievable. For Realists such 
as Ethan Kapstein and Thomas Moran, defense industrial innovation is coupled to two 
dominant effects. First, even if technological superiority is attained, it is generally not 
preserved because existing technologies tend to diffuse faster than new ones are cre-
ated.120 Second, armament production is burdened by a constant and nearly inexorable 
rise in cost from one generation of weapon to the next. Indeed, Adam Smith once de-
scribed this phenomenon as the “law of the increasing cost of war.”121 Because of 
military imperatives for inter-generation technological advancement, the cost of de-
fense goods tends to increase at a rate higher than that found in civilian commodities.  
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  Consequently, arms production imposes increasing burdens upon those states 
that possess the financial, technological and industrial capacities to engage in domes-
tic manufacture. Many states lack the resources to produce even the most mundane 
defense technologies. All others face what Andrew Moravcsik labels the “autarky-
efficiency dilemma.”122 While autarkic production may still be possible, the costs of 
some items are so excessive as to risk poor economies of scale, inefficiency-fuelled 
price rises, introduction delays, and inferior technological performance for all but the 
wealthiest countries.123 The desire for defense autonomy can therefore undermine the 
security effect through the production of weapons of insufficient quality and number. 
  Realist analyses of weapons production thus regard multinational procurement 
as a necessary evil for a majority of countries. For these states, reliance upon foreign 
equipment and supply networks is the only practicable means of meeting their mini-
mal security requirements. The contentious issue that countries face, therefore, is not 
whether to engage in defense industrial cooperation, but how to avoid the pernicious 
effects of collaboration while attaining maximum national advantage. Realists antici-
pate that states will favor those forms of collaboration that infringe least upon their 
military and political autonomy, ensure that national governments retain complete au-
thority over the cooperative process, and enhance their options for autarkic production 
at a later date should that option be forced upon them. 
  Countries should not rely upon cross-border purchases. While imports may 
provide a cheaper alternative to local development and production, it also presents the 
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highest risk of foreign dependence. Any form of market allocation is a source of inse-
curity to states, as suppliers can manipulate trade to advance their interests, either 
through strategically withholding technologies and product support, or by entrapping 
buyers into exploitable, asymmetrical political relationships.124 Moreover, foreign pur-
chase does not contribute to either preserving or expanding national armaments 
development or production capabilities; on the contrary, it may hasten their atrophy 
should they exist. Countries only have two options to mitigate these risks, if there is 
no alternative to direct purchase. First, they can create a system of mutual dependence 
to restrain their “partners” from exerting undue pressure. Second, they can rely upon a 
diverse set of suppliers and thus prevent dependence upon any one party.125 
  States ideally will structure their collaborations to ensure that some part of the 
production process occurs on their own soil, and moreover within their national indus-
try. Co-development and co-productionmethods that we will explore in greater 
detail in the next chapterare preferred because they allow countries to share the fi-
nancial and technical risks of weapons production while funneling work to their own 
defense firms. States can thus use multinational means to meet national ends in attain-
ing welfare and security goals. Realist analyses also assume that no matter which 
method is chosen, states will dominate the process. Non-state actors, such as industry 
and international institutions can provide a coordinating role, or in the case of the for-
mer perform the actual development and production. Nonetheless, states will deny 
them any decision-making roles concerning technology transfer and work allocation. 
Arms collaboration, like that for any other commodity, will be a strictly intergovern-
mental affair. Partnerships will arise to meet immediate needs, and then dissolve once 
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the objectives are achieved. Relations between states within these groupings will re-
flect their relative power, with rules established to prevent cheating. 
  Social Constructivist analysis, naturally, takes a different approach to state ar-
maments procurement. Weapons production has become a defining act of statehood, 
and as such, it cannot be divorced from this identity function. Questions of methods 
and means are only important in that they may reflect this issue. Given the ideational 
significance of arms procurement, a constructivist approach would seek to determine 
how this act either reproduces an existent state identity or denotes a collective identity 
emerging within a collaborative partnership.  
  While states acquire defense equipment because of its social value, they none-
theless face the same economic and technical pressures favoring multinational 
cooperation that we outlined earlier. One must consider, however, the larger political 
context of this cooperation, as well as possible transformative effects of collaborative 
behavior. Defense industrial collaboration within security communities, for example, 
occurs in environments in which collective transnational identities are present. The 
question then becomes a matter of determining which identity, state or regional, is be-
ing satisfied through collaboration. Even when cooperation occurs outside this 
context, as we have noted, collaborative relationships can lead to a positive identifica-
tion between self and other that can create changes in behavior.126 
  A constructivist approach would attempt to map identity and action. If an or-
thodox conception of state identity exhibited the dominant influence on conduct, 
countries should structure their collaborative procurement to better serve that identity: 
eschewing any compromises on their autonomy, and engaging in practices that maxi-
mize national industrial and security interests. A salient collective identity, on the 
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other hand, would reshape state interest so as to make it less distinct from the commu-
nal interest. States should embrace ever-deepening forms of cooperation in which 
concerns of dependence and of exploitation do not affect decision-making. Behavior 
should be characterized by diffuse reciprocity, a willingness to permit defense indus-
trial interdependence, and possibly, even integration through a merging of home 
markets and the de-nationalization of domestic firms.127 States might even accept an 
“internationalization of authority” in which coordinating international organizations 
are granted decision-making competences, or partner countries harmonize their do-
mestic laws and regulations.128 
  Constructivist analysis can offer an additional insight concerning the object of 
collaborative procurement. Whereas realism does not assume variance in state conduct 
pertaining to the types of technologies that countries seek to acquire, constructivism 
considers the ideational value of arms and how differing values may produce diver-
gent preferences. Indeed, some technologies may be more closely associated with 
certain social identities. Given the links between high technology defense equipment 
and state identity, a constructivist approach would assume that other technologies at 
intermediary and low levels of sophistication might not impose the same imperatives 
of orthodox state interest. Instead, other identities may become manifest in any col-
laborative behavior in these technological domains  that is to say that a collective 
identity need not be dominant, but if present, it might have greater effect in those areas 
of state activity that are least tightly bonded with the ideas of state-hood. 
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Methods  
  This dissertation employs a constructivist framework to analyze recent inter-
state collaborative behavior in Western Europe. By mapping changes in the nature of 
armament procurement collaboration in these regions over time, I intend to measure 
both the degree of de-nationalization in the regional defense industrial base and the 
extent to which the process is driven by a transnational collective identity. Given that 
such an identity is argued to exist in Western Europe, this dissertation problematizes 
both identity and technology in order to test their salience. I hypothesize that an emer-
gent European identity will first induce economically rational weapons collaboration 
in low-end technology that can be detected through an absence of traditionally self-
regarding state behavior. 
  To test this hypothesis, I shall employ a process-tracing approach that is both 
historical and interpretive in method. While this may risk an analysis that is “devoid of 
theoretical shape” and is uncomfortably resembles “a recitation of facts and historical 
developments,” it is nonetheless essential to our exploration.129 It allows us not only to 
gauge changes in state conduct between specific episodes of armaments collaboration, 
but to also examine the ideational environment in which the behavior occurs. To this 
end, this study uses discursive analysis to operationalize the concept of identity and 
measure ideational shift, in this case the difference between a purely nationalized 
worldview with narrowly conceived state interests and a collective regional identity. I 
shall evaluate the policy context in which state decision-makers initiated and justified 
their collaborative ventures. It is impossible to quantify ideational changes by measur-
ing minute transformations. Nonetheless, the thorough content analysis of archival 
data, e.g., government position papers and corporate reports, and interviews, should 
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reveal which sentiments received the greatest articulation within a given collaborative 
project.   
  This technique is fraught with its own particular set of problems. It assumes 
that official proclamations are strategically worded and runs the risk of descending 
into hermeneutic circlesthe post-structuralist tendency to move beyond a search for 
ideational meaning within text and discourses toward an often futile anti-scientific 
quest to look for meanings within meanings. The risk of confusing proclamation for 
fact is particularly acute in any study of European procurement cooperation: as one 
U.S. military officer assign to NATO noted,  
It is politically correct to say ‘Buy Europe,’ to say ‘support the [idea of 
European Union],’ but when it comes down to brass tacks. . .there is 
rampant nationalism and rampant inconsistency in official statements—
and of course, an unending lack of trust.” 130 
Discursive analysis, however, remains the only method of exploring something so elu-
sive as self-conception.  This study uses an added safeguard by correlating statement 
and deed, so that we should safely determine the salience of a proclaimed identity 
through simple observation of actual behavior. 
  This approach allows us to evaluate the most relevant counterhypothesis, 
namely that provided by rationalist models which contend that collaborative behavior 
ongoing in the European Union is merely a functional response to systemic economic 
forces such as rising equipment costs. A realist analysis would have us believe that 
arms procurement cooperation is inherently limited. State collaborate only because 
they are compelled to do so by financial and technological constraints. There are no 
grander visions at work, and no expectation that cooperation will evolve in any sys-
temic way beyond the forms that it currently assumes, or will stop serving the 
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parochial interests of the states involved. A detailed content analysis should show if 
material necessity has merely led to a transformation in state priorities, permitting 
heretofore unseen forms of procurement collaboration, or if self-interest has changed 
because the "self" is now perceived to be something larger than the national commu-
nity. 
  The dissertation’s focus is longitudinal, covering the range of intra-regional 
European procurement cooperation in the period from 1967 to 1997.   I have selected 
four project-specific cases based primarily on the level of technology—either high or 
low—of a given program.  I designate multinational collaborative projects as either:  
a) high-technology programs defined by high R&D costs, involving systems such as 
aerospace platforms, military electronics, or precision-guided munitions; b) low-
technology initiatives encompassing shipbuilding, land vehicles,131 and small arms 
and ordnance production. My high-tech cases are the Tornado fighter-bomber (1969-
1985) and the European Fighter Aircraft  (1975-ongoing).  The chosen low-tech cases 
are the Field Howitzer 70  (1968-1981) and the Self-Propelled Howitzer 70  (1973-
1986).  All these cases involve both co-development and co-production of weapons 
systems between West European partners. I have chosen these cases because they can 
be unambiguously coded as low or high technology and detailed, accessible informa-
tion on them is available.  Moreover,  they also allow for a relatively rigorous analysis.  
Within each technology dyad, the more recent caseshere, the European Fighter Air-
craft  and the Self-Propelled Howitzer 70are conventionally regarded as direct 
follow-ons to the earlier projects. One can thus observe the same core group of na-
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tional actorsin these instances Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy collabo-
rating together over time, across projects of similar type, and involving the same 
industries and organizational models. Consequently, this study should permit examina-
tion of possibly shifting state interests and behaviors pertaining to successive episodes 
of procurement cooperation between established partners. 
  While my project-specific cases are extremely important to the execution of 
this dissertation, I complement them with the study of Europe’s premier market-
liberalization scheme: the 1986 Anglo-French Reciprocal Purchasing Agreement. This 
initiative is noteworthy because it is a globally rare example of an effort to integrate 
segments of national defense industrial bases. The Anglo-French accord was the first 
comprehensive effort in NATO Europe to liberalize the regional defense equipment 
market through competitive cross-border tendering.   
 
Conclusion 
  This dissertation will provide exploration of the role of ideas in shaping state 
policy, and moreover, in a very sensitive area of state activity: defense procurement. 
Ideational analyses can always tell us something more about international relations 
vis-à-vis mainstream theory. In any given situation, there are countless variables that 
may have some causal significance. Constructivism reaches beyond orthodox parsi-
monies, employing “thickly described histories” and interpretive methods, to “uncover 
collective meaning, actors’ identities, and the substance of political interests.”132 This 
dissertation seeks to say something new about the conduct of interstate affairs, to ex-
plain phenomena that possibly cannot be adequately addressed by the rationalist and 
materialist paradigms that dominate the field. In the following chapter, I will provide a 
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historical background of the post-war defense industrial collaboration in Western 
Europe and show that cooperation is an evolving process. As such, it cannot be auto-
matically assumed to fit within the narrow confines of mainstream theory and 
scholarship.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
Historical Background 
 
  The late François Mitterrand once argued that "if one wishes to create Europe, 
care must be taken to define some unity of armament, otherwise the rest of the discus-
sion will be pointless."1 This remarkable insight reflects a little recognized and often 
forgotten feature of regional integration in Western Europe. In that region, interna-
tional cooperation assumed an explicitly “defense-first” posture.2 Before the advent of 
coal and steel communities, common agricultural policies, and free trade areas, de-
fense was not only the glue that bound Western states together the political and 
economic integrations that now are taken for granted—the routinized inter-
governmental discussions over questions of political economy and policy coordina-
tion, multinational industrial cooperation, and the de-nationalization of traditionally 
inviolable areas of state activity—either occurred first or in greater degrees in the de-
fense realm..3 Organizations such as NATO, WEU and FINABEL4 in Western Europe 
provided the successful and enduring collective defense of their member states; 
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moreover, they vastly reduced the security dilemmas between these countries and es-
tablished the norms of multilateralism and transparency that have made possible the 
notion of European union. 
  While interstate security cooperation set the foundation for the integration 
movements that now exists in the North Atlantic area, one must be careful not to over-
state the situation. These partnerships succeeded admirably in organizing the common 
defense. Their record in providing for that defense is more spotty. Complex coopera-
tion may have become the dominant trend in the West, but defense industrial 
integration amongst these same states may yet be a dream deferred. At the very least, 
multinational procurement cooperation for most of the last fifty years has been a 
“dream come untrue.”5  
   The same tensions between nationalism and internationalism in armaments 
procurement that we explored in the preceding chapter found expression in Western 
politics from the institutionalization of the alliance beginning in the late 1940s well 
into the present-day. These states sought to balance innate desires to preserve their 
sovereignty and techno-industrial vitality, while concurrently engaging themselves in 
a coalition in which there were legitimate political, economic, military arguments for 
rationalizing their collective defense industrial efforts. As state preferences and con-
straints have evolved over time, the interplay of these desires and demands have 
produced a dynamic situation. Indeed, when one looks at the situation in Western 
Europe, we see a pattern of shifting impulses between rationalization and nationaliza-
tion in the regional defense equipment market: from the near-total commonality of 
arms immediately following the end of the Second World War, to the piecemeal re-
nationalization of state military forces in 1960s, and finally, to the hybrid situation that 
                                                 
5 Panayiotis Ifestos, European Political Cooperation: Towards a Framework of Supranational Diplo-
macy (Avebury: Gower Publishing Company, 1987), 53.  
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exists today in which domestic production dominates but is nonetheless coupled to 
growing inventories of cooperatively procured weapons.6 
  Furthermore, in each of these periods, the options faced by states were not as 
simple a choice as either buying abroad or producing at home. Multinational weapons 
procurement could assume a number of forms, ranging from supranational govern-
ance, to free-trade, to project-specific defense industrial collaboration. Each model, 
and its sub-variants, evoked tradeoffs in procurement efficiency and national inde-
pendence: i.e., the greater one’s sovereignty was maintained, the less effective the 
process and outcome of the collaboration, and vice versa. Consequently, even as the 
pendulum may swing between nationalism and internationalism in defense procure-
ment, states enjoy several alternative methods of cooperation such that part or all of 
their collaborations may reflect more subtle effects of identity-driven behavior. For 
example, it is conceivable that a group of states could be ostensibly very parochial in 
their defense procurements, privileging their national defense industries for the bulk of 
their equipment needs, and yet they may engage in periodic collaborations that are 
other-regarding in terms of their design and execution. States may institutionalize de-
pendencies in their defense procurements that would denote an identity-shift from the 
national to the transnational. Conversely, states may create a broadly cooperative envi-
ronment, but nonetheless in both discourse and action, behave as traditional self-
interested, utility-maximizing actors. 
  This chapter has two objectives. First, we review the history of defense pro-
curement collaboration within the North Atlantic Alliance, from its inception to 
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beginning of our window of analysis in 1968, with the initiation of the Tornado and 
FH-70 projects. We will pay particular attention to institutional, discursive, and epi-
sodic trends in Western Europe. The second aim of this chapter is to define the 
concept of procurement multinationalizationto overview the basic models of arma-
ments cooperation that states can employ. Until now, I have used the terms 
multinationalization, internationalization, transnationalization, and Europeanization 
synonymously and somewhat loosely. In the latter half of this chapter, I will discuss 
the modalities that cooperative behavior can assume, as well as the theoretical and his-
torical significance of each. 
  
History 
  Procurement cooperation in the West is not a new phenomenon. Contemporary 
collaborative projects, such as the Eurofighter, the TRIGAT anti-tank missile, and the 
Apache stand-off missile, which are presented as standard-bearers of the Alliance ef-
fort to rationalize its collective defense effort, are in fact the latest instances of process 
of cooperative procurement in the North Atlantic area that has been ongoing since 
World War II. Much of the war effort on the Western front was supported through the 
United States Lend-Lease initiative which supplied British, Canadian, and free allied 
forces with American military hardware.7 At the conflict’s end, of all the countries that 
would later comprise the European Union as of 2004, only Britain and Sweden sur-
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vived with their defense industries intact.8 Ireland had no defense industrial base to 
speak of, while the continental states were completely disrupted due to war-time de-
struction. Moreover, West Germany was not only devastated, but much of its surviving 
defense industrial base had been dismantled following the Nazi capitulation in 1945. It 
would be another ten years before Germany would be permitted to engage in any do-
mestic defense procurement.9 
  Consequently, Europeans were unable to provide for their own defense equip-
ment needs in the first years following the war. Nonetheless, the desire existed both to 
restore state militaries so to meet their minimal defense needs as quickly as possible, 
and to begin the long-term process of reconstituting national defense industries. The 
United States moved to meet this demand, partially as a component of the larger post-
war economic reconstruction effort and as a means to counter a perceived Soviet 
threat in Eastern and Central Europe.10 Military assistance continued after the war 
through the discounted sale of American weapons, or through gifts of surplus equip-
ment and supplies. This relationship was institutionalized with the enactment in the 
Summer of 1949 of the United States’ Military Assistance Program (MAP) which 
provided free military hardware to those western and other friendly, anti-communist 
states who applied. The $14.4 billion in military aid initially approved under the MAP 
represented an enormous boost to European defense efforts. Through this program, 
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and the bilateral grant and trade agreements that preceded it and coexisted along side 
it, by 1958 over half of all heavy weapons in Western Europe were of American ori-
gin.11  
  The MAP rearmed Europe but did not in itself create sufficient conditions for 
the re-establishment of national European defense industries. This process was sup-
ported by concurrent and subsequent initiatives in transatlantic and intra-European 
cooperation. First among these was the North Atlantic Treaty. Although the MAP was 
legally distinct from the Treaty, and the two were separately ratified by the United 
States’ Senate just two days apart in July 1949, the United States and its allies justified 
the aid pact under treaty provisos calling for both military and economic cooperation 
among partner states so as to better provide for their collective defense.12 Article 2 of 
the North Atlantic Treaty called upon the signatories to “eliminate conflict in their in-
ternational economic policies” and to “encourage economic collaboration between any 
and all of them.” Similarly, Article 3 stressed that alliance members “separately and 
jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid,. . .maintain and 
develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.”13  
  These clauses, as Francis Beer noted, only “vaguely implied” a role for arma-
ments cooperation among allies; they certainly did not set any concrete objectives or 
procedures to that end.14 Moreover, because of its ambiguous language, the Treaty did 
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not make any normative claims concerning the desirability of cooperative military-
related economic activity vis-à-vis traditional patterns of state behavior. While this 
was arguably unavoidable in an alliance of sovereign states, all of whom were eager to 
maintain their freedom of action, the omission would later haunt NATO military plan-
ners as member states exercised their right to “self-help” without any supranational 
control or oversight. In any case, Alliance leaders from the 12 founding member states 
quickly moved to flesh-out the treaty recommendations.15 During the September 1949 
inaugural meeting of NATO’s supreme political decision-making body, the North At-
lantic Council, ministers created the Military Production and Supply Board (MPSB) 
and the Defense Financial Economic Committee (DFEC). 
  The MSPB and the DFEC were the first multilateral institutions in Europe or 
elsewhere founded to co-ordinate interstate defense industrial policies. Alliance gov-
ernments recognized that their collective defense would necessarily require some level 
of collective and “comprehensive management” of their combined defense industrial 
effort.16 To this end, Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI)17 rap-
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idly became a mantra amongst NATO defense planners, and both the MSPB and the 
DFEC represented the institutional face of this stated desire. MSPB was empowered 
“to promote co-ordinated production” and standardization of defense equipment. The 
DFEC, on the other hand, sought to “develop” financial guidance for defense pro-
grams, “recommend financial arrangements” for common military plans, and to 
recommend the “interchange of military equipment.”18 
  These organizations with their impressive mandates represented a promising 
beginning to the Alliance and to its effort to rationalize defense procurement. Unfor-
tunately, they quickly encountered structural barriers that marginalized their efficacy, 
as well as that of their successors right through to the present daya number that now 
approaches 180 standing and ad hoc committees and groups within NATO alone.19 
First, at no time has any Alliance body been given the political authority to make deci-
sions concerning Alliance-level procurements: no common funding, no power to 
award industrial contracts, and no power to harmonize military requirements. These 
powers remained vested solely with the member governments. Further, even in an ad-
visory role, NATO organizations were captive to national preferences, as their 
members served explicitly as national delegates. Consequently their allegiances were 
not to the common good, or even to the Alliance as an institution, but to the parochial 
whims of their state governments.20  
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  Second, these NATO initiatives suffered from a diversity of national inter-
estsa situation that worsened as financial and industrial conditions shifted in the 
post-war period. The United States tended to define standardization as the purchase of 
American defense equipment.21 While this attitude caused some discomfort among 
Europeans, particularly those with aspirations toward restoring and expanding their 
national defense industries, by the mid-1950s the European members of the Alliance 
no longer had to rely totally upon the largesse of the United States. This occurred, in 
part, due to American policy which sought to hasten the reconstruction of European 
industry so that the European countries could better share the burden of their defense. 
As early as 1949, the United States transferred machine tools under the Mutual De-
fense Assistance Act. By 1952, the United States complemented the Military 
Assistance Program with the Offshore Procurement Program.22 The effect of this latter 
initiative was to encourage European firms to produce components and sub-assemblies 
for the American weapons systems acquired by their national governments. In some 
cases, the American government took a more direct approach. In 1953, for example, 
the United States spent $1 billion to rebuild and re-vitalize European munitions pro-
ducers with the stated intention of making NATO Europe “self-sufficient in 
ammunition production.”23 A year later, the United States purchased on behalf of the 
British government 450 Hawker Hunter fighter planes produced in the United King-
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dom for the exclusive use of the Royal Air Force.24 Similar efforts were conducted in 
France and the Benelux states.  
  These United States defense industrial assistance policies, among others, 
helped reestablish armaments production capacities throughout the Alliance. John 
Calmann writes that, “after 1955, nearly all of the European members of the Alliance 
were producing some part of their defense equipment.”25 The resumption of signifi-
cant defense industrial activity throughout the region restored a measure of the 
political and military normalcy that these states had lost as a result of the war. Unfor-
tunately, in doing so, it also made cooperation far more difficult, as these states 
acquired the industrial assets needed to support their parochial interests. As one NATO 
officer remarked at the time, “European governments are quite agreed on the need to 
cooperate, but they have no idea on what.”26 The larger defense producers  France, 
the United Kingdom, and by 1955, West Germanyhad divergent strategic and finan-
cial interests that were not easily reconciled. The Germans were obligated to purchase 
substantial levels of British and American arms to subsidize those countries’ military 
presence on German territory. Britain and France both had global military ambitions 
and the desire to expand well-rounded domestic defense industrial bases. The smaller 
states such as the Benelux and Italy were specialized niche producers and still de-
pendent on cheap United States imports to provide the bulk of their defense needs. In 
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all of these states, large and small, there existed the impulse to “internalise the devel-
opment and manufacture of defense equipment.”27 Their defense industries not only 
became part of their larger political and economic infrastructures, as William Walker 
and Philip Gummett note, they also became “prized national assets” to be protected 
and nurtured.28  
  In this environment, incentives for cooperation for cooperation’s sake were 
scarce. Indeed, as Calmann asserts, Europeans had 
no broad basis of agreement about defense needs (nor about how to sat-
isfy them) on which to build some common system of procurement. 
The question [remained] why, under these circumstances, they should 
bother with or want to have such a common system in the first place.29 
In the span of fifteen years, following the end of World War II, the countries of NATO 
Europe had progressed from substantial levels of equipment standardization based 
upon American equipment to a diversity of weapon systems based on incompatible 
national designs.  
  Institutionally, however, NATO remained committed to promoting RSI within 
the alliance. The emphasis, however, shifted from building upon existent rationaliza-
tion amongst its members, to “closing the barn door,” in the words of a United States 
congressional report.30 In 1959, the Alliance adopted the NATO Basic Military Re-
quirement (NBMR) scheme. NBMR operated on the premise that standardization 
could be achieved if member states were aware of the military requirements at the alli-
ance-level. As conceived, either national militaries or NATO committees would 
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submit proposals for NBMRs to a permanent Standing Group for evaluation. If ap-
proved, following consultation with NATO Command Officers, the Standing Group 
would shunt the proposals to the Alliance’s central Military Committee, to formalize 
weapons specifications and to disseminate them to the member states. It was then in-
cumbent upon the allies to frame suitable defense industrial partnerships to satisfy the 
demand.31  
  The NBMR initiative collapsed within seven years. Exclusive reliance upon 
military advisors led to the creation of requirements that did not consider state budget-
ary limitations. Moreover, as Trevor Taylor writes: 
. . .A fundamental problem was that governments were very reluctant to 
arrange production of items which military representatives in NATO 
felt were needed.32 
Although forty-nine NBMRs had been written by 1966, none yielded a collaborative 
project that produced an actual weapons system. That year, the Council of National 
Armaments Directors (CNAD), an organizational descendent of the Defense Produc-
tion and Supply Board, was created to ensure that NATO continued to place an 
institutional fingerprint on the defense industrial activities of the member states. By 
the mid 1960s, efforts to guide alliance-level defense procurement in a top-down fash-
ion were abandoned in favor of an explicitly circumscribed oversight role. The 
initiative for interstate cooperation would remain with the national governments. 
CNAD continued the process of disseminating information on doctrine and national 
equipment requirements, except there was no longer the expectation that this activity 
would yield any “project. . .for a particular item of equipment.”33  
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  While NATO efforts to promote collaboration during its first twenty years 
floundered at the multilateral level, wholly intra-European institutional efforts fared 
little better. In October 1950, French Defense Minister Rene Pleven proposed the crea-
tion of an European Defense Community (EDC) to contain German re-armament and 
to deter possible Soviet aggression. The EDC treaty allowed for the establishment of a 
unified regional military force that promised a level of defense cooperation not found 
in NATO: a common defense budget, a centralized procurement agency, and the inte-
gration of national military units at the division level.34 Articles 107 through 109 of 
the treaty specified the procurement rules for the unified European Defense Force. A 
Board of Commissioners would be empowered to determine and execute integrated 
community-wide programs for arms production, logistics and infrastructure. The 
Board would strive to standardize defense equipment “as rapidly as possible,” and all 
decisions on defense industrial allocations would require a two-third majority for ap-
proval.35  
  The EDC collapsed in 1954 when the French government refused to ratify the 
Treaty after the parliament rejected the establishment of a supranational agency that 
would might control the country’s military and defense industrial base. European ef-
forts to retain the initiative and press forward with regional defense regime succeeded 
in establishing the Western European Union that year under the revised Brussels 
Treaty. The WEU largely overlapped with NATO in terms of its objectives, and it was 
rendered inactive soon after its formation and remained so until 1984.36     
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  The failure to institutionalize armaments in Western Europe before 1970, did 
not mean that cooperation was either scarce or uneventful during that period. Euro-
pean impulses toward sovereignty and autarky curtailed any desire to rationalize their 
defense efforts through international organizations. Regionally, Europeans emphasized 
state control over national defense industrial assets.  Interstate arms cooperation, when 
it occurred, would be structured to serve national ends. Focused and unchallenged 
state involvement in the collaboration process would allow them to maximize poten-
tial gains to their defense bases through access to technology and production skills 
without the meddling of a long-standing, potentially efficiency-seeking institutional 
arrangementorganizations that, as Gummett and Walker note, might  
[compel] governments to submit to a form of arbitration which dimin-
ishes their individual command over industrial assets most tightly 
embedded in notions of sovereigntya tall order in the best of times.37  
Consequently, most of the procurement cooperation that occurred in the 1950s and 
1960s arose from states engaging in bilateral deals with other European countries, or 
from multilateral projects with the United States, in which the participant states alone 
defined the program and arrange its procedures and organization. Only once this was 
done, would it be given a post-hoc NATO seal of approval. 
  This sort of ad-hocery dominated the period, and was manifest in a host col-
laborative projects conducted on both a transatlantic and European basis. In fact, 
cooperation tended occur in sequence. The first programs were transatlantic  the F-
104G Starfighter, the Hawk, Sidewinder, and Bullpup missiles, and the M-109 howit-
zer   were all joint-production defense industrial collaborations. Europeans used 
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access to American technology to further advance their own industries. In the case of 
the F-104G, for example, German participation bestowed it with leading edge United 
States’ technology and design skills that allowed Germany to restore its aerospace in-
dustry.38 Judith Reppy and Philip Gummett note that once Europeans re-established 
their national defense industries through American assistance, they turned inward, of-
ten to a mixed strategy of national procurement coupled to occasional episodes of 
interstate industrial consortia with other European partners.39 
  By the end of the 1960s, intra-European collaboration had attained a signifi-
cant share of all cooperative activity within the Alliance. Tornado, Lynx, Alpha-jet, 
and ROLAND, to name only a few projects of the period, represented the transition to 
a more ostensibly collaborative environment. Nonetheless, by the early 1970s, there 
was no conclusive evidence that the nationalization of defense production was waning 
to any significant extent. Indeed, the words of Paul-Henri Spaak seemed as apt in 
1970 as they did when he first spoke them eleven years earlier: 
We still have not managed to obtain any worthwhile standardization in 
our equipment in NATO. With one or two minor exceptions, we have 
not succeeded in properly apportioning armament production tasks 
among allies. We repeat experiments in one country, which have al-
ready been concluded in another; we insist on reinventing what has 
already been invented; and we refuse to trust our friends with secrets 
which have been known to the enemy for a long time.40 
The European defense industrial environment, however, was not fixed. The possibility 
existed for substantial changes to the status quo. Economic, military and ideational 
factors underlining defense cooperation were changing, and arguably in ways that 
would favor greater and more complex cooperation in the future. 
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  By 1970, cost escalation in defense equipment and the inability to address the 
problem through purely national initiatives had become a driving force behind interna-
tional procurement collaboration. Among modern weapons technologies, commodity 
costs invariably increased over time, and significantly, at a rate faster than that of their 
civilian counterparts.41 In practical, post-World War II terms, this has translated into 
an average cost escalation in defense goods roughly 5 percent per year above the rate 
of inflation for civilian products since 1945.42  
Mary Kaldor has argued that:  
what matters in the military market is not so much the ability to design 
a weapon that is cheap to develop and produce, as the ability to design 
a weapon that can claim an improved technical performance over its 
predecessors.43 
 The military imperative for performance improvement insured that each successive 
generation of weapon system was more expensive than the one that preceded it. For 
low-value, low technology goods such as munitions, cost escalation was relatively mi-
nor. These systems did not require incessant technological innovation because of the 
absence of effective countermeasures, or as in the case of dual-use goods, they were 
not “explicitly engaged in combative environments.”44 Sophisticated, technologically 
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dynamic goods such as aircraft and tactical missiles, on the other hand, experienced 
inter-generational cost increases often in excess of 250 percent in real-terms.45 
  Here, the same military-technical revolution that emancipated military com-
manders through force-multiplication and real-time command and control, also 
diminished state capacity to satisfy national defense needs through strictly native pro-
duction schemes.46 Cost escalation had become the price of a modern military, and it 
outpaced the capabilities of most national, industrial-technology defense bases 
(ITDBs). Thomas Callaghan suggested that at this rate, the advanced weapons-
producing states would face “structural disarmament,” as the price of weapons ex-
ceeded the countries’ ability to acquire them through indigenous means.47 As quality 
increased, limited resources restricted the potential for quantity. Successive genera-
tions of weapons faced ever-diminishing production runs theoretically yielding 
untenable force postures and the proclaimed specter of a one-ship navy or one-plane 
air force.48 Increased cooperation offered a means to escape structural disarmament 
through pooling national resources for some common equipment goal. 
  While techno-economic concerns were the leading motivation for most past 
defense industrial collaboration in NATO Europe and elsewhere, they were certainly 
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not the only ones. While many states placed great value on the economic well-being of 
their defense industrial complexes and used multinational cooperation to achieve that 
end, using collaboration to supply security needs was no less legitimate.  
  That NATO had become, by the 1970s, in the words of Thomas Callaghan, less 
of a collective force as envisioned by its architects in the early 1950s and more of a 
collection of forces that made a sham of the collective defense and the Integrated Mili-
tary Command, had not been lost to pundits both within and without Alliance 
institutions.49 Given that NATO national militaries pursued the ideal of fighting to-
gether seamlessly in integrated naval and air defense commands, and in multinational 
army groups on the ground, it seemed obvious to any reasonable observer that 16 
separate defense ministries procuring different weapons to disparate standards did not 
represent the best possible use of allied resources, nor did it offer the best chance of 
operational success. Indeed, General Andrew Goodpaster, Supreme Allied Com-
mander Europe in NATO during the beginning of the 1970s, remarked that NATO lost 
between 30 percent to 50 percent of its potential combat effectiveness due to nonstan-
dardization.50 
  While General Goodpaster may have overstated the case somewhat,51 it is clear 
that NATO’s operational prospects as a disjointed alliance were less than optimal. In-
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deed, if victorious armies are those that win the battle of logistics, then the fact that 
NATO Europe continued to field 6 different national assault rifles, 4 national anti-tank 
missile types, 3 national variants of self-propelled artillery, to name only a few sys-
tems, seemed an open invitation to military disaster. Moreover, each “family” of 
weapons necessitated separate doctrines, training procedures, and support services, 
even though the platforms may have been functionally similar. For example, UK main 
battle tank ammunition, though of NATO “standard” caliber, could not be fired from 
any non-British NATO tank;52 a Bundeswehr soldier skilled in the use HK641 assault 
rifle had neither the training nor the specialized kit needed to maintain or competently 
fire a British SA80 without traversing a substantial learning curve; and finally, a 
French Mirage jet landing at a Dutch airfield could not be readily serviced for the sim-
ple fact that the tools needed to remove restraining bolts and side-panels were of a 
proprietary French design suitable only for French aircraft.53 Such dis-commonality, 
on everything from tank-treads to tactical missiles, undermined the very purpose of 
collective defense through military integration because it ensured maximum friction in 
any and all joint operations.54 Allies that could not talk to each other, provide mutual 
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fire support, maneuver together, rearm together, or even refuel togetherjust a few of 
the effects of nationalized procurement and equipment diversitycould not hope to 
effectively complement each other while fighting in the same battlespace, under the 
same command, and for the same objective. Indeed, under such conditions, the coali-
tion would have to work just as hard not to kill each other through fratricide as they 
would to destroy the enemy.55 Multinational production presented a practical, albeit 
partial, solution to these tactical problems. Instead of 16 sixteen states producing their 
own individual designs, collaboration permitted dyads, triads, and even multilateral 
groupings of states to procure the same weapons, with the same ammunition, the same 
spares, and the same support systems.  
  Further, common weapons brought with them a closer alignment of doctrine 
and of military requirements. For example, in a study of the Anglo-German-Italian 
Tornado Multiple Combat Role Aircraft: 
British officials were frank to admit that they never really tried to un-
derstand German requirements until told that the next aircraft would 
either be developed cooperatively with the Germans, or it wouldn’t be 
developed at all.56 
For a military alliance, all these factors were extremely important as they could de-
termine its ultimate chances of success or failure in combat. Moreover, greater 
commonality offered the potential savings of billions of dollars of coalition re-
sourcesscarce monies that might be used to improve training or stocks but were 
nonetheless squandered through duplicated R&D and production. 
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  Security and economic logics traditionally assumed prominent positions as jus-
tification for collaboration efforts within the Alliance. They held the immediate 
promise of saving money, of preserving or establishing valued techno-industrial ca-
pacities within participating states, and finally, the more hypothetical but no less 
coveted goal of saving lives in wartime. Consequently, these arguments were the first 
to be seized upon when justifying cooperation and the most vociferously pursued. A 
third rationale was also often present, though typically far more muted and arguably 
less understood by proponents and observers alike, though its relative emphasis and 
importance was regularly noted by the late 1960s: the promotion of political linkages 
between partner states. The act of collaborationand thus standardizationeven on 
an item-by-item basis, created significant interdependencies. As noted, armaments co-
operation requires that states make operational compromises with their partners, 
concessions in which optimal military needs may be sacrificed in favor of a common 
requirements objective. Politically, however, the sublimation of “national priorities” to 
some greater goodbe it simple alliance cohesion or the grander goals of West Euro-
pean economic and political uniondenoted a potentially radical step beyond debates 
over calibers or preferred stand-off ranges. The act of collaboration could provide both 
practical and symbolic reaffirmation of the ties among states and the vision that the 
interests and identity of a given country could possibly mirror, if not wholly merge, 
with that of a larger community of states.  
  At a rather mundane level, this observation is unsurprising. After all, the two 
largest European collaborative aerospace projects during the post-war period, the Tor-
nado and the Alpha-jet, were both called “political aircraft,” in which the value of 
displaying political commitment exceeded cost and operational calculations.57 In the 
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former case, for example, the British desire to push the project forward, and thus 
demonstrate the United Kingdom’s status as a “good” European worthy of EC 
membership, compelled decision-makers to set aside their military requirements. The 
political symbolism of Tornado  was such that Britain readily invested billions of 
pounds for development, maintenance, and support in an aircraft that was known to be 
inferior in some air combat roles to the Royal Air Force plane that it was intended to 
replace, the Lightning a technology that the United Kingdom had not only produced 
indigenously but that was nearly 20 years older than Tornado.58 Moreover, Britain’s 
partners, West Germany and Italy, also accepted operational compromises to maintain 
British involvement, both to pursue their own parochial state interests as well as retain 
British interest in the European integration movement.  
  European armaments collaboration in the late 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s 
rested on the same political undercurrents. The early years of intra-European coopera-
tive procurement occurred in a time of healthy defense equipment budgets and of 
healthier export markets, which lessened the primary material imperatives to collabo-
rate. The incentives for military standardization were as pressing then as now, but the 
relatively few instances of early cooperative procurement in Western Europe also dis-
played a discernible political character. All of these collaborations occurred in 
technologies that were still within the technical and financial bounds of states to pur-
sue autonomously. Wholly banal items such as ordnance remained nationalized, as did 
very high value-added systems, like variable-geometry aircraft, i.e., Tornado. The re-
maining range of “mid-level” technologies, while certainly high-tech, were not the 
items that state elites regarded as exemplifying the apex of techno-industrial develop-
ment and thus were acceptable for collaboration. These collaborative efforts were not 
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able to reverse, or even halt, the broad trends toward de-standardization ongoing since 
the mid-1950s. They were, however, fairly high-profile projects that provided signifi-
cant techno-industrial benefits and an important demonstration effect: that Western 
Europeansformer enemies and active competitorscould indeed achieve rap-
prochement and work together to build the still young European Community and the 
common defense. Franco-German cooperation of the period best exemplified this 
trend. The joint production of hundreds of jet trainers (Alpha-Jet) and of hundreds of 
thousands of tactical missiles (HOT, Milan, Roland) were a result of the 1963 Élysee 
Treaty and consequently reflected the new found partnership between these two states 
at the defense-industrial level.  
  While the significance of past diplomatic maneuverings such as these should 
not be overstatedas we shall soon seethe potential implications of this pattern of 
arms collaboration-as-community-building are profound. Within NATO Europe, both 
conventional wisdom and governmental proclamations maintained that identity and 
interest were in flux: a discernible European identity coexisted along with fifteen 
separate national state identities and its salience only increased with time;59 and offi-
cial debates about the conduct and future of defense industrial policy were often 
“presented in an European rather than a national context.”60 Over the last thirty years, 
this particular behavior has become commonplace, as the regional good is at least 
rhetorically emphasized over the welfare of any of its national components, e.g., the 
creation of an European aerospace industry through multinational collaboration, or the 
building of an advanced European defense industrial base. Cooperation is thus subor-
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dinated to larger political ambitions expressed in the language of identity convergence 
which are not linked to any immediate security or parochial state economic concern.  
  While the true extent to which cooperative procurement was (and is) shaped by 
the lofty ideals of regional integration, or even simple Alliance fealty, is debatable, 
this discursive trend cannot be readily dismissed. When European defense decision-
makers such as B. O. Heath, former chairman of the British Aircraft Corporation, as-
sert that: 
Without wishing to raise emotional issues, I think that there is a longer-
term advantage in [collaboration] both nationally and collectively, in-
dustrially and politically. One does have the feeling that in working 
with, what seems now wrong to call foreigners, one is doing a little in 
the strange mode of military aircraft to unite Europe, if you want to put 
a name to it, and bring people together. It is a strange medium for it, but 
I certainly have that feeling on occasions.61 
he has moved the collaboration debate beyond national self-interest, and even beyond 
the domain of a military alliance of sovereign states. If this were truly the case, and 
the chairman and his cohorts were sincere, then armaments collaboration could both 
reflect a transformation in state identity toward a new paradigm, as well as a mecha-
nism for moving the process of ideational change forward.  
  Whatever the rationale for collaboration in NATO Europe, it is clear that, as 
one RAND study noted, these states did not engage in cooperative procurement solely 
because they “need[ed] a common piece of equipment on which they can profitably 
collaborate.”62 They held instead complicated sets of objectives that might not be mu-
tually reinforcing and were possibly contradictory. Military, techno-economic, and 
political/ideational incentives to engage in cooperative procurement each followed a 
                                                 
61 B.O. Heath, “The MRCA Project,” The Aeronautical Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society 74 
(June 1970): 455. 
62 Michael Rich et. al., Multinational Coproduction of Military Aerospace Systems The RAND Corpo-
ration R-2861-AF, October 1981, 41.  
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discrete logic. Each also prescribed implicit courses of action that, when combined, 
could lead to duplicitous rhetoric and ineffectual conduct. For example, the desire to 
maximize a state’s own techno-industrial gain from cooperation could severely limit 
any concurrent appeal for community and regional integration. To promote the latter 
suggested building a political order in which the state interest was eclipsed. The pur-
suit of the former, by contrast, was a distinctly national endeavor seeking to protect 
one’s own industry, employment, and technology base. In such circumstances, as Law-
rence Hagen wrote: 
Self-interest can be disguised as communal interest; hierarchies of val-
ues can be blurred or ignored; conflicting goals can be presented as 
complementary; and the interests of one party can be cloaked in the 
terms of another in order to induce a favorable response. . .Taken to-
gether, the result is a volatile situation [where ] the public mode of 
policy expression is particularly prone to distortion and obfuscation.63 
Countries might exalt community-building and see themselves as partners in an evolv-
ing supranational political order; they might also value their duties and obligations as 
members of a troubled military alliance and desire to correct its flaws; and finally, 
they might regard weapons acquisition as a sovereign right, integral to both the physi-
cal and economic security of their national societies. It was the tension within this 
“hierarchy of values” held by statesthe reasons why they coveted the production 
and possession of armaments, and the pressures that motivated them to procure these 
items collaborativelythat shaped how, when, for what, and with whom states would 
cooperate.  
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in the Atlantic Alliance (Kingston, Canada: Center for International Relations, Queen’s University, 
1980), 12-13.  
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Taxonomies 
  While all these issues will be addressed in greater detail in the subsequent case 
studies, for the moment let us turn to a less historical discussion and focus upon on the 
“how” aspect of collaborationthat is to say, the forms of cooperative arms procure-
ment that countries might employ use. The modus operandi of collaboration for a 
given technology or technology domain has theoretical significance. Defense indus-
trial cooperation is a complex business. For a single “multinational” weapons system 
to reach the field, partnerships must form, requirements fixed, developmental and pro-
duction workshares decided upon, technology exchanged, and certain techno-
industrial compromises agreed upon. Above all, potential political and economic in-
terdependencies must be considered, and either embraced or minimized. Roger Facer 
asserts that there is always some “loss of national sovereignty. . .in creating a more 
coherent system of [multinational] defense procurement” and in which “important de-
cisions need not go out the hands of individual governments.”64 The transactional 
nature of arms cooperation explicitly makes national policy dependent on that of oth-
ers simply because anything that is shared can be also be withheld. 
  One can best frame collaboration in terms of a continuum of interdependence 
and autarky. At one extreme, collaboration can consist of limited technology ex-
changes that do not threaten traditional notions of state sovereignty and may actually 
promote the expansion and diversification of distinctly national defense industrial ca-
pability; at the other, cooperation may in fact denote defense economic integration in 
which issues of state identity no longer determine procurement decision-making. Con-
sequently, procedural choices not only reflect state preferences over material needs 
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and acquisition methods, but also more fundamental ideas of self, other, and the 
relationship of each to defense technologies. 
  There are arguably as many nuanced methods of collaborating as there are po-
tential weapons technologies. For our purposes, however, there are 5 broad structural 
models that are applicable to cooperative procurement and have been either seriously 
proposed or actively employed in the Transatlantic region. In order of decreasing na-
tional independence  and thus increasing political and economic integration  these 
are: (i) managed, full specialization; (ii) a single community-wide defense equipment 
market based on free-market principles; (iii) reciprocal trade; (iv) co-development; and 
(v) licensed production. 
  The first of these, managed specialization, represents the apex of supranational 
authority in procurement cooperation. Here, states sacrifice their procurement deci-
sion-making functions to a coordinating institution empowered to perform those tasks 
at the community level. Instead of a Dutch Ministry of Military Economic Affairs or a 
French Délégation Général pour l’Armament, a single regional procurement executive 
would determine what weapon systems were required for community security, and 
would support R&D and award production contracts to those firms that best fit desired 
cost, political, and technological criteria. Such a structure need not necessarily impose 
maximum economic efficiency, and arguably could not, just as such as similar struc-
tures do not exist at the national level. Taxpayer democraciesor even a community 
of taxpayer democraciesmust always cater to the concerns of their electorates, and 
economic welfare issues typically receive the greatest interest. It is conceivable, there-
fore, that procurement decisions could continue to set aside cost-efficiency arguments 
in favor of political, second-best alternatives, and use procurement to achieve micro-
economic goals, such as maintaining employment in Northern Wales or subsidizing 
regional heavy industry in Flanders or in Bavaria, as currently occurs. What is impor- 
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tant, of course, is who, or rather what, would make these determinations: a regional 
institution with the same centralized decision-making powers as national organizations 
but empowered to make critical decisions of resource allocation and industrial distri-
bution across state lines. 
  This model creates a unified defense market from above through the renuncia-
tion of a major component of state sovereignty: provision for the national defense. 
Countries become less state-like and more akin to provinces whose security is ad-
dressed at higher levels of authorityan authority, that by definition, possesses the 
political legitimacy to make such decisions, as all states currently do in the interna-
tional system. Specialization at this level has been attempted only once among NATO 
countries in the form of the proposed procurement agency of the aborted European 
Defense Community of the early 1950s. Subsequent, less encompassing attempts to 
coordinate regional/Alliance procurement, however, also failed precisely because of 
their potential to undermine the institution of state sovereignty.  
  The second means of structuring multinational procurement is less politically 
intrusive than managed specialization, but its potential to effectively denationalize de-
fense industries is no less great. Free trade represents the procedural opposite of 
managed specialization. The latter functions through positive integration based on su-
pranational control, through the creation of new institutions that impose rule from 
above on otherwise sovereign parties. Free trade, by contrast, relies on negative inte-
gration through marketization in which barriers to cooperation are removed and 
economic actors are allowed to operate relatively unfettered from petty political im-
peratives. In this model, defense technologies are commodified and traded in the same 
fashion as civilian goods. States act as consumers on open regional and/or interna-
tional markets and solicit bids from all firms within these areas, irrespective of  
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national identity.65 Defense companies are unencumbered by state meddling, but also 
fully exposed to market forces. Firms can restructure as they choose, both within and 
across state borders, and are free to form prime contractor-subcontractor partnerships, 
strategic alliances, and mergers. As inefficient companies falter and close with the end 
of discriminatory industrial policies and as successful firms exploit the new liberal 
environment, the effects of comparative advantage would emerge, with the most capa-
ble national producers becoming principal suppliers community-wide. 
  Marketization entails a redefinition of state sovereignty in which sovereignty’s 
links with arms procurement are minimized. The ability to develop and produce de-
fense technologies is no longer a cherished capacity for which autarky remains an 
ideal. Instead there is an explicit assumption that the market provides a stable set of 
suppliers, who can be counted upon to provide defense equipment as needed. Produc-
ers supply to the entire market and firm nationality and security of supply concerns no 
longer matter. Indeed, as defense firms enjoy freedoms long practiced in the civilian 
sector, such as cross-border equity exchanges and acquisitions, any questions of na-
tional affiliations may become superfluous.  
  This is the perhaps the most significant aspect of the free-market model, given 
that the name is something of a misnomer. Absolute free trade in arms for all classes 
of defense technology is impossible because the optimal production scale for certain 
weapons systems is so great that there is a tendency for competition to produce natural 
monopolies.66 This pattern has become increasingly prevalent in NATO national mar-
kets in high technology fields, particularly aerospace; high costs have discouraged 
states from subsidizing multiple producers, and years of corporate insolvency and 
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mergers have produced solitary national champions, such as Germany’s DASA or 
British Aerospace in the United Kingdom.67   
  Nonetheless, for either Germany or Britain to choose the other’s national 
champion as its principal supplier for an entire class of defense equipment without any 
guarantees of industrial reciprocity would be a radical shift. For the British Ministry of 
Defense to regard a German firm as it would a British firm and vice-versa implies that 
the security of both is fundamentally indivisible. It is therefore telling that such rela-
tionships do not yet exist within the NATO Community. True, direct, or off-the-shelf, 
equipment purchases from foreign suppliers have been a feature of North Atlantic de-
fense cooperation since the Second World War. This form of cooperative procurement 
has fallen, however, in relative importance over the last thirty years, as even the least 
developed defense industrial economies expanded basic techno-industrial capacities.68 
Moreover, defense markets throughout the Transatlantic area have remained largely 
illiberal and politicized. Policy makers continue to exclude the bulk, if not all, of their 
defense industries from market forcesa whole industrial sector “jealously guarded 
and generously protected” through R&D subsidies, nationally discriminatory pro-
                                                 
67 Additionally, it should be noted that defense industrial cost-efficiency is not solely the product of 
“comparative advantages in the factors or conditions of production,” but is also shaped by the extent of 
domestic production and resources available for R&D. Because the nature of the arm market limits new 
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some cases, arms control regimes prevent technology transfer. Loc. cit. 
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laborative schemes. United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Secretary of Defense, 
Defense Trade: European Initiatives to Integrate the Defense Market (GAO/NSIAD-98-6, October 
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curement policies and the transference of capital to contractors under highly “favor-
able” terms.69 
  The third method of multinational arms procurement is reciprocal trade. This 
form of managed free trade offers some the same benefits as the free trade model, but 
the application of market forces to state procurement structures is limited in scale and 
scope, and is thus more politically acceptable. Under reciprocal trade, states open their 
domestic defense bases to relatively unfettered, competitive cross-border tendering by 
firms in allied countries. Discriminatory defense industrial policies are rescinded, and 
within limits, the national identity of companies ceases to be a legitimate standard for 
awarding contracts. Unlike pure free trade, however, market entry is limited by more 
than cost and/or technological criteria. States continue to value the well-being of their 
national DITBs, but make explicit distinctions between certain classes of defense pro-
curementbetween those that are of strategic importance in a techno-nationalist 
sense, and those that do not serve as engines of techno-industrial development and are 
not symbols of national greatness. For the latter category, the absolute need for certain 
national production competencies is either de-emphasized or explicitly rejected. Coun-
tries may therefore embrace trade liberalization restricted to these areas, with the 
additional caveat of diffuse reciprocity: all participating states must share the same 
open procurement policy and trade should balance over the long-term.     
  In Western Europe, reciprocal trade is best exemplified by the 1987 Anglo-
French Reciprocal Purchasing Agreement and the 1989 Independent European Pro-
gramme Group European Defense Market Initiative. The North American equivalent 
is the United States-Canada Defense Production Sharing Agreement. All of these 
pacts share the attributes of diffuse reciprocity and non-discrimination regionally, with 
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the Europeans moving more cautiously, limiting their liberalization to production con-
tracts of under $100 million. Reciprocal trade offers these states the best of both 
worlds in the conflict between efficiency and autarky: they are assured that their ad-
vanced defense industrial bases will be safeguarded and preserved largely intact but 
they can also reap the cost-efficiency gains of marketized procurement policies ap-
plied uniformly throughout a bi-, or multilateral defense “community”, however 
restricted in scope.  
  Reciprocal trade allows for piecemeal integration, whichwhile not as ag-
gressive as either the imposition of supranational control or full marketizationcan in 
time produce the same effects. As firms enjoy larger “home” markets for their prod-
ucts and as national defense establishments become accustomed to employing each 
other’s equipment, interdependency becomes both entrenched and self-sustaining. In 
time, this process can advance to the point where national markets become so inter-
twined as to be indistinguishable from each other. This condition already exists in 
North America, albeit with certain important caveats. Progress in Western Europe, 
however, has been far more muted. What remains important, however, is the ideational 
component of managed trade: identity and/or interest convergence can reach the level 
in which one state regards another’s defense industrial base as being an integral part of 
its own, however partially.  
  Given the historic imperatives for sovereignty and autonomy in defense pro-
curement, international marketization at any level must necessarily involve much 
more than the simple quest for greater budgetary and industrial efficiencies in pro-
curement. States must make hard choices as to the exact nature of their defense 
industrial “portfolio.” They must distinguish among those technologies that are of 
strategic material importance, as well as those serving to define how the country per-
ceives itself and how it is perceived by others, e.g., modern, advanced, independent,  
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German, etc. States must also identify those allies with whom they share not only mu-
tual obligations, but also a web of intertwined interests and shared values so deep that 
concept of self blurs to embrace the other.  
  Little wonder then, that the vast bulk of cooperative procurement throughout 
the Alliance historically has avoided any form of marketization to the maximum ex-
tent possible. Within the NATO “community,” as throughout the international system, 
countries tend toward “non-market solutions” to meet their procurement objectives 
when faced with a pressing need for multinational collaboration.70 The last two meth-
ods of cooperative procurement reflect the pervasive desire to both politicize 
procurement and to structure collaboration so that it maximizes national gain and pre-
serves national defense industrial capabilities. The first of these, licensed production, 
is the most prevalent form of armaments collaboration globally. It was once the cor-
nerstone of cooperation within NATO and is still commonly used throughout the 
Alliance. In this model, states procure the rights to manufacture in their home indus-
tries weapons developed abroad. That said, the process can be complex and nearly 
always involves much more than the transfer of technical diagrams and patent waiv-
ers. Buyers and sellers must exchange volumes of information in order to integrate the 
desired technology within the recipient’s defense industry. In some cases, complete 
factory-floor fabrication methods and skills have to be transferred.  
  The seller loses ultimate control over technology that it indigenously created, 
but uses the transaction to recoup its original R&D investment and to help subsidize 
inter-generational advancement. The buyer gains access to technologies that it lacks 
the financial wherewithal or technical competence to develop on its own. By procur-
ing the design, and not the completed system, recipients can ensure significant gains 
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for their domestic DIBs. They can safeguard domestic employment levels and local 
production capacities; modify foreign designs to better suit national military require-
ments; minimize outflows of foreign exchange, and ensure access to spares and 
replacements; and finally, use the acquired productive skills to expand the national 
DIB and create a domestic capacity for the later development of similar technology.71  
  In some cases, licensed production created capabilities that did not exist prior 
to the initial series of projects. Judith Reppy and Philip Gummett note that the devel-
opment of the postwar Italian aerospace industry progressed from licensed production 
of American technology, to the development of an indigenous military trainer aircraft, 
with Italy later becoming a major participant in regional armaments consortia.72 This 
pattern emerged elsewhere in the alliance when countries with either weak or special-
ized manufacturing capacities expanded their domestic industrial potential through 
collaboration to become significant producers in their own right. 
  The use of licensed production within NATO has not been sole preserve of the 
weak: both strong and medium-sized defense industrial states use it to acquire ad-
vanced, ready-made foreign systems that are so attractive that the expense of a parallel 
R&D effort is not justifiable. That Britain builds French Exocet missiles or that the 
Netherlands manufactures German Leopard tanks is, from a military alliance stand-
point, a positive step. Every act of standardization, however small, improves the 
chances for allies to interact effectively. If the ultimate objective of cooperation, how-
ever, is to promote community-wide defense industrial integration or a transnational 
division of labor in armaments production, then licensed production is counterproduc-
tive. The practice does not bring national DIBs closer to together, but rather serves to 
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maintain autonomous industrial infrastructures. States choose it precisely because it 
enhances the profile of their defense industries with the introduction of new technolo-
gies, acquired production skills, and new work orders, without the financial burden of 
autonomous development. Moreover, it does so without the potential disruption and 
redistribution of assets that would arise from a market-driven community-level indus-
trial restructuring, or worse still, a meddling supranational authority. 
  Licensed production, however, is not a perfect tool for self-seeking states hop-
ing to achieve maximum gains for their defense technology base. Licensed production 
provides clear industrial benefits, but its effect on national technology innovation is 
indirect at best. As recipients are involved only in replicating existing equipment de-
signs, their home R&D networks are not fully tasked. While cooperation can expose 
them to new production technologies and management techniques, they do not neces-
sarily share in advancements made during the process of developmentdiscoveries in 
the applied sciences, e.g. metallurgy, chemical engineering, electronics, ballistics, etc., 
that can be “spun-off” into other areas of the defense industrial base, or even into the 
larger national economy. Compounding this situation, most supplier states have his-
torically rarely provided the latest technology in licensing exchanges.73 Few licensers 
wish to create ready-made competitors, and consequently sell specifications to sys-
tems with inferior propulsion systems, reduced firepower or protection profiles 
compared to the  variants used in the home market. The use of modular subsystems 
means that some of choicest and most sensitive technologies, such the firmware for 
guidance computers, can be “blackboxed” and not transferred at all, except of course 
as unit sales.74 
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  In co-development, the final general acquisition strategy for multinational co-
operative procurement, states share in both the development and production of new 
technologies, and thus reap maximum benefit. Co-development allows states that are 
weak in certain areas to secure access and develop new competence, while allowing 
the strong to retain and expand those competencies that they already possess.75 In co-
development, states agree to a common military requirement and then jointly proceed 
through every stage of weapons development and production, beginning with feasibil-
ity studies and project definition, and later terminating with system engineering, 
prototype production, subassembly manufacturing, and final assembly. Partners either 
share equally in each phase, or more commonly adhere to a detailed calculus in which 
national work-shares are directly proportional to the amount of money that each state 
contributes to the collective R&D pool.  
  Co-development is thus a basis for market-sharing cartels in which countries 
seek an explicit and structured division of national responsibilities to allocate work to 
national producers and research centers. Through the principle of le juste retour, or 
fair-return, governments determine not only which of their military equipment firms 
participate in a given collaborative venture, but also in which aspects of technology 
development and production. States demand an immediate and exact workshare equal 
in value to their contribution to a given project’s development cost. For example, in 
the Anglo-German-Italian Tornado  fighter-bomber project, the participating states 
held a 42.5/42.5/15 percent respective cost-share/work-share. This meant that Italy 
                                                                                                                                              
aspect of the plane’s design. The two subsystems deliberately withheld were the radar control and im-
aging computers, or more specifically, the ROM firmware that contained their operating systems. These 
systems allowed the Hawkeye  to perform its primary role as a surveillance platform. Northrop-
Grumman hoped to monopolize control over the technology to the extent of denying buyers even basic 
maintenance knowledge. Interview, Official with Northrop Grumman Europe, Summer 1996. 
75 David Greenwood, “Collaborative Arms Acquisitions in Western Europe, Inhibitions and Con-
straints” in International Arms Procurement: New Directions, ed. Martin Edmonds (New York: 
Pergamon Press, 1981), 88.  
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provided 15 percent of the total R&D costs and, in return, was permitted to produce 15 
percent of the value of the airframe, engine and avionics packages. Italy also received 
15 percent of the total production run of planes. These figures were meticulously 
measured and were often changed to reflect currency fluctuations or revised national 
military requirements. In some cases, states calculated cost-share/work-share to the 
hundredth decimal point in order to extract some techno-industrial benefit from every 
last cent of expenditure. 
  This practice has shaped nearly every instance of co-development within the 
Alliance since it became the dominant form of multinational collaboration for major 
weapons systems in the mid-1960s. Even as the civilian sector of the North Atlantic 
economy began to transcend national barriers, particularly in Western Europe, through 
deliberate moves toward regional economic integration, arms procurement collabora-
tion in major systems remained at best “second-best:” as Lawrence Hagen argues, a 
form of “integration without tears.”76 Through juste retour, partners have emphasized 
relative gains, as the desire for equity overrode concerns with military or economic 
efficiency. Even when sub-assembly development has been competitively tendered, 
the “desire” for fair-return has undermined any potential gain, as no participating na-
tional firm is permitted to lose no matter who wins the contract. Because each state is 
allocated a seat at the design and production “table,” regardless of technical compe-
tence or cost, “winners” can be compelled to subcontract work to “losers,” or, as in 
cases like the ECR90 tactical airborne radar for the Eurofighter, national firms may 
actually hold positions in each competing international consortium.77 
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  Co-development, like licensed production and direct offset trade, represents a 
form of collaborative protectionism in that competition is restricted and states employ 
foreign technology and capital to support their own domestic defense industrial assets. 
Unlike the other forms of state-led cooperation, co-development requires greater coor-
dination to ensure that juste retour is fully implemented, often leading to the creation 
of a project-specific multinational procurement agency. Nonetheless, national self-
interest remains paramount. States determine the allocation of production and research 
centers to satisfy purely national ends while imposing considerable diseconomies 
through higher transportation costs, communication problems, and duplicated admin-
istrative and assembly nodes. Collaboration does not occur to provide positive-sum 
gains in which partners coordinate their activities to rationalize alliance-wide surplus 
capacity and seek cost efficiencies that can lower defense financial burdens on na-
tional society. Instead, co-development, as Philip Gummett and William Walker 
rightly note, is just a complex method of initiating “reciprocal moves [to] maintain the 
status quo in terms of the broad distribution of defense capabilities.”78 The collabora-
tion that it structures, while intricate, is only a “substitute for integration (emphasis 
mine).”79 
 
Conclusion 
  These acquisition strategies differ in terms of how they either complement or 
degrade the pursuit of state sovereignty. Each requires that states make specific 
choices about the extent to which they are willing to compromise their autonomy in 
defense decision-making and defense industrial capacity. Countries must determine 
which segments of their national DIBs are critically important, both to their security 
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and to their sense of self-definition.  They must decide upon those areas where autarky 
in desired, those that can shared between partners but nonetheless satisfy the parochial 
imperatives of self-interest, and those can be sacrificed to partners whose interests and 
identity maybe moving toward convergence with their own.      
  Yet as we have briefly seen, there has been no definite tendency among West-
ern European states to make hard choicesto commit to radical restructuring of 
national defense industrial policies that would indicate a reconceptualization of state 
sovereignty, and correspondingly, denote significant shifts in the conceptualization of 
self. Cooperative strategies that would represent such a watershed are either theoreti-
cal, in the cases of supranationalization and full marketization, or in a handful of 
problematic and heavy qualified attempts at regulated trade out of forty-plus years of 
defense industrial cooperation. North Atlantic states have structured most of their pro-
curement collaborations to present the least possible challenge to their sovereignty and 
national state identity. Through offsets, licensed production and co-development, 
states actually create procedures that minimize interdependence and preserve auton-
omy through cooperative means. 
  We must be careful, however, not to arrive at any conclusions from what has 
been a limited overview. If identity shifts are both present and salient within Western 
Europe, their influence may not appear in broad transformations, but rather manifest in 
nuanced behavior in collaborations for different classes of defense goods and over 
time. Ab initio co-development and licensed co-production in high technology goods, 
for example, can co-exist with reciprocal market arrangements in other areas. Even in 
industrial collaboration, market principals of compentence and cost can still be em-
ployed in the allocation of sub-contracts. Today, one even sees the first stirrings of 
supranational control through the still debated European Armaments Agency.   
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  Thirty years ago, the defense industrial environment in Europe began to shift. 
It is at this point that one sees in the history of the Tornado project cooperation more 
complex than had yet been attempted. Furthermore, European collaboration also be-
came more diverse at this time with the low-technology howitzer co-development 
projects beginning with the FH-70. Both of these collaborative schemes began institu-
tional and behavior trajectories that extend to the present day. If European cooperation 
has indeed become integrative over time, and its motivations more diverse and with a 
greater emphasis upon ideational transformations, an analysis of these two institu-
tional histories should provide some indication. It is possible that state behavior within 
families of defense equipment may reflect changes in identity and interest, as the same 
countries cooperate to produce separate, yet similar, systems over a period of years. 
We shall address this possibility in the following chapters when we evaluate coopera-
tive behavior in the Tornado-Eurofighter and the FH-70 - SP-70 project dyads, 
respectively. 
  This latter set will allow us to also to consider the role that levels of technol-
ogy may play in highlighting identity shiftsa point that we will address in chapter 7 
on managed defense trade initiatives. Certain technologies may be embedded in na-
tional identity while others are more open to the influences of transnational identities. 
Low-technology arms production may still be as enshrined by states as are high-tech 
weapons. Nonetheless, in the North Atlantic area with its history of deepening coop-
eration and trustand particularly in Western Europe with its assumption of state 
identity convergencecountries do not face the same ideational incentives to not dif-
ferentiate between weapon types. The legacy of integration and the emergence of 
increasingly stable expectations about intra-group behavior have possibly allowed 
states to treat the least important domain of their high-politics interestsdefense in-
dustrial production of unsophisticated armaments—as just another part of the common  
 
111 
market process. Here, the development of a transnational identity subsumes self-
interest to a collective interest in which states may actually permit the creation of a 
regional DIB at cost to themselves, i.e., forging a transnational division of labor that 
reduces national capabilities and disadvantages both domestic constituents and na-
tional security. The task remains to ascertain whether this phenomenon has occurred 
and what exact role identity and identity-shift play in determining the behavior.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Tornado Multirole Combat Aircraft 
 
Introduction and Overview 
Among some students of European integration there is a questionable belief 
that national consciousness and that national allegiances are incompatible with their 
surpranational manifestations.1 Throughout the history of the European Union, how-
ever, nationalism and supranationalism have coexisted in an uneasy relationship, with 
the former always present and the latter visible most often in agonized half-steps or 
upon the fringes of national interest. That the desire to promote and protect some na-
tional “good”however definedhas been the dominant feature of the integration 
project in Europe is incontrovertible. Though West Europeans succeeded in cobbling 
together a fairly successful customs union within ten years of founding the European 
Economic Community, interstate cooperation did not become a perfected art. Far from 
it, in fact. As Stanley Hoffman, Wayne Sandholtz, Andrew Moravcsik and others have 
noted, during the Community’s early years in the 1960s and 1970s, cooperation rarely 
came easily, and was often embraced only after autarkic national options had been ex-
hausted, and even then, it was constrained by parochial state concerns such that any 
resulting collaborations were little more than half-way houses toward any meaningful 
integration.2  
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European Community (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1970), 262.  
2 Wayne Sandholtz, High-Tech Europe: The Politics of International Cooperation (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1992); Andrew Moravcsik, "The European Armaments Industry at the Crossroads," 
Survival 33 (1992), 71; Stanley Hoffman, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the 
Case of Western Europe,” Daedalus (Summer 1996); Alan Milward, The European Rescue of the Na-
tion-State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992; Andrew Moravcsik, “Negotiating the Single 
European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community,” Interna-
tional Organization 45 (Winter 1991). 113 
 
 
While the imperatives of national interest typically colored cooperation and 
generally hindered any emergent supranationalism, the dominance of national identi-
ties and their effect on shaping state preferences and behavior have not been 
necessarily incompatible with deepening collaboration between states, or even with 
the development of regional loyalties or affections. The regional identity that we dis-
cussed in Chapter 1 did not emerge spontaneously and intact, but rather developed 
over time, and in the face of a reconsolidating and resurgent nationalism that chal-
lenged the Union’s institutions and many of its loftier ideals. In the present case study, 
we shall explore an episode of European defense equipment collaboration that began 
at a time in which questions of a European identity were premature at best.3 The pur-
pose here is to use this first case as a base-line to gauge changes in state behavior over 
time which would signal shifts in affective attachment to regional integration. 
The Tornado Multirole Combat Aircraft (MRCA) was at the time of its incep-
tion in 1968 the largest and most technically complex collaborative undertaking in ab 
initio weapons development in Western Europe. It also ranks among the largest multi-
national cooperative industrial projects of any type. Helmut Schmidt, the West 
German Chancellor in the early 1970s, once asserted that the Tornado project was the 
“greatest undertaking since the birth of Christ.”4  
Hyperbole aside, Tornado embodied a number of milestones in European 
weapons cooperation. Tornado began as a German-inspired and German-led effort to 
                                                 
3 Lindberg and Scheingold noted that the affective attachments to Europe and toward European integra-
tion throughout the late 1960s were still somewhat poorly defined. While the existing data 
demonstrated that elite and mass attitudes were favorable to the ideal of integration and to its intergov-
ernmental and supranational institutions, this support was rooted in actual and anticipated welfare 
benefits provided by the Economic Community. This provided a permissive consensus that pro-
European elites used to justify and expand the Community’s scope, but its reach did not extend into 
areas of security and foreign policy cooperation. Here, national appeals against cooperative behavior 
had the greatest likelihood of success. This was true even for economic and industrial issues that could 
be construed in the public mind or by counter-elites as having some tangible import to national security. 
Lindberg and Scheingold, Europe’s Would-Be Polity, 62. 
4 Cited in Egon W. Heine, “MRCA, EFA. und PAH 2: Lernprozeß im Management internationaler 
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bring together in July 1968 the other three European members of the F-104 Starfighter 
consortium—Italy, Netherlands, and Belgium—plus the United Kingdom and Canada 
to explore the possibility of an ab initio collaborative program for a multinational, 
multi-function, tactical fighter-bomber. Within a year, German leadership had given 
way to a conflictual partnership of equals, with the United Kingdom and Italian mem-
bership wavering, and Belgium, Canada, and the Netherlands out of the program, 
having withdrawn under the common position that it was evolving in ways that did not 
and would not satisfy their interests. Nonetheless, the myriad negotiations and com-
promises that locked the remaining three countries together through development and 
production established early on that Tornado would indeed be something beyond nor-
mal European collaborative practice. 
First, Tornado was the first non-bilateral co-development program enacted by 
Europeans, bringing together Italy, Germany, and the United Kingdom to design and 
build an airplane based upon a variable-geometry airframe and its own unique en-
ginetechnologies as yet not employed by any NATO Europe country. Second, it 
formed the basis of a reorientation of regional defense industrial cooperation, eroding 
both its historic French dominance, as well as the attendant model of politically moti-
vated asymmetries in project leadership and technology control. Third, Tornado 
introduced a level of managerial organization and of partnership that was unique at its 
inception and more complex than anything attempted previously. Fourth, and signifi-
cantly, the project marked the beginning of a collaborative relationship between 
Britain, Germany, and Italy that expanded across technologies to include the FH70 
and SP70 howitizer programs of the 1970s and 1980s, and is forecast to endure at least 
until the mid 2030s, at which time the last of their respective Eurofighter fleets should 
retire from service. 115 
 
 
 The  Tornado program introduced all these changes to the practice of defense 
industrial cooperation in Western Europe. As the first noteworthy episode of true 
European codevelopment, it was and remains a significant achievement on the preced-
ing grounds alone.5 Nonetheless, for our purposes, Tornado’s value lies as much in 
what it has grown to represent over time as in what it accomplished in fact. Tornado at 
its start was not the manifestation some grand vision of European solidarity or of a 
new European sensibility. Indeed, as we shall see in the following section, if there was 
ever a time for a European breakthrough, the late 1960s were not the moment. Tor-
nado was a nationalist response to nationalist excesses that tainted most European 
defense equipment collaborations of the time, as well as the larger processes of Euro-
pean integration of the period. As William Walker noted in one of the few detailed 
analyses written about the project, the participating governments pursued “national 
ends by international means.”6 The imperatives of national interest were always close 
at hand within Tornado, manifest in both its organization and execution. Nonetheless, 
the project evolved to become the flagship of European cooperation and has over its 
30 year life-span continued to evolve. It has come to exemplify a level of cooperation 
and interdependence that was unanticipated by its founders, and arguably unrecog-
nized by many contemporary political decision-makers.  
                                                 
5 It is worth noting that as late as Summer 1969, there existed little consensus as to the viability of mul-
tinational cooperation through industrial consortia, à la Tornado. Given that past efforts in both the 
military and civilian spheres, such as the Franco-German Transall and the Anglo-French Concorde, 
had often led to unavoidable compromises in timeliness, national military requirements, and bureau-
cratic structure, some European critics considered the model dangerous to whatever regional industry it 
was applied. One unnamed Continental opponent argued that such cooperation “[was] a way to hide 
mistakes.” Further, it might “[kill] the industry by introducing a socialistic, non-competitive, non-
private enterprise system. To compete with America through consortiums is nonsense.” The editors of 
Aviation Week and Space Technology at the time suggested that Tornado would indeed be a “critical 
proof” for Europe to determine whether such fears were justified or if meaningful and efficacios coop-
eration were possible. Cited in “Consortium Fate Linked to MRCA Project,” Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, 2 June 1969, 114.    
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  This chapter examines the influence of Tornado and traces its development. If 
cooperative behavior within the Tornado program ceased to be a mere “residual of na-
tional needs and interests” even to a minute degree, we must determine how this could 
occur, given our theoretical expectations concerning the relationship between defense 
high technologies and identity-driven behavior, as well as what significance it might 
have had in reshaping the trajectory of European defense equipment collaboration.7 In 
the following sections, I shall detail the history of the Tornado program and highlight 
the military, industrial, and political motivations held by the participating states. For 
all of them, Tornado was more than just a fighter-bomber: it was a program that al-
lowed them to meet a number of international and domestic goals concurrently. While 
its military value must not be understated, the grander strategic and techno-industrial 
aims of the member states established the environment in which Tornado emerged, 
and arguably determined how they ultimately constructed the program.  
Second, I examine the execution of the decisions that the participating states 
made concerning issues of industrial and political equity, organizational structure, and 
the harmonization of military requirements. I contend that these actions not only es-
tablished what Tornado has become; they also allow us to match actual state behavior 
against a sample of official state rhetorics used to justify participation in the program. 
Third, I sketch the execution of the Tornado project to show how national myopias 
have either advanced or retarded the weapon’s performance on both technological and 
industrial grounds. Finally, I discuss how the pursuit of national interest within the 
program has been subverted through a process of unintended consequences that has 
led to a situation best described as integration through the backdoor, as Tornado mem-
ber states have begun piecemeal techno-industrial specialization. 
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Breaking with Tradition: 1963 – 1968 
  The history of the Tornado is a convoluted one. It did not begin with the first 
NATO multinational feasibility study, which was conducted in 1968 for a multirole 
military aircraft that would replace the fleets of American-designed fighter and strike 
planes that had been either purchased or produced under license in the 1950s and 
1960s throughout Western Europe and Canada. The Tornado’s history did not even 
begin in any of the states that later developed the project and carried it to completion. 
Rather it began in Francea country that at no time had a formal connection with the 
system’s development. While this is not the place to explore the fine details of Euro-
pean Union history, one cannot separate European defense equipment collaboration 
from the larger influences of the integration movement, even though, as noted in the 
last chapter, the Union has never been permitted a direct institutional impact upon the 
defense procurement policies of its member states. While our focus is on ideational 
changes over time rooted in the evolution of the integration project the multi-level 
politics of intra-European diplomacy have played a no less significant role. As a tech-
nical editor of Flight International wrote of Tornado, collaborative programs were 
“like royal marriages; largely the pawns of international politics.”8 In Western Europe 
in the mid- and late-1960s, the weight of politics was particularly heavy. 
A lasting irony in the evolution of the Union has been the role of France in its 
development. On the one hand, European integration found its first voice in the in-
sights of French intellectuals and politicians, such as David Mitrany and Robert 
Suchmann, who advocated the eventual reformation and sublimation of national states 
into a grander European order. On the other hand, however, successive French gov-
ernments have worked quite hard to subvert the ideal of integration in order to serve 
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the national political and techno-industrial ambitions of the French state. Charles De 
Gaulle, first president of the Fifth Republic, stated clearly his image of Europe and of 
France’s place in it when he said: 
I intended to assure French primacy in Western Europe by preventing 
the rise of a new Reich. . .to cooperate with East and West and, if need 
be, contract the necessary alliances on side or another without accept-
ing any kind of dependency. . .to persuade the states along the Rhein, 
the Alps, and the Pyrennes to form a political, economic and strategic 
bloc; [and] to establish this organization as one of the three world pow-
ers, and should it be necessary, as the arbiter between the Soviet and 
Anglo-Saxon camps.9 
De Gaulle’s vision of Europeand to a considerable degree, that of his succes-
sorswas that of a Community of sovereign states that was more than an alliance but 
considerably less than a union.10 France would hold a special role in such an associa-
tion, being at least a first among equals and at most the definitive leader in its political 
and military fields.  
  Throughout the 1960s, this French vision of Europe assumed five principal 
forms: First, the aborted Fouchet Plan in 1960-62, which would have denied any kind 
of supranational European Community involvement in shaping a common foreign pol-
icy, and well coupled the collective power of the Community states to the pursuit of 
French diplomatic objectives;11 Second, France undertook a six-month boycott of the 
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European Commission in late 1965 in order to prevent the planned adoption of major-
ity voting within the Community’s intergovernmental “executive” body, the European 
Council. France insisted upon and retained the policy of unanimity in Community de-
cision-making and the right of national veto over Community decisions that might 
impact national interests. Third, the French withdrew from NATO’s integrated military 
command in 1966, and subsequently tried to persuade the other Community members 
to reduce their dependence upon the United States and to embrace French leader-
shipor at the very least support official French policiesin matters of collective 
defense. 
  Fourth, France embraced what has been called the “French Model” of defense 
industrial collaboration with its European allies.12 Following the end of World War II, 
France moved quickly to re-establish its defense industrial base and to attain the 
broadest level of technological competence that it could sustain. The creation of the 
French Fifth Republic in the early 1960s established the ideals of defense industrial 
modernization and expansion as a state religion that would support France’s preten-
sions of global power status on technological, industrial, and military grounds.13 
While France emphasized defense industrial independence from the United States, it 
nonetheless valued intra-regional procurement collaboration as a vehicle for its na-
tional grand strategy. Cooperation was viewed as a means of compelling France’s 
European allies to subsidize the French defense industry while concurrently weaken-
ing the military bonds between its partners and the United States.14 France hoped to 
hasten the de-standardization of European militaries around American equipment and 
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while concurrently pressing its neighbors to exchange their dependence upon the 
United States for greater reliance upon France.   
  The essence of the so-called “French model lay in its organizational and pro-
cedural characteristics. France valued cooperation only so far as it expanded French 
political and industrial interests to the maximum extent possible. To these ends, the 
French preferred bilateral relationships that would minimize the need for any complex 
international management structures while also, according to Edward Kolodziej, being 
more “responsive to French control or direction.”15 French leadership was invariably 
emphasized within these collaborations. France pressed for quasi- prime contractor - 
sub-contractor relationships with potential partners by insisting upon lead firm status 
for its defense producers within joint ventures whenever possible, e.g., with weaker 
allies. At the very least, France often reserved for itself responsibility for the highest 
value-added subsystem in a given weapons platform, or symbolic leadership through 
an inconsequential, albeit, de jure greater French share within a given joint venture.16 
  The fifth and final factor of French influence upon European politics in the 
1960s, was France’s initial refusal to permit the United Kingdom’s accession into the 
European Economic Community. Between 1963 and 1969, France alone vetoed suc-
cessive British overtures. Pietro Quaroni, the former Italian ambassador to Paris, noted 
that while the French government argued British economic incompatibility with 
Community membership and the United Kingdom’s traditional extra-continentalism as 
justifications for its exclusion, the real reason lay in French desires to dominate Euro-
pean politics. He asserted “the French [had] never given up the hope of transforming 
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the Common Market into a French political sphere of influence.”17 The entry of West-
ern Europe’s third strongest state into the Community would upset its internal balance 
of power and thus render unattainable any dream of unchallenged French regional 
leadership.18  
  The first French veto against British entry in 1963 set in motion events that 
would lead 5 years later to the Tornado program. While it would ultimately require the 
collapse of the De Gaulle administration in 1969 to end unmitigated French resistance 
and permit UK accession to the European Economic Community, the British govern-
ment accelerated a multifaceted policy begun in 1961 of reaching out to the French 
leadership to demonstrate United Kingdom’s worth as a partner and as a potentially 
dutiful member of the Community. While Britain pursued a diplomatic solution with 
France to negotiate entry, it also took more practical steps to present itself as a good 
“European.” British efforts centered upon those areas of economic and political activ-
ity that lay outside the institutional mandate of the European Communities, 
specifically civil and defense high technology collaboration. In these fields, the United 
Kingdom could forge partnerships that would stress regional solidarity and coopera-
tion, while also offering its allies significant technological and industrial payoffs in 
coveted fields that might complement British accession bids.19 
  Given France’s dominant position within the European Community, and its 
desire to promote its national industrial and technology base into a position of regional 
preeminence and global strengthto say nothing of its opposition to the United King-
dom’s accessionFrance was the principal target of British techno-diplomacy. 
Moreover, given specific French views of aerospace as a provider of national grandeur 
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and as a motor for industrial modernization, Britain regarded cooperation in that sector 
as a lever to change French attitudes. The United Kingdom’s aerospace industry, 
unlike that of France, survived the Second World War intact. It possessed comprehen-
sive capabilities in most areas, and was the regional leader in propulsion and avionics. 
Consequently, Britain could offer substantial technology transfer benefits to any po-
tential European partner intent upon expanding its own aerospace industries through 
collaborative developmenta fact recognized by most NATO Europe governments. In 
1965, a British parliamentary report—the Plowden Report—codified not only the need 
to appeal to France and rest of Europe technologically, but explicitly to use Britain’s 
aerospace strengths as the enticement. The report’s authors proclaimed: 
The aircraft industry is one in which governments can readily promote 
cooperative international ventures, because they take the major share of 
industry’s products. At the present stage of United Kingdom foreign 
policy the aircraft industry has a role to play for which few other indus-
tries are so well fitted.20 
  France agreed with this basic British position in that that collaboration could 
offer French industry a great deal of technological assistance, as well as extending the 
possibility that Britain could buy its way into the Community at some future time once 
French desires had been satisfied. As one Gaullist national deputy put it: “Britain 
should show a certain goodwill in technology towards the [Community].”21 To this 
end, the United Kingdom collaborated with France in no less than eight major aero-
space projects between 1962 and 1967: the Concorde supersonic airliner, the Martel 
air-to-ground missile, the Airbus A-300 airliner, the Puma, Lynx, and Gazelle family of 
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tactical helicopters, the Jaguar military trainer/ground attack aircraft, and lastly, the 
Anglo-French Variable Geometry aircraft (AFVG).  
  British “goodwill,” however, went beyond embracing France as its partner of 
choice in intermediate and leading-edge aerospace collaboration. British elites quickly 
realized that despite the United Kingdom’s strong technological and industrial stand-
ing, wooing France would require the sublimation of British industrial interestsor as 
was often reported in the British defense press of the 1960s, the outright surrender of 
those intereststo French whims.22 No matter what proclamations of fidelity and of 
solidarity emanated from London during this time, as Chris Layton noted, Paris recip-
rocated only in so far as the “tricolor [was] hosted over the result” so as to satisfy 
French pride.23 In all Anglo-French collaborations pursued through 1968, France 
made every effort to impose its aspirations on the collaborative process. For example, 
all cooperative ventures were subject solely to French industrial law and the manage-
rial committees or holding companies erected to facilitate cross-channel industrial ties 
were located on French territory. France insisted upon maximum control over devel-
opmental and production processes to an extent that blurred the line between co-
development and co-production. For example, the airframes for Concorde, Jaguar, 
Airbus, Martel, and Puma were not collaboratively designed ab initio but rather were 
derived from existing French prototypes. In these particular projects, British involve-
ment lay principally in financial contributions and in cost-share/work-share 
arrangements in subsystems in which France stood to gain from United Kingdom par-
ticipation, namely engine development. Of all of the instances of Anglo-French 
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cooperation during this time, France promised to grant British project leadership in 
only two: the Lynx and the AFVG.  
  Despite these pledges, and notwithstanding the 55 million pounds per annum 
that Britain spent after 1961 to feed French ambitions in bilateral aerospace collabora-
tion, it had become clear by the late 1960s that France would not yield, either to 
enlarging the Community or to embracing fully its industrial partnership with the 
United Kingdom.24 By 1968, France had yet again denied British accession; and it had 
rendered a sham its agreement on the Lynx, rejecting joint procurement in favor of the 
higher French-content Puma and Gazelle systems.25 More critical, France also unilat-
erally withdrew from the AFVG  while it was still in the development phase, but 
nonetheless employed its newly acquired British technology and data to produce an 
all-French variable-geometry design, the Mirage 3G.26 These events led British com-
mentators at the time to assert that the United Kingdom possessed a stronger grasp of 
European ideals than its partner-cum-rival across the Channel. Sir George Edwards, 
chairman of Britain’s premiere fixed-wing aerospace manufacturer, British Aircraft 
Corporation, put the matter bluntly when he wrote: 
I regard this kind of thing as being a complete negation of the basic 
concept of what we are trying to do in Europe. I want to see, as much 
as anyone, a strong, united European aircraft industry. I have spent 
enough years trying to bring it about and I rate this as not the way to do 
it. This is said in sadness rather than in anger, but it needs to be said.27 
Britain, however, stood to either lose or win much more than a battle for sym-
bols and distant dreams. Its failed embrace of France posed real challenges to its 
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tangible diplomatic, military, and ideational interests. First, entry into the Community 
remained a core policy goal. Successive British governments regarded “Europe” as the 
country’s last best hope of reversing its twenty-plus years of post-War economic stag-
nation and decline.28 French duplicity did not dampen this desire; it merely convinced 
decision-makers in London that the United Kingdom’s road to Brussels, to paraphrase 
the British defense analyst William Walker, could not travel through Paris.29 New 
partners would be required to share in the collaborative process, and more importantly, 
advocate Britain’s role in Europe. 
Second, the cancellation of the AFVG left Britain’s Royal Air Force in the un-
enviable position of entering a new decade without a conventional high-performance 
fighter, bomber, or interceptor meant to enter service. AFVG was more than a political 
aircraft or instrument of European diplomacy. It was also set to fulfill operational re-
quirements established by the British Ministry of Defense into the 1980s, and 
moreover, to reverse what has been regarded as the greatest act of British strategic 
myopia in the 20
th century.30 The defense White Paper of 1957, the Sandys’ Review, 
sent the United Kingdom down a defense cul-de-sac as it shifted policy away from 
war-fighting to deterrence and to a reliance upon yet-undeveloped technologies. Nu-
clear weapons carried upon precision-guided strategic and tactical missiles would 
prevent war, and should this fail, defensive missiles would cleanse British skies of any 
and all threats. Manned, fixed-wing aircraft were to have little utility in the new age. 
The authors of the defense review concluded that the current generation of British 
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military aircraft would be the last: the Lightning interceptor, the Canberra and Bucca-
neer tactical bombers, and finally, the Vulcan strategic bomber. 31   
   This strategic vision—which was at best a half-century ahead its time, and at 
worst fanciful—would have meant that, with the exception of a few test platforms, 
1959 would be the last year that an all-British, mass-produced airplane would enter 
the field.  Less than five years after the White Paper, however, vision gave way to the 
reality of two failed advanced missile programs (Skybolt and Blue Streak), successive 
currency devaluations, stop-go economic growth, and a growing recognition that Brit-
ain remained involved in interstate conflicts that were not solvable with nuclear 
weapons or uninvented technologies.32 By 1962, the British government acknowl-
edged that in the absence of a viable missile program, the United Kingdom would 
require at least some fixed-wing air capability for both deterrence and defense.33 Un-
fortunately, however, a half-decade of technological and industrial divestment was 
enough to ensure that any return to the status quo ante would be extremely difficult. 
Years later, during the parliamentary censure debate in the House of Commons 
following the AFVG debacle, Defense Minister Denis Healey admitted: “We faced the 
problem of reconstructing an aircraft programme from scratch.”34 Healey noted that 
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Britain’s best option then was to “fill the gap with British aircraft where possible, buy-
ing the minimum of American aircraft to complete the need.”35 Soon, however, even 
this alternative proved to be beyond the means of the state. By 1964, Britain cancelled 
the last of its domestic programs—the Tactical-Strike-Reconnaissance plane (TSR2)—
after hemorrhaging $720 million in R&D costs into a program seen as the most tech-
nologically ambitious in Europe, and one that it could not afford to produce.36  
AFVG would have provided for nearly all of Britain’s operational needs, re-
placing not one, but five separate aircraft types, due to the potential benefits inherent 
in its variable geometry design.37 Its cancellation threatened to leave Britain with only 
two non-American designs set to enter its armed forces: the Anglo-French Jaguar—a 
tactical strike aircraft crafted from a French subsonic trainer, and the Harrier—a 
short-range, vertical take-off and landing naval fighter. One British parliamentarian, 
Sir Ian Orr-Ewing, argued that this would be disastrous for British defense. Barring 
necessary procurements, by 1975 the RAF would not only not possess the 1000 air-
craft needed to fulfill its requirements, most of the 460 systems that it could field 
would be primarily 1950s technologies already entering obsolescence.38 Both 
quantitatively and qualitatively, the United Kingdom would be unexceptional in the 
military aerospace arena relative to its principal European allies, and possibly even 
inferior to France and Germany.39 
This last point had not escaped notice within British decision-making circles, 
and certainly not among the parliamentary opposition parties, who moved quickly to 
                                                 
35 Ibid. 
36“British Study Development Cost Rise,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 2 June 1969, 125. 
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bring down the government. That the United Kingdom might find itself technologi-
cally and militarily inadequate vis-à-vis NATO allies—to say nothing of neutrals such 
as Sweden and adversaries like Poland—was seen as a “discredit to the Administra-
tion, a discredit to the Air Staff, and a discredit to industry.”40 AFVG was to be both a 
means to an end and an end in itself. The British government of the day hoped that it 
would not only be the key to the European Community and the salvation of the Royal 
Air Force, but a high-tech jewel that would further Britain’s status as a modern and 
potent world power. Any replacement for the AFVG would have to satisfy all of these 
divergent goals: it would have to present a façade of Europeanism in which national 
priorities determined the extent of international collaboration;41 it would have to be 
multi-functional so as replace entire fleets of military aircraft; and finally, it would 
need to be gold-plated, a worthy rival of any military aircraft found anywhere else in 
the developed world. 
Indeed, by 1967, some form of cooperative procurement for this platform was 
regarded as unavoidable. Britain’s economy continued to suffer from slow growth and 
periodic currency devaluation. The country could no longer afford to maintain its for-
ward military presence outside the Europe and the North Atlantic area. UK service 
inventories were slated for across-the board reductions, which included decommis-
sioning the entire fleet of Royal Navy conventional-take-off-and-landing aircraft 
carriers and the Royal Air Force’s inventory of strategic bombers. In this environment, 
the British Ministry of Defence simply lacked the resources to pursue so technologi-
cally ambitious a project as an advanced military aircraft through indigenous means. 
That said, the perceived political, industrial, and military benefits arising from the de-
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velopment and production of this system were regarded as too substantial to abandon. 
The 1968 interim report to the UK Defence Statement stated the variable geometry 
aircraft studies would “continue as the basis for a possible collaborative project.” Re-
portedly, the British government would not move to execute any notional planning 
until it could at least secure guarantees of foreign sales, or more preferably attract a 
development collaborator into the program. The government gave first preference to 
Bonn, though the Benelux and Italy were also seen as potential partners. Even a re-
newed relationship with France was not out of the question in the longer term, if it 
might assure that the Royal Air Force secure the technology.42 
That said, a successor would require a convergence of national interest that had 
been sorely lacking in the Anglo-French partnerships of the mid-1960s. That relation-
ship had proved positive for Britain only in so far as it had produced a number of 
missiles and aircraft that would shape UK military inventories for more than 30 years. 
The association had, however, failed to satisfy basic British political, and indeed, in-
dustrial goals.43 What was desired were partners whose ambitions were more national 
than imperial.  
 
Continental opportunities  
When one considers the interests and desires of Britain’s prospective partners 
elsewhere in the Community, national interests dominated their decision-making. For 
all of these states—Germany, Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands—the “idea of 
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Europe” was remarkably thin.44 These countries began their negotiations in October 
1967, less than ten years after the founding Treaty of Rome, when the “community” 
was more an economic alliance, and “Europe,” in the minds of most decision-makers, 
represented little more than a rhetorical flourish. State interests, and importantly state 
behavior, remained rooted in traditional notions of sovereignty and relative advantage. 
Their pursuit of a collaborative venture to procure a new, common frontline aircraft 
for the 1970s had more to do with their own discrete political, military, and techno-
industrial interests than any expressed fealty to the idea of European integration. 
In 1967, the Community’s “others” were keen for high-technology defense co-
operation. This collaboration, however, would be an expression of realpolitik by other 
means, and this was arguably nowhere more clear than in their shared motivation to 
embrace Britain after the collapse of AFVG. London was not alone in its disenchant-
ment with the French model of defense collaboration. Throughout NATO Europe, 
governments became increasingly skeptical of France’s commitment to the European 
ideals championed by its intellectuals and given early institutional form by its more 
visionary politicians in the early 1950s. Ambassador Pietro Quaroni argued in 1968 
that French arrogance had reached its tolerable extreme: 
Two wars have been fought. . .not to allow France or any other country 
to become the recognized paramount power in a United Europe. The 
only possible Europe is a Europe of consent, in which all countries par-
ticipate as equals, at least so far as equality is attainable among nations. 
Any attempt to establish a hegemony, whether by France or by any 
other country, could only lead to the disruption of Europe.45 
Decision-makers in Italy, Germany and the Benelux had no desire to become the 
Community’s sub-contractors, both literally and figuratively, to France’s techno-
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political and regional ambitions.46 Indeed, a year later, one German official was no 
less adamant on the need for British entry into the Community: 
The Common Market will dry out unless the British come in. We are 
now forced to work with the British in fields not covered by the Com-
mon Market, and advanced technology is one of them. We must explore 
and exploit any areas to keep Britain in Europe.47 
His government and others hoped to build upon two decades of post-war prosperity 
and to re-assert their national interests, as well as their separate visions of a European 
community. This desire was manifest in growing support for British accession follow-
ing 1964. British admission, Quaroni argued, would expand the European project by 
giving it a critical mass and a “better balance of power” internally, one that would 
prevent any single state from imposing its will on the others.48  
Reaching out to the United Kingdom in aerospace would nurture continued 
British interest in accession despite French obstructionism, and allow London to 
demonstrate its fealty to the Community and to its members. Moreover, embracing 
Britain would satisfy a larger range of petty national interests. The collapse of the 
AFVG presented these countries with a unique opportunity. Ten years earlier, all of 
them had been members of the F-104 Starfighter consortium: a cooperative 
procurement initiative led by the United States to promote NATO standardization 
through the licensed production of its air superiority fighter-interceptor. The 
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production of its air superiority fighter-interceptor. The Starfighter was 1952 technol-
ogy designed to satisfy American requirements for a high-altitude interceptor, but later 
embraced by the Allies as a multi-mission, front-line aircraft with varying degrees of 
success.49 That said, the indigenization of a foreign military platform was arguably a 
tertiary concern relative to the political and technology benefits derived from their 
partnership. Starfighter did not simply transfer licenses and systems, but whole pro-
ductive capacities where none existed  or were emergent. Indeed, as Bjorn Hagelin has 
argued, this single program advanced airframe production competences 15 years 
among the participants.50  
  While these states had participated in other cooperative ventures with France 
on platforms such as Transall and Mirage, Starfighter had given them an unparalleled 
boost in their aerospace capability. Franz-Josef Strauss, for example, the West German 
defense minister in the late 1950s, described German gains from this American largess 
glowingly:  
. . .The aerospace industry has received through [the government] 
ready-made know-how in the shape of a US license purchased by the 
state; it has therefore. . .[gained access to]. . .the most advanced tech-
nology of all other countries, especially that of the United States. . .If 
we have to spend the taxpayer’s money, then we should in this particu-
lar area make a virtue out of necessity, in order to catch the leading 
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technologies after [the 12-years of Post-war occupation and forced dis-
armament]. 51 
Other states held a similar perspective. While none had sought to translate this 
collaboration into wholly autonomous national defense aerospace industrial bases – 
for reasons we shall detail shortly—all them regarded Starfighter  and their other 
cooperative programs as stepping stones toward greater independent production and 
closing what was perceived as a technology gap with the established aerospace states. 
Nonetheless, the licensed production of foreign technology, albeit American, 
was less than a panacea. First, and foremost, the licensees did not share in the process 
of innovation: they either assembled or re-created technologies created elsewhere. 
While they did achieve tangible political, technological and military benefits from the 
procurement efforts, ultimately the technology did not belong to them. Production un-
der license rarely conveyed intellectual property ownership, and licensees had no 
guarantees that they could readily redirect their efforts toward other goals: third-party 
sales, follow-on military projects, and critically, input into the civilian technology 
base.52 Most damning, however, was the fact that these states found themselves in the 
unenviable positions of supporting other countries’ industries by granting their part-
ners economies of scale and allowing them to recoup research and development costs 
through licensed- and co-production. Consequently, by the late 1960s, there was a 
growing desire to move cooperation as far back along the innovation chain as possi-
ble: to stop simply assembling or buying items designed elsewhere, and to actually 
acquire proprietary rights to new technologies. 
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  While Germany, Italy, and the Benelux states were not capable of autonomy 
and were not uniform in their desire to press for true ab initio collaboration, they were 
at least willing to explore the art of the possible. As a consequence, Britain’s new 
availability as potential partner was both timely and critical. Starfighter, which had 
entered national inventories across the 1950s, and continued to be produced by the 
consortium members, was rapidly reaching obsolescence in the face of Soviet aero-
space advances. Indeed, Dutch assessments held that the national F-104 fleets would 
no longer be sustainable by 1980 and were rapidly becoming inadequate for the close 
air support and interceptor missions for which they and their partners employed the 
aircraft. Further, the effort to transform a single-mission American fighter-interceptor 
into a multi-mission platform suitable to serve the nations’ disparate military require-
ments had never been particularly smooth: for the Germans, specifically, the situation 
had become untenable as they experienced the attrition through operational accidents 
of nearly a seventh of their total inventory by the early 1970s.53 
  Securing a replacement that would meet projected military needs well into the 
1970s and 1980s either alone or through collaboration amongst the consortium mem-
bers, whose number also included Canada, was impossible. As an Italian officer noted, 
“at that time, we in Italy had no experience in designing a modern combat aircraft. 
Nor did the Belgians, or the Dutch, or the Germans,” and all of them could only wildly 
speculate as to what requirements such a platform should meet and how to proceed.54 
The United Kingdom, on the other hand, was a technology leaders possessing an un-
disputed lead in jet powerplants—courtesy of Rolls Royce—and a proven competence 
in airframes and avionics. As a German official noted at the time, whereas the conti-
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nentals could only offer “opinions,” “the [Royal Air Force] pressed hard for the night 
and all-weather attack aircraft and they backed their arguments with actual data.”55 
  The appeal of partnership with Britain, of course, extended beyond the techno-
logical gains that it could offer potential partners: in addition to the political 
“balancing” argument to which decision-makers remained sensitive, these states were 
not above manipulating Britain’s supplicant status to serve their own interest. Just as 
France had manipulated the United Kingdom to gain technologies and expertise, so 
too could the others exploit Britain’s weak bargaining position regarding Community 
accession to maximize British concessions in program organization and management 
and thus mitigate against the kind of techno-political posturing for which Paris was 
infamous. 
  That said, the continentals faced their own unique constraints that shaped how 
they would ultimately embrace Britain as a collaborative partner. The Belgians and the 
Dutch were not in a position to impose a particular, “nationalist” vision, given their 
relatively small defense budgets and the related fact that whatever program ultimately 
took shape, their cost-share/work-share inputs would be considerably less than the lar-
ger states. Indeed, the initial assessments for production of the Starfighter replacement 
assumed that both states would each purchase 240 aircraft, compared to 600 aircraft 
notionally desired by Germany and the British requirement of 385.  
The projected Italian buy was even less at 200 planes. Rome never concealed 
that Italy’s position was further complicated by its perennially weak governments that 
produced what Italian aviation industrialists of the period condemned as a “general 
insensibility and negligence unequalled by any other country in the European Eco-
nomic Community.”56 The constant rotation of national governments, caused by 
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recurring fiscal mismanagement and social unrest throughout the period, ensured that 
Rome’s support of, and participation in, any notional program milestone could not be 
taken for granted. Indeed, Italy effectively sat out the initial systems definitions phase 
of Tornado, and lagged in both prototype fabrication and final production, as the Ital-
ian Air Force and aerospace industry lobbied successive administrations to remain 
committed to the project and to redirect monies from elsewhere in the national budget 
to retain an Italian role in it.57 When project development formally began in 1970, 
Rome’s ability to fund its relatively minor contribution to Tornado development was 
so much in doubt that both Germany and Britain extended the Italians a long-term, 
low-interest loan so as to prevent an obligatory national opt-out from what was then a 
two year-old program.58 
  Whereas the freedom of action for these minor players in the consortium was 
limited by default, Germany’s intersecting interests and constraints notionally left it 
considerably more room for mischief. Ultimately, however, it was no less restrained. 
Whereas Britain found itself compelled to collaborate partially for the sins of its 
past—its refusal to embrace fully the European integration movement in the 1950s—
so too were German elites compelled to cooperate because of the burdens of their his-
tory: the Nazi conquest and devastation of all of their new continental partners.59 On 
the one hand, for the British, cooperation was a necessary evil: Sir Richard Smeeton 
of the Society of British Aerospace Companies, for example, complained that the cou-
pling of European politics and national financial weakness were driving the United 
Kingdom “more and more into collaboration whether we like it or not.”60 On the other 
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hand, for Germany, cooperation was much more than a necessary evil: it was a neces-
sity.  
Germany’s readmission into the Western community of nations in the 1950s 
was accompanied not only by formal prohibitions on the types of defense technologies 
that the country could possess and produce, it also necessitated a fairly complex calcu-
lus in which decision-makers had to carefully balance latent German ideas of 
modernity and “normality” against a new set of state identities. Germany was now de-
fined as an abnormal state, a sanctioned and divided country committed (or rather, 
condemned) to securing legitimacy and rehabilitation through first NATO, and later 
the European Economic Community.61  
German elites were as enamored as their European counter-parts with the idea 
that an advanced, national aerospace capacity would have positive spillover effects to 
the civilian economy—one report from the Economics Ministry went so far as to 
claim that such technology was not only synergistic with other sunrise sectors, but was 
also environmentally “friendly.”62 But, the Germany defense industry was ten years 
behind its peers as a result of the post-war occupation and obligatory disarmament. 
When the Western Allies finally allowed West Germany to rearm at the end of 1954 
under NATO auspices, the Adenaeur and Erhard administrations successively were 
able to square the circle: resurrect the German defense industrial base as a partial step 
toward reasserting German sovereignty and oblige the Allies to treat Germany as a full 
                                                                                                                                              
war effort during the war. Indeed, Britain emerged from the Second World War, with the strongest de-
fense industrial base in Western Europe; and its war-time dependence on the United States and the 
Commonwealth for materials and platforms, was rightly regarded as a brief interregnum in what had 
been a increasingly autonomous national armaments capacity since the 19
th century. 
61 The 1954 London Treaty that established the Western European Union (WEU) provided for an ex-
pansive list of weapons that the Bonn Republic could not indigenously produce: 
nuclear/biological/chemical weapons, influence ocean mines, long-range missiles, strategic bombers, 
and initially, submarines and surface warships. C.J.E. Harlow, “The European Armaments Base: A Sur-
vey. Part 2: National Procurement Policies,” in Defence, Technology, and the Western Alliance, No. 2, 
Part 2 (London, The Institute for Strategic Studies, July 1967), 38. 
62 Mark Lambert, “Germany stays in Aerospace,” Flight International, 14 February 1976, 368. 138 
 
 
partner; and to use cooperative procurement both to regain lost technological ground 
and to promote European rapprochement.63  
The German leadership did not regard defense industrial autonomy as a legiti-
mate path. Franz-Josef Strauss—West Germany’s second post-occupation defense 
minister—summed up Bonn’s position when he noted that:  
. . .[W]e are not building up capacities for a specific procurement         
project for which other countries already maintain productive capaci-
ties . . .We have always tried to follow a ‘middle of the road’ strategy . . 
. [to] avoid even the beginning of an armament’s autarky.64  
Nonetheless, Strauss and the government were quite keen to build defense production 
capabilities that would complement those found in the civilian economy. Moreover, 
cooperative procurement would not only provide the engine for this industrialization, 
it would also create a certain feed-back: cooperation would launch and sustain the 
productive capacity whose breadth and depth would be later presented as justifications 
for future collaborations. Strauss described this German vision plainly, noting:  
If you want to have a share of in a system based on work-share, you 
have to have something to offer to be admitted into the system. Be-
tween a beggar and a producer there is neither a community of interest 
nor one of production.65 
German interest did not simply arise from concerns of high politics or indus-
trial policy. The trauma of the war and subsequent dislocations had left little popular 
support for indigenous aircraft production. The Bonn Republic emerged from World 
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War II with a mandate to disavow practically all of the Nazi regime’s excesses, and 
this included the singular Nazi idea of “airmindedness:” the partial identification of 
modernity and state grandeur with the development of a fully competent aerospace 
industrial base.66 The Nazis used this concept to camouflage what became their un-
checked militarism in the 1930s, and their legacy ensured that successive post-
occupation administrations through the late 1960s enjoyed little political room to sup-
port national aviation. Indeed, German decision-makers refused to support the 
development of civil aviation until 1963, and even then, did not codify an aerospace 
industrial plan until 1970. 
The aerospace industry that developed through the 1950s did so because Ger-
man accession into NATO not only demanded German rearmament, it also rested upon 
a system of foreign guidance and dependence that were more politically acceptable to 
the postwar public. As a result, after 13 years of NATO membership and the assump-
tion of a central role of the alliance’s territorial defense, German defense expenditures 
in 1968 were second only to the United Kingdom within NATO Europe. Further, the 
country possessed the third largest aerospace industry in Western Europe—one that 
had attained nearly all of its mass through the building of foreign military platforms 
either, under license or in more nuanced collaboration. Unlike nearly all other national 
armaments producers for whom defense was only a fraction of their overall industrial 
activity, the aerospace industry in Germany at the time was almost exclusively mili-
tary in its orientation, with defense orders accounting for between 80 to 90 percent of 
total production.67 German aviation industry thus was paradoxically “oversized,” 
“one-sided,” and largely non-indigenous.68  
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The issue besetting decision-makers of the period was not how they might end 
their dependence on foreign ties and largess: procurement collaboration was politi-
cally unavoidable for reasons rooted in both domestic and international politics. 
Instead, the issue before them was how might they transform the conduct of coopera-
tion to give Germany a more prominent role and to better satisfy German national 
aims. The early post-occupation collaborative “compromise” had allowed for the 
speedy reconstruction the defense industrial base, but it failed to fully satisfy state po-
litical and techno-industrial desires. First, while German elites were keen to use 
membership in both NATO and the Community to advance national rehabilitation and 
Germany’s status as both an equal and a partner, Bonn’s defense industrial relation-
ships in Europe never kept pace with evolving German ambitions. Given that the first 
post-occupation German governments had defined Franco-German ties as Bonn’s 
paramount relationship within Europe—codified in the 1963 Elysee Treaty that also 
established Franco-German defense industrial collaboration—it is unsurprising that 
Bonn would become as dissatisfied with the prospect of the French vision of intra-
European collaboration as London ultimately did. French procurement policy ensured 
that Germany remained in a subordinate role no matter how long the relationship en-
dured or the nature of the technologies produced. Indeed, from the reconstitution of 
the German defense industry until Tornado, Germany had never received equal 
status—much less project leadership—in any European collaborative venture.69 While 
                                                                                                                                              
purchases of systems and platform, this was never regarded as an appropriate strategy, given the risks 
that high-cost procurements would upset the country’s much-envied trade balance with its partners. 
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coproducing extant French technology did advance industrial competences, it was a 
slow road toward indigenizing aerospace production, and by 1967 a more balanced 
procurement policy was coveted. As one German industrialist noted during the period: 
We in Germany had been frustrated in our attempts to design and build 
an aircraft with [our partners]. And the desire to create a German cap-
ability to design and build advanced combat aircraft was also a major 
consideration. We had experience of repairing foreign combat aircraft 
and building them under license, now we saw the need for a capability 
to design such aircraft.70 
No less than Britain, Germany required collaborative partners whom, as John Cal-
mann wrote: “[would] seek to promote not merely [their] own industries at German 
expense,” but German industry as well as their own.71 Reaching out to first the other 
members of the Starfighter consortium, and later to the United Kingdom, to initiate a 
collaborative program and subsequently secure a prominent role in its development 
would—it was hoped—satisfy the myriad of German political, industrial, military, and 
strategic goals: 
 
   Replace the rapidly obsolescing Starfighter fleet with a platform designed to 
satisfy German military requirements, 
   Nurture continued British interest in Community membership and provide ve-
hicle to strengthen British accession appeals, 
   Strengthen and indigenize Germany’s aerospace capabilities using politically 
acceptable, i.e., collaborative, means. 
                                                                                                                                             
gram. The NKF was unsustainable, however, due to the inability of the Germans to meet all of the 
technological requirements for national R&D and production, its high cost, and the lack of domestic 
political support. The initial invitation to the Starfighter group was to internationalize the NKF under 
the framework of the European Multi-Role Aircraft—the conceptual predecessor to the Tornado. The 
NKF platform was remarkably similar to the later Tornado in both form and function and its partial 
development arguably strengthened Germany’s bargaining position during the Tornado negotiations. 
See “The US-German V/STOL Tactical Fighter Programme,” Interavia 5 (1967): 778-780. 
70 Quoted in Alfred Price, Panavia Tornado: Spearhead of NATO (London: Ian Allen, Ltd., 1988), 17. 
71 John Calmann, “European Co-operation in Defence Technology: The Political Aspect,” in Defence, 
Technology, and the Western Alliance, No. 1 (Institute for Strategic Studies: London, April 1967), 13. 142 
 
 
Given Britain’s position on the pursuit of greater – and deeper – defense tech-
nology cooperation in Europe, one could argue that, in the year leading to the 
initiation of Tornado that both the United Kingdom and Germany were propelled by 
converging interests—or more accurately, converging needs—toward their peculiar 
embrace in July 1968.  Their disparate ambitions not only made their cooperation 
more likely, it also bounded their behavior, limiting their ability either to commit mis-
chief against each other or to part and pursue other options. As a requirements officer 
in the British MoD noted: 
On precedent the United Kingdom would have built its own aeroplane, 
but the Government had stated publicly that Britain was not going to 
build the aircraft alone. That made it very difficult for us to negotiate 
terms. . .The other nations had never developed a modern combat air-
craft. . .The [Starfighter consortium] wanted to develop an aircraft on 
their own but they knew that their industries lacked the capability to do 
it. They knew that they would have to collaborate with somebody, the 
British, or the French, or the Americans. So there was pressure for a 
collaborative development on their part, and there was political pres-
sure on our part to do it. Those pressures forced us together.72 
While this assessment is arguably too limited in its appraisal of the interests at stake, it 
does reflect the British perspective that no other practical alternative existed: coopera-
tion, whether desired or desirable, was unavoidable and the universe of appropriate 
partners quite limited.  
Given that Britain and its prospective partners may have been keen to cooper-
ate, one must not overstate the significance of their shared interests. While these 
interests favored the pursuit of some form of cooperation, the means and tone that co-
operation remained significantly undefined and contestable. Recall that these states 
were set to pursue national objectives—their parochial military requirements, indus-
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trial objectives, and nationally defined strategic goals—through international means. 
Even though they were not in a position to dominate the collaborative process, they 
were also not restrained from striving to maximize their material returns from their 
collaboration, or from remaining sensitive to the relative gains of their partners.  A 
myriad of national parochialisms shaped Tornado—manifest in both its organization 
and execution—and led to a series of inter-state bargains that saw the prospective pro-
duction consortium drop by half and the creation of a weapons system widely 
regarded as a second-best solution by the industries that assembled it and the militar-
ies that employed it. Indeed, as late as 1972, the commander of the German Luftwaffe, 
Lt. General Gunther Rall, commented that his service was “not totally married to the” 
system despite the investment of millions of deutschmarks, the commitment of the 
German state, and a procurement plan that was set to consume upwards to 20 to 30 
percent of the entire German defense budget yearly by the end of the decade.73 That 
said, desperate national self-interests combined to form a program that, however 
flawed, went further to minimize nationalist excesses and inefficiencies than any pro-
ject before or since.  
 
Tornado takes shape: 1969 - 1976 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, countries traditionally have been reluc-
tant to cooperate in armaments procurement because of dependency and equity 
concerns. National defense industries have often compounded this resistance, driven 
by their unease with the prospect of either enriching potential competitors or under-
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mining their often privileged position within their home polities: monopsony markets 
that have been characterized by emerging monopoly producers over time.   
The depth of any collaborative venture—that is to say, its intimacy and inten-
sity—is a reflection of those compromises in program control and relative advantage 
that states may make (or not) in order to pursue their prospective partnerships. In the 
context of an industrial joint venture relationship, in which states underwrite coopera-
tion between their respective national champions—the type that ultimately 
characterized  Tornado and nearly every other episode of co-development/co-
production within Europe before and through the mid-1990s—such compromises fol-
low consistent paths. One can identify three, not necessarily mutually exclusive, key 
issue areas, or decision points, that national government must invariably address in 
their collaborations:74 
   Requirements harmonization. While most episodes of armaments pro-
curement cooperation in Western Europe have reflected a clear 
prioritization in state goals toward political and techno-industrial gains 
from collaboration, these countries are nonetheless procuring weapons 
systems to satisfy some tangible military objectives. Partners will likely 
have dissimilar military objectives based on national concepts of opera-
tions that require some compromise in order to proceed into 
development and production. State motivations to make concessions 
(or not) highlight the nature of their overall preferences underlying 
their cooperative endeavor and suggest the extent of interdependence 
that they are willing to embrace.  
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   Equity. At a minimum, popularly accountable, tax-payer democracies 
seek returns from their international industrial collaborations that are 
equal to their investments. As noted in the preceding chapter, the insti-
tution of le juste retour has been the defining characteristic of intra-
European armaments cooperation since the early years of the Atlantic 
alliance. Indeed, the idea of a comprehensive equity regime in which 
collaborating states make long-term, multiproject commitments in or-
der to minimize politically-driven economic distortions within any 
given program only took shape—albeit, limited to discussion only—in 
the mid- to late-1990s.75 That said, governments enjoy considerable 
latitude to achieve some desired cost-share/work-share balance. Their 
options range from multiple lines of production, national work-share 
requirements for all major and minor systems, etc., to single source 
production for subsystems and fixed national responsibilities for final 
assembly and lifetime support and maintenance. 
   Institutionalization. Procurement cooperation is an innately difficult 
process. Governments must bridge differences in language, law, techni-
cal standards, and state-industry relations. Relations among national 
purchasing authorities must be harmonized to some desired degree to 
minimize strife, as well the ties between national producers who—as 
was often the case in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s—were typically ca-
joled into a non-market relationships with cross-border competitors.76 
A “unified administrative structure” can mitigate these divides, but also 
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notionally insulate the program management process from the worst 
excesses of national interference—thus ensuring a rough balance be-
tween national and collective interests.77  Moreover, it can also provide 
program oversight to guarantee that the venture remains within cost 
and timeline restrictions.  
States rarely engage these decision “points” – what to build, how to build, how 
to control and coordinate—in any kind of priority. Indeed, there has been in Europe a 
wide spectrum, from cases in which these issues were addressed early on (and often 
concurrently) to others where they persisted across the life of the program until either 
final production was reached or the collaboration collapsed into failure.  Furthermore, 
these junctures are not mutually exclusive. For example, international program man-
agement agencies are often established to enforce the equity goals laid out in the 
founding memoranda of understanding. Similarly, equity decisions can assume many 
forms, such as trading national requirements for work-share, or exchanging work-
share for the non-material gain of establishing an official program language or central-
izing the program management on one’s own territory.78 
As all of these decisions involve some compromise among the participants, 
they provide insight into the kind of relationship that these states are willing to con-
struct and under most circumstances, why they do so.79 We will now discuss state 
approaches to each of these issues. 
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Requirements Harmonization: What to build 
It is sometimes easy to forget that before the Tornado was so named, its would-
be designers and producers initially called it simply the Multi-Role Aircraft. By the 
time Britain had entered the consortium in 1968, the platform’s design had ripened 
somewhat, and the title had expanded to the Multi-role Combat Aircraft. This unin-
spired title was not a product of a collective lack of vision, but rather a reflection of 
the disparate—and somewhat incompatible—national visions in military doctrine and 
concept-of-operations. The allies sought a single platform that could execute short-
take-offs-and-landings, provide good performance at both high-speed/high-altitude 
and low-speed/low-altitude operations, loiter for extended periods, carry a wide range 
of external stores, and finally, be both reasonably cheap and lightweight. Britain called 
for an aircraft that could serve both as tactical bomber and a bomber-killer—an air 
interdiction capability to locate and strike ingressing enemy aircraft at long distances. 
The German Luftwaffe regarded its primary responsibilities as tactical close air sup-
port over the Warsaw Pact’s likely invasion routes and the provision of air-superiority 
and battlefield reconnaissance, while the Bundesmarine wanted a coastal interdiction 
capability. The Italians and the other consortium countries, however, were less de-
                                                                                                                                              
 
It is stupid to put two or three countries together during the development stage of an 
aircraft. A successful aircraft is the product of one [national] team – [the US compa-
nies] McDonell Douglas with the F-4, Boeing with its transports, Grumman with the 
F-14, and [France’s] Dassault with its fighters. It [cooperation] is a way to hide mis-
takes. What is worse, it could be killing the [European aerospace] industry by 
introducing a socialistic, non-private, enterprise system. To compete with America 
through consortiums is nonsense. “Consortium Fate Linked to MRCA Project,” Avia-
tion Week and Space Technology, 2 June 1969. 
 
Another French official proclaimed that once the “fallacy” of the “consortium philosophy” became in-
contestable, arising from its myriad inefficiencies and compromises, “West Germany” would regain its 
senses and within seven years buy the Mirage G-2[France’s indigenous successor to the AFVG ]—an 
aircraft that would  better satisfy the Luftwaffe’s requirements than any notional multinational venture. 
See Jean-Mari de Septmontagne, “In Favor of Cooperation but Development of Engine Begun Unilat-
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manding: calling simply for an air-superiority platform that could rival the Soviet’s 
best fighters, while also providing some limited interdiction capability.80 
Reconciling these varied national objectives proved to be immediately conten-
tious and nearly fatal to the project. The problems confronting the consortium states as 
they wrestled with this were not simply confined to fuel capacity or the number of 
hard points on the fuselage. The issues involved high-order military, financial, and po-
litical concerns and, as it happened, were serious enough to lead to considerable 
tension among the member governments. 
The desire to build an aircraft that was all things to all air forces—prior to 
British membership—led the consortium initially to design an aircraft that was three-
times the final empty weight of Tornado:  a plane with the size and mass of a small 
bomber. Luftwaffe officers labeled this morphing set of alternate requirements the 
eirelegende Wollmilchsau – the “egg-laying, wool-milk pig.”81 British membership 
brought greater conceptual focus, but only just: instead of one type of Tornado, the 
consortium would build two. The “100” variant was to be a nimble, single-engine, sin-
gle-seater suitable for the air-superiority role. The “200” was slated to provide the 
other requirements. It was conceived as a two-engine, two-seater, notionally optimized 
for interdiction and reconnaissance, with roughly 60% percents commonality in avion-
ics with its smaller sibling, and 80-85% commonality in other systems, including same 
engines, wings, center and rear fuselage, empennage, and undercarriage.82 The United 
Kingdom was to assemble and employ the 200 variant alone. Germany planned to take 
a mix of aircraft and take the production lead on the 100 variant, which it and Italy 
alone would employ. That rationalization, however, proved to be insufficient. Canada 
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and Belgium departed the program in early 1969, claiming that either system was be-
yond their industrial and budgetary means. Holland left a few months later, once the 
United Kingdom lobbied the remaining members of consortium to build the 200 vari-
ant alone. 
While neither Germany nor Italy wanted to abandon their air superiority con-
cerns, both regarded yielding to the British desire for the program to more closely 
approximate British interests as a necessary price to pay to safeguard the larger effort, 
and thus their political and techno-industrial objectives. Indeed, to the dismay of Ger-
man critics in the Bundeswehr and elsewhere, the civilian leadership’s approach 
seemed set on sacrificing German military aims—among others—to the goal of “sus-
taining a political symbol.”83 German defense minister Georg Leber put the matter 
most succinctly when he said: “When I consider all of the arguments surrounding the 
MRCA, I have the impression that what is at issue here is not a weapons system but a 
religious belief.”84 
The Dutch, however, were not willing to accommodate. Despite remaining in 
through the initial conceptualization phase and receiving defined work-share alloca-
tions in both the airframe and engine, The Hague declared that Tornado had evolved 
too far away from Dutch specifications—“too big, too heavy, too expensive, and too 
complicated”—to justify its continued participation.85 The Dutch case suggests of the 
differences among the consortium members in the degree to which they were willing 
to submerge their national interests to some larger regional goal, however defined. 
Moreover, their actions exemplify the chasm that can exist between state rhetoric and 
the actual execution of national interest. The Hague’s support for European armaments 
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collaboration in general and Tornado in particular had been quite politically correct 
and extended from the monarchy down. Prince Bernhard appealed to a British audi-
ence of industrialists in late 1968:  
There is little of the aircraft industries in any of the four countries [the 
remaining members of the consortium] surviving in their present form 
if the project should be abandoned. . .[Governments and industry have 
to forgo] the still prevalent tendency to believe that co-operation can be 
achieved without giving up a measure of independence.86 
Nevertheless, the Dutch turned away from the demands of European collaboration the 
following May. Moreover, Holland has never looked back—after a short-lived effort 
to persuade first the remaining consortium, and later the other members of F-104 
group to build a lighter plane more suitable to Dutch aims, Holland effectively aban-
doned cooperation in fixed-wing aerospace in Europe. It opted instead for dependence 
on the United States, first with co-production of the F-16 to replace its aging fleet of 
F-104s in 1976, and later through planned licensed production of the F-35 Joint Strike 
Fighter, a platform that will form the backbone of the Dutch air force well into the 
mid-21
st century. 
  While the loss of Dutch participation in Tornado—in addition to the other mi-
nor players—was decried as a “blow to the morale” of the proponents of advancing 
European aerospace cooperation, it would be wrong to see the immediate cause of the 
Dutch decision—the readiness of both Germany and Italy to embrace the British posi-
tion—as a victory for British national egotism.87 The vision that advanced the design 
and production of the 200 variant, only later called Tornado GR1/Interdiction and 
Strike (IDS) variant, may have been somewhat closer to Britain’s ideal, but it ulti-
mately remained a compromise choice. The IDS overlapped with the operational 
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abilities of the UK’s existing Jaguar units. The British, like their allies, were willing 
to pay the price of redundancy for the continuation and success of the program — here 
defined as an overly complicated and thus unnecessarily expensive aircraft.88 
The IDS satisfied some, but not all, of the remaining members’ military re-
quirements, as became immediately apparent once the first prototypes took to the skies 
in 1973. The same pressure that compelled them to collaborate did not disappear with 
the introduction of the “strike and interdiction” variant of the Tornado. With the IDS, 
all were now compelled to make procurement decisions they would have otherwise 
avoided, as capability “gaps”—the so-called “fighter gap” and “reconnaissance 
gap”—began to define the limits of their aerospace abilities. For example, both Rome 
and Bonn opted to retain their F-104 fleets past their desired retirement dates. Italy 
even continued to produce its own national variant of the F-104, the F-104S, well into 
1970s and continued to support it into the mid-1990s—despite rapidly inflating opera-
tions and maintenance costs—for lack of a better option until the introduction of the 
Eurofighter neared. 
The United Kingdom and Germany also faced immediate air-superiority and 
reconnaissance needs. By 1970, both procured American F-4 Phantoms to satisfy 
these needs. Ultimately, Germany purchased a special tranche of 35 Tornados in 1990 
to satisfy its electronics counter-measures and reconnaissance needs, dubbed the ECR 
variant.89 Britain went a step further and within months of the first production batch of 
Tornado in 1976, it abandoned efforts to mold the IDS into an interceptor platform and 
instead set forth to construct 165 UK-only air defense variants (ADV) of the Tornado, 
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or F-2/F-3 ADV.90 Whereas the ECR embodied only minor tweaks from the IDS stan-
dard, the ADV was as different to the IDS as the “MRCA 100” was from the “MRCA 
200”. Unlike the IDS, which was designed to strike enemy airfields, troop concentra-
tions, and shipping in all environmental conditions and in single-pass attacks, the 
ADV was an interceptor built around a high performance radar and specially placed 
airframe hard points to accommodate a mix of short-range and long-range anti-aircraft 
missiles. The ADV, consequently, was not only longer than the IDS, 20 percent of its 
primary subsystems and component were unique to it. These differences yielded an 
aircraft that was nearly £2 million more expensive than its predecessor (£10.7 million 
vice £9 million), and most significant, one that was non-interchangeable in terms of 
roles and missions.91 
The development of these follow-on variants to the IDS, as well as the interim 
procurement of the American aircraft, occurred because the remaining members of the 
Tornado consortium all made political decisions to devalue their requirements while 
accepting some uncertainty as to how they might yet satisfy those needs. The United 
Kingdom could use its greater experience to persuade its allies that the MRCA 200 
concept would be more economical and militarily useful than the air-superiority alter-
native. That said, as a supplicant to the group, it could not dictate a non-MRCA 
solution—or rather, one that did not reflect the same level of allied input and concep-
tual “ownership.” On the other hand, given their inability to procure a system on their 
own, Germany and Italy were willing to set aside some of their requirements, however 
momentarily. Ultimately, the consortium states moved to right the program’s short-
comings as they pertained to their national needs only after the project had progressed 
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through development and initial production. Moreover, they did so using the collabo-
rative tools that they had created and safeguarded via the IDS—although the other 
variants were national specific, their production continued to adhere to the same work-
share divisions that applied to the IDS.92  
The state solutions to requirements problem, as they manifested in the Tornado 
program, reflected some of the necessary compromises need to advance the program 
forward: imperfect fixes to an imperfect system. Only after they secured the project—
and presumably its attendant political goals—did they advance their military require-
ments. Even so, Tornado proved to be an inadequate vessel to expand beyond the 
interdiction and strike mission. For example, British commentators and parliamentari-
ans routinely criticized the Tornado for being unable to match the aerial combat 
capabilities of the American F-15, and as I noted in the last chapter, some Royal Air 
Force officers even regarded the platform’s dog-fighting capability as inferior to the 
Lightning, Britain’s 1950s air superiority system.93 These inherent limitations in the 
technology—while limiting the states’ ability to successfully craft national solutions 
from their “European” compromises—did have one positive “European” effect, how-
ever: they added incentives to the participants to reconvene years later and attempt to 
build a follow-on platform—the Eurofighter—that would satisfy those capabilities 
that they abandoned to advance the MRCA. 
 
Institutionalization – How to control and coordinate 
  Whereas requirements could be amortized into the future, the business of allo-
cating workshare and determining leadership were issues that required the immediate 
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attention of the consortium states. Although  none of the member governments were in 
a position to impose de jure program leadership and industrial dominance over the 
project, that did not keep them or their national industries from trying. The problem 
confronting the consortium arose from the special character of Tornado’s genesis: the 
program explicitly began as a German-led venture in October 1967. Bonn not only 
advanced the initial negotiations, it also declared its intention to procure upwards to 
56 percent of the total airframe production run, roughly 600 planes out of 1100. Al-
though that number would fall to an even split with the United Kingdom at 42.5 
percent apiece, as the pre-development MoU neared in April 1970 and Germany re-
vised its requirements in keeping with the abandonment of the proposed MRCA 100, 
Germany continued to press for outright program control. After all, leadership desig-
nation traditionally emerged from national division of funding and the anticipated 
aircraft production.94 
  Only the United Kingdom possessed the actual wherewithal to bring the pro-
gram into existence, however, even though its original 1969 workshare allocation was 
only 24 percent. For some British industrial and governmental commentators, the idea 
of ceding program control to any European partner was a non-starter: even trading air-
frame leadership for British control over the propulsion systems based on Rolls 
Royce’s unrivaled economic position in Europe, as had been the case with the Anglo-
French collaborations, was unacceptable. As one British Aerospace Corporation offi-
cial noted, “we fell for that one with the French, and we aren’t going to fall for it 
again.”95 Another senior official, speaking on behalf of the national industry, was 
equally critical:  
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“[the British aerospace industry] has the ability to tackle any of these 
[systems design and production issues] alone because [British] strength 
goes across the board—airframes, engines, equipments, and electron-
ics. . .We cannot go on [to retain technological strength] if we go on 
accepting a subordinate role.”96 
The British could, and did, support their position with hard facts: Britain had both the 
industrial base and technology base to engage in leading edge aerospace design and 
production—a capacity, as we have shown, Germany did not possess by their own 
admission. The German engine manufacturer, Motoren and Turbinen Union (MTU), 
had been assigned initially 52 percent of the design responsibility for engine (again, 
traditionally distinct from airframe cost-share/work-share considerations), but this fig-
ure proved to be wildly optimistic: MTU possessed the industrial plant and technical 
skill set to provide, at best, 15 percent support to the engine design.97 Rolls Royce was 
obliged to provide 75 percent of the development effort for the first engine proto-type 
just to facilitate the technology transfer to permit both MTU and its Italian counterpart 
Fiat to perform their 40 percent and 20 percent respective shares of production that 
were established in early 1970.  
Despite this unpleasant reality, both German industry and its British counter-
part, engaged in a guerilla lobbying campaign from June 1968 into early 1969 to 
persuade their governments of the rightness of their leadership claims—an effort that 
culminated in British Aircraft Corporation placing full-page ads in German newspa-
pers touting that firm’s preeminent position in European aerospace.98  Ultimately, the 
governments intervened with overriding political objectives and brought their indus-
tries to heel. They did so by crafting a leadership model which one member of the 
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British House of Lords coined as “wholly cooperative” and wholly satisfactory too: 
instead of a single national company dictating the will of a particular government to 
its collaborators, the member states settled upon an international management author-
ity of interlocking governmental and industrial agencies.99  
  The idea behind this move was to prevent the program from stalling in its first 
two years of conceptualization and development following British accession to the 
consortium in 1968.100 Given that neither of the two principal members of the group 
would openly submit to the other, either politically or industrially, the only practical 
option that was to create two legal “fictions:” 
   The first was a trinational directorate embodied by a directorate of senior mili-
tary and national defense ministry personnel meeting biannually to provide 
overall program direction and policy guidance, as well as to resolve any po-
litical disputes that might arise. As the early Tornado negotiations received an 
official NATO blessing, this body was called the NATO Management Organi-
zation (NAMMO) and was established in September 1969.101 Beneath it, sat 
the semi-autonomous executive agency, the NATO MRCA Development and 
Production Management Agency (NAMMA). This agency functioned as a 
conduit between the nations and industry. It provided routine, real-time over-
sight of program execution and acted as a unified procurement agency for all 
Tornado acquisitions. 
   Second, in March 1969, the principal airframe producers – the British Aircraft 
Corporation, Germany’s Messerschmitt-Boelkow Blohm, and Italy’s Fiat—
formed a joint venture company named Panavia Aircraft GmbH. On the en-
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gine-side, Rolls Royce, MTU, and Fiat, established Turbo Union Limited later 
that year in September. Both of these organizations functioned as perma-
nently-staffed, international companies responsible for all marketing, 
contracting, and development and production of the airframe, engine, and 
principal subsystems. In both arrangements, the national constituents operate 
as both shareholders and principal sub-contractors.  
At both the political and industrial levels, the governments moved in directions 
that were unique at the time. First and foremost, they established that neither weighted 
voting—based on work-share allocation—or majority voting would form the basis of 
decision-making. As B.O Heath noted, “all partners would have to be persuaded of a 
common course of action by discussion and exploration on a joint basis.”102 This man-
date did not completely eliminate the equity/competence arguments, but it definitely 
diminished them. As one British executive noted, London’s embrace of this regime 
meant that British industry could not necessarily count on Whitehall’s support to pro-
mote a parochial national vision.103 Indeed, the decision to surrender leadership to 
agencies that did not prioritize commercial logic and favor technological strength was 
regarded as a political fait accompli. Another industrialist remarked: “[The govern-
ment’s compromise to the consortium] has worked out to getting 2 percent of 
something or 100 percent of nothing and we have gone for the 2 percent because we 
have no other choice if we are to stay in the game.”104  
      Attitudes such these were not universal: some welcomed the wide reaching 
level of equality to program. Fiat’s chief engineer, Giandomenico Captele, noted: 
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Three nations acting as equals in the design of an aircraft: we really 
welcomed that idea. In previous international projects, we Italians had 
almost always been a minority partner, and it is frustrating when you 
know your engineering judgment is always being downgraded on that 
account. We thought it a sound concept for engineers to give their ideas 
and have them judged on technical merit rather than the size of the 
shareholding in the programme held by their country.105 
The significance of this innovation, however, extended far beyond faciliting Italian 
contributions to program’s design. Non-discrimination in both Panavia and NAMMA 
allowed Rome to secure shares in sub-systems development that nominally exceeded 
the value of its 15 percent work-share allocation: 
. . .Italians succeeded in winning for their industry much of the techno-
logical infusion that the Germans had originally sought. For its 13-15% 
contribution, Italy reasonably should have expected little more than an 
assortment of modules and control boxes. But the Italians set their 
sights on and won some complete. . .systems.106 
 More important than this, however, were the interpersonal relationships that this par-
ticular governance pattern created at the industrial level. Alfred Price argued that: 
The decision to give each national company an equal say. . .and to 
make all votes unanimous, was to have a far-reaching effect on the pro-
gramme now taking shape. It tended to prevent any one company trying 
to establish a viewpoint which it then felt it had to defend.107 
Captele explained this phenomenon from his personal vantage point as program par-
ticipant, noting that: 
Initially the people from the different countries did not know or trust 
each other and that caused difficulties. We were all very defensive; 
people thought the others were following the interests of their compa-
nies rather than the project as a whole. But very soon we built up 
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personal relationships and learned to respect each other, and developed 
a common mentality. From then on co-operation was wonderful.108 
While Captele was arguably exaggerating—hard feelings and hard bargaining 
continued to beset the program through the early 1970s—he nonetheless highlighted a 
feature of Tornado that has set it apart from other collaborative programs. According 
to some contemporary British analysts, the enforcement of procedural equality did 
more than just establish the “common mentality” of which Captele speaks: it estab-
lished expectations of behavior and trust that brought the national shareholders (i.e., 
the national champions bound together through Panavia) closer together within the 
confines of the Tornado project over the ensuing decades than anyone had thought 
possible in 1970 or 1972. Indeed, as one senior British Aerospace (the successor to the 
British Aircraft Corporation) representative noted, since the 1970s the personal con-
tacts between engineers has grown beyond that which has been contractually required. 
These connections have permeated, albeit incompletely, throughout their respective 
companies; for example, by the mid 1990s, it has become common for national firms 
to appeal to their cross-border peers to perform nation-specific maintenance and modi-
fications to the home firm’s national Tornado fleet. As the representative noted, this 
occurred because of the belief that the partner companies will treat their planes with 
the same attention as they do their own country’s fleet.109 
It would be a mistake to assume that this particular innovation—the applica-
tion of industrial equality within the program—was the product of some kind of 
grandiose collaborative vision or even some limited awareness of potentially effi-
ciency-maximizing behavior. One can construct a persuasive economic argument that 
in a collaborative program, such as Tornado, in which national firms assume design 
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and production responsibilities for discrete systems, those competences should be em-
braced for long-term maintenance and support, if only to prevent wasteful duplication 
of effort. But, the relationships that have evolved at the industrial level are poorly un-
derstood by legislative elites and would be resisted by them if they were fully 
aware.110 Nonetheless, this outcome has occurred because “no one could think of a 
better idea” to ameliorate leadership concerns in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
Indeed, when we look at other aspects of program guidance and institutionali-
zation, it is immediately clear that the regime of “no state leadership” 
that the members enacted was an exceptional component of a much larger effort that 
was in many ways tainted by “crass” nationalism and “undisguised political bargain-
ing.”111 For example, the second programmatic innovation that states enacted dealt 
more with the institutions of control than the procedure adopted. NAMMA, Turbo Un-
ion, and Panavia all represented significant steps forward in the conduct of European 
procurement collaboration. Prior co-development efforts, such as the Jaguar, were 
organizationally minimalist: little more than coordinating bodies without dedicated 
staff which would meet infrequently to exchange information and provide a veneer of 
joint guidance to partners who were comfortable keeping their industrial competitors 
and political rivals at arm’s length. In Tornado, the member states actually created an 
executive agency that was notionally isolated from the political whims of the national 
governments. While NAMMA—much like its industrial counterparts—was propor-
tionally staffed based on country workshare totals, the agency’s mandate was to 
provide independent oversight. As one NAMMA manager, Heinz Birkenbeil, noted: 
All service officials seconded to NAMMA had to sign a form that they 
would not push the interests of their own country, industry, or air force, 
they would push only the interests of the MRCA programme. When 
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service officers joined the organization, for a time after arrival, they 
would follow their national line of thinking and national approach. 
How long that lasted depended on the individual. But being forced to 
work with people from other two nations and to listen to their argu-
ments, after a while they came to the NAMMA way of thinking. 
Although it was always staffed by people from the three nations, there 
was always a NAMMA line on any acquisition, though sometimes it 
would be contrary to the British line, the German line, or the Italian 
line, and sometimes it ran counter to all three.112 
Although Birkenbeil recounts cases in which German, British, or Italian staffers were 
chastised by their respective countrymen for not embracing “their” national position, 
one should not assume on this evidence that state interest was completely removed 
from the endeavor. In reality, the states kept NAMMA on very short leash on all issues 
beyond mundane, day-to-day oversight. As Alfred Price notes, while national defense 
ministries specially selected representatives to fill NAMMA positions, those same 
ministries “were unwilling to forgo [their] power to the minutest degree:” all 
NAMMA procurement decisions not only had to routed through the national capitals, 
but nationally-hatted program specialists would subsequently travel to NAMMA 
headquarters to sanction any agreement.113 
    On the industrial-side, the situation was considerably more sensible—to a 
point. As we noted, industry leaders in all three states eventually recognized that they 
had few choices but to remain in the “game.” As Price notes,  
. . .They knew that they had to work effectively with their foreign part-
ners: nothing a company could gain from clever in-fighting was 
comparable to the unmitigated disaster awaiting all of them if the pro-
gramme collapsed.114 
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In Britain, it was widely understood that London would not support any high-value, 
high visibility military aerospace development and production product unless it was 
assured that the state could secure an adequately sized market and recoup R&D costs. 
For both the Italians and Germans, membership in Tornado was not only seen as a 
source of technology infusion, but also as means for the governments to pursue their 
own industrial policies. For example, Rome insisted upon and won the right for every 
Italian airframe producer to have a share in production, either subcontracting to Fiat, 
or to the foreign national champions. Across the range of the program, Italy took con-
scious steps to ensure that work was channeled to firms located in disadvantaged areas 
of the country, particularly those south of Rome. Bonn, on the other hand, attained its 
long desired indigenization of production, but in the absence of significant civilian 
demand, found itself with an increased burden to sustain the sector.115  
  Consequently, the national industries found themselves pressured by their gov-
ernments to behave, and being as dependent upon government largess in securing 
workshare and contracting opportunities as they were, industrial leaders had to be 
somewhat accommodating in addressing organizational disputes. Additionally, this 
was made easier by the absence of any kind of insulation between Panavia and the na-
tional champions. Members of both Panavia and Turbo-Union were also ranking 
employees of the national “parent” firms. Consequently, these individuals could act 
authoritatively, as they used their executive positions to ensure that agreements made 
at the international level would be respected and implemented back home.116 
  That said, acceptance of both the Tornado’s  institutional machinery and its 
governing rules was not universal. Segments of British industry, in particular, chafed 
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at its lack of program control as late as 1972. The British Society for British Aero-
space Companies argued that London’s compromises on leadership and work-share 
posed a pernicious, long-term threat to Britain’s competitive advantage.117 British in-
dustry, however, was not alone in its uneasy embrace of the Tornado program. When 
the program began to coalesce in late 1969, there were actually three international in-
dustrial coordinating bodies: Panavia, Turbo-Union and Avionica. This last 
organization, a joint venture between national defense electronics associations, Brit-
ain’s EASAMS, Germany’s ESG, and the Italian SIA, oversaw the production and 
development of Tornado’s avionics systems. Its tenure however was shortlived as both 
state and industrial interests proved to be irreconcilable.  
  Avionics represented approximately 40 percent of the total value of the pro-
gram. As with every other systems area, the United Kingdom held a high 
technological advantage over its partners, and both London and EASAMS argued that 
all avionics contract should reflect that strength.  Bonn and its firm, on the other hand, 
rejected any increase in British technological content within the overall project. While 
Britain pushed for a British radar suite, both Italy and Germany pressed for cheaper, 
off-the-shelf American systems that, it was believed, would both provide a firewall to 
British domination and provide for the diffusion of better technology. Unable to attain 
needed consensus at either the political or industrial levels, Avionica deadlocked. The 
radar dispute, coupled to entrenched disagreements over types and producer of other 
subsystems, actually halted progress on Tornado development for five months.118 This 
delay and the ongoing tensions between national producers eventually led the states to 
                                                 
117 Edgar, The MRCA/Tornado, 59. 
118 Ibid, 69. 164 
 
 
dissolve Avionica in 1972 and transfer its functions to Panavia—though nominal avi-
onics coordination was extended to Britain’s EASAMS group to placate London.119 
 
Equity: how to build 
  The Avionica debacle exemplifies the lack of vision—or more precisely, the 
absence of a truly European vision—that characterized most of Tornado’s genesis. 
Cooperation was driven by self-regarding state interest. Innovation was possible, but 
could be readily offset by self-interest and relative gains concerns. The depth of this 
parochialism is best seen in the politics of program equity. As a former British Perma-
nent Under Secretary of State for Defense once remarked, most armaments 
collaboration is managed through “opportunism, expediency, and horse-trading.”120 
We have already observed opportunism and expediency as they were manifest in Tor-
nado: a perceived opportunity to change the regional balance of power and the 
willingness of national governments to embrace defense industrial and military com-
promises to sustain their new partnerships. We now turn to the compromises that 
shaped program work-share allocations.  
Equity has both material and symbolic attributes. The symbolic equity shares 
within Tornado are exemplified by the Avionica solution: the exchange of status for 
substance, in this case by extending de jure British leadership while denying the Brit-
ish the industrial objectives that they sought. Elsewhere in the program, such trades 
were common. For example, a common British complaint from the early 1970s, held 
that Tornado was a German program despite fixed workshares that assigned Britain 
and Germany equal weight in both airframe and engine design—42.5 percent and 40 
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percent, respectively. Indeed, British concerns were not totally without merit: Panavia 
was legally a German company, located in Munich, subject to German law, and sig-
nificantly, a managing directorship permanently assigned to a German citizen. On the 
other hand, German analysts could claim the reverse: Turbo Union was a British com-
pany located in Bristol and enjoying similar “benefits.” Moreover, the engine that it 
developed was not an ab initio design, but actually an existing Rolls-Royce design 
augmented for the Tornado airframe. 
  As we have established, the leaderless-leadership governance model within the 
program made the location of coordinating bodies largely irrelevant regarding the gov-
ernance and conduct of the project—other than the obvious added costs of moving 
engineers and administrators back and forth from national centers to the international 
companies. The symbolic importance, however, was substantial. German commenta-
tors regarded their compromises vis-à-vis Rolls and Turbo Union as a necessary evil 
and a purely political decision on their part: unless Germany offered that fig-leaf to the 
British, they certainly could not count on London’s willingness to compromise in 
other areas and the larger political and industrial goals would be endangered as the 
project faltered.121  
  Choices of location, legal setting, and even the official program language and 
currency—English and the Deutsche Mark, respectively—were surrogates for national 
dominance and facilitated future compromise. Such give-and-take was vital, because 
the states routinely placed their own techno-industrial and political desires over any 
commercial reasoning as they blessed contracts and parceled out work-share. Indeed, 
although the industrial division of labor had been crudely set by late 1969 at 
42.5/42.5/15 (UK/GER/IT) for the airframe and avionics and 40/40/20 for the power-
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plant, the national governments were very sensitive to the content of their design and 
production share. As one British executive put it: 
. . .All partners wanted their industries to have a fair share of work – 
both design and production, but further a fair share of new technology, 
innovation, and expertise. With this they were willing to undertake the 
project and their share of the risk and investment involved.122 
For states intent upon maximizing their own gains from their collaboration, simply 
producing some percentage of the gross value of the platform was insufficient.  They 
could instead be expected to follow one of two paths: 
   Seek to capture those subsystems that offered the greatest returns in terms of 
technology infusion and prestige, or 
   Ensure that national firms could act as sub-contractors to foreign primes re-
sponsible for coveted items. 
Subsequently, while the nations had macro-responsibilities, e.g., German design of the 
center fuselage, the British leadership over the rear and front fuselages, Italian control 
over the wings, etc., the reality was that these governments actively campaigned to 
secure value-added gains throughout the platform. As NAMMA’s Birkenbeil re-
marked, despite the recommendations of his agency, “haggling” over “lucrative 
contracts” was both widespread and detrimental: 
The decisions were taken by the countries themselves. . .There were 
many times when a company proposed a system that system was ac-
cepted but it was not built by the company or even in the same 
country.123 
The government would barter contracts between themselves in a quid-pro-quo fashion 
that Birkenbeil described as  
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‘You get this part if you agree to that contract going here and this con-
tract going there.’ That is a big disadvantage of an international project. 
There were many times when the entire programme nearly fell apart 
because the nations could not agree.124 
 
The project ultimately endured because the governments opted not to mask the politi-
calization of the development process. While each sub-system and sub-sub-system had 
national leads, these firms were often obliged to embrace at least two foreign partners 
in sub-contractor relationships. Consequently, the Tornado was more internationalized 
than is readily apparent. Systems as mundane as the platform’s landing gear were tri-
national efforts uniting second- and third-tier producers from throughout the 
consortium.  
One must not confuse this diffusion of work and technology as largess. It was 
instead a state-mandated phenomenon in which the governments drove up program 
costs through the politicalization of the development process. This “collaborative pre-
mium,” arising from parochial national goals, has been estimated to be as high as 40 
percent for development and 10 percent for production.125  
Nonetheless, the Tornado program was not entirely colored by nationalist ex-
cess. Despite some collaborative input, single-source production was the rule for sub-
systems and components.126 The only “purely national efforts” in the program were 
confined to testing, evaluation, and final assembly. Further, while the politically moti-
vated inefficiencies were significant—so much so that a 1985 British Parliamentary 
Committee condemned London’s handling of the work-share negotiations and argued 
that a better process be considered for future programs—Tornado ultimately proved to 
be a mitigated success for the participating states. Not only did they acquire the air-
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craft and its technology, they did so at a cost that was less than one would expect for 
purely national ventures.127 Cost-savings for the three states, based their individual 
program shares, have been estimated to range between £850 million and £1.9 billion 
(in 1976 pounds). 
Conclusion 
  Tornado was the first, truly multination co-development and co-production 
project in Western Europe. It established the baseline from which we can assess all 
later episodes of cooperation. Tornado did not reflect some kind of Europeanist epiph-
any on the part of European decision-makers. As we have shown, the member states 
pursued the project for the most nationalist of motivations: to establish a quasi-balance 
of power within the Community between themselves and their would-be French he-
gemon. The execution of the project continued to betray this ignoble beginning: states 
routinely allowed their national goals to contort the larger effort. That said, it was this 
peculiar vision of “Europe”—as one French official quipped, the idea “building 
Europe for us, and not for Europe’s sake”—that led to programmatic innovations that 
ultimately set Tornado apart and contributed to its enduring success.128 Tornado bene-
fited from a mix of endogenous and exogenous pressures that compelled the national 
governments to restrain themselves. Their compromises—affecting their military re-
quirements and leadership designs—while seen by some as distasteful at the time, not 
only held them together but also established a level of intimacy that exceeded the 
founders’ expectations.  
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  Nonetheless, one must stress that this harmonization of interests did not ger-
minate from some conception of an emergent, collective Europeaness. At the 
corporate level, inter-personal relationships paved the way for trust and greater effi-
ciencies. Among state decision-makers, however—whose interests and perceptions 
ultimately mattered the most—the prerogatives of narrowly defined national interests 
continuously appeared throughout the early life of the program. The states never wa-
vered in their desire to maintain control over the collaborative process and to ensure 
that they reaped maximum benefits from that process. Identity was an important factor 
in Tornado’s conceptualization and execution. That said, the identities that were at 
play during that time were almost exclusively national and one could see their effects 
in the actions and arguments advanced by the state governments. 
My hypothesis holds that a high-technology system such as Tornado would be 
a nationally driven and nationally oriented endeavor. Consequently, the legacy of the 
program is compatible with my argument—especially given that it emerged at a time 
before the notion of a European identity was systematically measured or even viewed 
as a notable feature of social landscape in the region.129 The issue before us now, is to 
assess if the motivations and conduct of European procurement cooperation has be-
come “European,” either over time or in different technology areas. As the 
Community evolved into a Single Market, and later into an Union, is it plausible that 
such shifts occurred. We will now turn the Eurofighter program to test this assump-
tion. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Eurofighter – Lessons Learned, 
Unlearned, and Lost 
 
Europe’s military aeronautics will have its new 
champion. The industrialization phase of EFA 
(European Fighter Aircraft), the most expensive, has 
officially begun. . .But this success will not produce 
others. EFA will probably be the final result of the 
great era of European military joint production, at 
least in the aeronautics field. And in other sectors too, 
from missiles to electronics, or major land-based 
weapons, things are unlikely to be any different. The 
era in which the major national industries reached 
agreements with their respective defense ministries to 
produce individual weapons systems jointly, carefully 
sharing out costs and benefits, is now ending. The 
history of EFA is instructive – a kind of obstacle race 
over higher and more difficult obstacles that is only 
now perhaps reaching its conclusion, after 
innumerable delays, reappraisals, and renegotiations. 
Nobody wants to or can embark on any more such 
operations, which, with the disappearance of the Soviet 
threat, are now to be considered high risk. 
-Stefano Silvesteri, “After EFA, Integrated 
Defense,” Sole 24 Ore, Milan, Italy, 3 September 
1996, translated by the Federal Broadcast 
Information Service, FIBS-WEU-96-173. 
 
Introduction 
At the start of 21
st century, the Eurofighter project is the largest collaborative 
armaments program in the European Union. Launched in October 1986 by the member 
states of the Tornado consortium plus Spain, it has evolved into a 60 billion dollar 
program set to produce at least 600 airplanes. Eurofighter will prowl nearly a fifth of 171 
 
the European Union’s skies, providing interception and air superiority capabilities well 
into the 2040s. This effort, whose formal development began over seventeen years 
after the signing of the Tornado development Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
in September 1969, represents much more than the joint procurement of an agile, 
multipurpose fighter for four Union air forces. It is the direct inheritor of the Tornado 
program, built upon the institutional and cooperative foundations of its predecessor, as 
well as being a response to its shortcomings. More important, the Eurofighter project 
bears witness to profound changes within both Europe and the larger international 
system. In the two decades separating it and Tornado, the European projet expanded 
both quantitatively with the admission of three new member states, and qualitatively, 
having taken its first transformative steps beyond being a “soulless market” of 
consumers, as Jacque Delors once derisively called it, into a transnational community 
of citizens: the direct election of the European Parliament, the establishment of a true 
common market via the Single European Act, the growing the “Europeanization” of 
public opinion and deepening of affective support for European unification.
1 In the 
years since project development began, the changes have been no less considerable, 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the existential threat that it posed, the 
establishment of the economic and monetary union as set out in the Maastrict Treaty 
given form in the introduction of the euro, and the pervasive expansion of Union’s 
regulatory authority.  
The Europe that Eurofighter will defend is worlds apart from the Europe in 
which  Tornado emerged in the 1970s. Then, the member states expended their 
energies on the “low politics” of agriculture and intra-regional tariffs. The idea of 
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advancing the legitimacy through the creation and sustainment of a European public 
sphere—indeed, even acknowledging its presence—did not exist at the level of 
regional policy until 1973.
2 Nearly thirty years later, the “idea of Europe” is not only 
taken for granted—albeit with considerable qualifications—the Union is a place of 
pooled sovereignty where collaboration, both civil and military, has become 
“obligatory political policy” for the member governments.
3 
Nonetheless, while Europe has expanded, the gap between Tornado  and 
Eurofighter has—in some ways—remained remarkably small. A seamless chain of 
industrial and political collaboration connects the two programs. At the time of this 
writing, more than thirty years of continuous partnership among the three principal 
state actors has produced two unique weapons systems designed with radically 
different performance characteristics and intended to perform different functions. 
Beyond this basic truth, however, the situation is muddled. Eurofighter has been as 
much a political aircraft as its predecessor, subject to the same ebb and flow of often-
conflicting national agendas.  But where Tornado could be seen as more a “religious 
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belief” than armament, tied to a peculiar, realist  vision of Europe and pursued 
vigorously by governments intent on harnessing the political, strategic, and industrial 
side-benefits of its procurement, Eurofighter has not enjoyed such incentives. Instead, 
it emerged in an environment in which there were no centripetal forces that would 
engender and sustain a commonly recognized mutual self-interest: no military threat, 
no shared techno-industrial priorities, no regional balance of power considerations. 
Indeed, as we shall see, the only things held common by these states were their 
willingness to pursue their own national prerogatives and the wholly insubstantial 
effects of an emergent European identity and its presumed redefinition of state 
interest. Consequently, instead of a “religious” commitment, the Eurofighter program 
has “hung by a silver thread,” from its initial conception in 1976 to production some 
twenty years later, periodically teetering on collapse and dissolution.  
The  Eurofighter program provides an excellent test case for the role and 
influence of an emergent European identity for many of the reasons highlighted above. 
Studying it in relation to Tornado provides a limited control over confounding 
variables that would otherwise arise if we were to explore a case defined by a different 
set of actors. Here, we confront the same set of significant countries, national firms, 
and indeed, even the same personalities.
4 These actors have moved together in 
lockstep through one successful episode of collaboration into another, and yet they 
have achieved different results. Whereas controversy and conflict were present to 
some degree in the Tornado program, they have defined Eurofighter from its very 
conception. Moreover, this program has become immersed in what Werner Voβ and 
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Michael Brzoska have labeled a “justification gap.”
5 In addition to the familiar 
questions of what to build, how to build, and how to manage, the Eurofighter 
consortium has had to grapple with a fourth question: why build?  Unlike Tornado, 
where the participating states always held clear and mutually supportive visions of 
what they sought to achieve from the collaboration, two decades later these states 
found the “why” question to be central, as the program has moved from crisis to crisis. 
Is  Eurofighter  a vehicle for advancing national grandeur? The national aerospace 
industry? The process of European armaments collaboration and the larger 
phenomenon of European unification? Some nebulous European defense industry? Or 
finally, is it an appropriate platform to defend the producing states against the myriad 
of threats that now exist out-of-area?  
In this chapter, we shall follow the evolution of the Eurofighter program from 
its conception in the late 1970s to initial production at century’s end. We consider both 
the rationales that state elites used to justify their participation and their actual 
behavior to discern any tell-tale signs that they moved beyond narrow conceptions of 
self-interest and the traditionally stifling confines of le juste retour. The following 
sections details the evolution of the Eurofighter. Unlike Tornado, with its relatively 
straightforward developmental track, Eurofighter  has experienced several critical 
junctures in which national antagonisms and conflicting agendas have endangered the 
collaborative enterprise. These junctures, or time periods, loosely correspond to two 
major program milestones: 
   Conceptualization and pre-definition: 1979-1985 
   Research and Development, and pre-production: 1987-1996 
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We will explore the underlying cooperative process that characterized each phase, 
focusing, as in the preceding chapter, on the issues of requirements harmonization, 
equity, and program control and management. This approach permits a comparison of 
the stated justifications for collaboration and its actual conduct, and thus allows us to 
assess what effect, if any, an emergent European identity may have had in shaping 
state approaches to the program. 
 
Ideational Shifts? 
  The question before us is whether the expansion of a transnational identity in 
the 1980s and 1990s had any demonstrable effect on the state rationales and program 
execution of the Eurofighter project. Eurofighter has taken shape—indeed, has taken 
flight—at a time when a discernable European identity has not only emerged, but has 
been consciously advanced. Nonetheless, as I have noted in the theoretical argument 
presented in Chapter 2, I would predict that such an identity would not have played a 
role in Eurofighter’s tortured history. Even a cursory examination of the declaratory 
positions taken by the project’s principal actors during its early years supports this 
view.  For example, Wolfgang Rupelt, the armaments director in the German defense 
ministry asserted that:  
International cooperation is but one option for meeting national 
[military] requirements and thus it must follow the [determination] of 
national [policy]; it must not happen the other way around. 
[Cooperation] is not an end in itself; it must show clear advantages of 
quality, cost, time, and risk reduction. All other considerations are 
secondary.
6 
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British, Italian, and Spanish notables echoed similar sentiments.
7 One French 
parliamentarian—speaking just before his country’s brief flirtation with pre-
Eurofighter concept development in 1979—was even more blunt about the limits of 
Europe where French defense production was concerned: 
 
. . .Voices are being raised by the champions of European integration 
calling for the restructuring of the European armaments industry under 
the aegis of the European Community whose purpose is wreck the 
national economy and France’s defense. National defense requirements 
would be dictated by outsiders. The fate of our firms and our workers’ 
place of employment would be decided by them too. This is 
unacceptable and we oppose it with all our might. . .There is a great 
danger in seeing French high technology, the ordnance factories, and 
nationalized industries sacrificed at the European level. All goes to 
show clearly that we have entered into an active phase of European 
integration. . .but it is running up against the national will. . . .
8 
While statements such as this are quite damning, one cannot assume a complete 
absence of discursive evidence that would definitively show the transnationalization of 
state priorities in collaboration. State positions on Eurofighter specifically have been 
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somewhat confused. At times, the Eurofighter  states have embraced Europeanist 
language to bolster their arguments for pursuing that specific program. For example, 
French Defense Minister Charles Hernu asserted that in the development of a new 
multinational fighter plane, what mattered most was a solution that “correspond[ed] to 
Europe’s needs and capabilities.”
9 Yet, Paris’ actions to dominate and subvert the 
project in the mid 1980s led the then-German Defense Minister Manfred Wörner to 
damn French aims as “inconsistent with the concept of partnership.”
10 Similarly, 
Wörner’s successor, Volker Rühe—the  individual with the greatest single influence 
on the development of the project—argued in 1995 that Bonn’s support for 
Eurofighter rested on the support for the “concept of European industry.”
11 But, three 
years earlier, Rühe had led the German defense establishment against further work in 
the program when it no longer supported German national aims, and having failed in 
that effort, campaigned to ensure that Germany received production rights exceeding 
its legitimate work-share allocation.
12 
  Given my hypothesis, such anti-Europeanist behavior is untroubling, but 
assessing the supposed poverty of a European identity vis-à-vis Eurofighter requires a 
more thorough analysis of state action over the life of the project. We must be 
sensitive to expressions of other-regarding behavior that are more nuanced than an 
unambiguous declaration or action. The following sections analyses the two phases of 
the program outlined earlier, paying attention to state preferences and behavior as they 
relate to questions of requirements harmonization, equity, and institutionalization. 
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Eurofighter’s Inception – 1977 – 1985: An exercise in 
national excess 
  The history of the Eurofighter, as with most episodes of European armaments 
collaboration, is not limited to just those states that ultimately produced it. 
Eurofighter’s roots extend back to 1969 when the Tornado consortium coalesced and 
set upon designing and building a political aircraft that would address their political, 
industrial, and strategic objectives. In this sense, Tornado had been a success:  
   Britain’s interest in joining the Community had been nurtured, and the United 
Kingdom’s accession eventually took place on January 1973. 
   German and Italian techno-industrial capabilities were enhanced, so much so 
for example, that Franco-German procurement was negatively affected as 
Bonn used its new status and competence as a design-capable aerospace state 
to insist that German requirements and German expertise be given 
consideration in Franco-German joint projects.
13   
Militarily, however, Tornado, failed to satisfy the consortium’s needs. While it 
proved to be an effective interdiction platform, all the producing states had more 
expansive requirements. They had all looked for a platform that would perform air 
superiority and interception roles. The Air Defense Variant of Tornado proved to be an 
inadequate—and not universally embraced—stopgap. While this requirement could be 
deferred, aging air fleets and a continued threat from the Soviet bloc meant that it 
could not be ignored indefinitely. Consequently, the ongoing Tornado development 
effort in 1972 was accompanied by the initiation of national explorations into 
platforms that would fix their perceived “fighter gaps.” Peter Levene, the British Chief 
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of Defense Procurement in the late 1980s, argued that something had to be done to 
rectify Tornado’s shortcomings: 
. . .[I]n the critical areas of agility, stealth, and survivability. . .[t]he 
Tornado and Harrier mix, as you can see there, although one of the 
lowest cost solutions, [it has] fallen far short of the requirement in 
every way.
14 
The United Kingdom and Germany took the lead in closing the capability gap, 
although their initial response was to proceed on a national basis. The Royal Air Force 
drafted “Air Staff Targets” 396 and 403 to establish the requirements for a new air 
superiority fighter in 1972. An initial appeal to France and Germany to support the 
British requirement failed, and London latter applied the new specifications to an 
update of the Harrier, the GR.7.
15 Four years later, Bonn drew its own requirements 
for a new tactical fighter, called the Taktisches Kampfflugzeug-90 (TKF-90). Tornado 
financing pressures, however, soon led the government to cancel all development 
funding and to seek a non-national—preferably “European”—solution.
16  
While state activity toward a replacement platform slowed, industry moved 
forward, building upon its Tornado experience. The national champions comprising 
the Panavia consortium—Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm, British Aerospace 
(formerly British Aircraft Corp.), and Aeritalia (formerly Fiat)—moved ahead of their 
respective governments and in April 1982 crafted a fighter aircraft design entitled the 
Agile Combat Aircraft (ACA).
17 The ACA also languished due to a lack of definite 
government financial support, but it did provide the spark that eventually yielded the 
first intergovernmental Eurofighter negotiations a year later. More important, however, 
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it also provided the basis for introducing Eurofighter’s  two other principal states, 
France and Spain, and through them, the first of a series of interstate crises that would 
define the program into the future. 
 
 An expanded partnership 
The Panavia states came together in the early 1980s to build upon their 
previous collaboration and to correct its shortcomings. They shared the perception, 
voiced by a senior Aeritalia executive, that their Tornado experience would allow 
them to work together more effectively, as they had learned how to cooperate and had 
narrowed the technology gap that divided them in the late 1960s: 
This is much easier than in 1968-69, when we were deciding on the 
multirole combat aircraft. Now we have some good experience on 
cooperation. Also, the governments have more confidence that we have 
the industrial capability to do something this sophisticated.
18 
None of them was willing to pursue cooperation at any cost, however, and certainly 
not as an end in itself. European cooperation within the consortium, or even within 
some larger grouping, was desirable but only as long as it supported national aims. As 
Manfred Wörner noted: 
 
But there is one clear limit to any form of cooperation, any form of 
compromise. Since we are a technologically capable nation and since 
we want to keep from falling behind in the development stage, we have 
to insist that our national aviation industry retain its vitality. I would not 
sacrifice it. . .I said at the time, ‘Let’s make a common aircraft. Or, 
we’ll make our own.’ Of course, we cannot do it alone because the 
German market is too small. We prefer to go with four partners in a 
European scale but with a new and common concept where my own 
industry has its complete and fair share in development and 
construction. If a European solution fails, we could go into a common 
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German-American construction. So, we have our choices. This is the 
point where I have to insist on our industrial interests, because these are 
fields of high technology.
19 
That the Tornado  partners would consider working together in a follow-on 
collaboration is not surprising, given their mutual comfort level and the perceived 
need. Moreover, that they might reach out to additional partners is also 
understandable: a larger partner-base meant both a larger market and longer 
production-run, as well as added financial support for development costs and access to 
new sources of innovation, should the prospective collaborators have capable defense 
technology bases. Reaching out to both Spain and France in late 1983 offered both 
these benefits, but the chain of events that unfolded from that act would also 
exemplify the “limits of cooperation” within European defense procurement at that 
time.  
 
Spain.    Madrid’s vision of Eurofighter in its pre-definition period assumed a 
somewhat different shade than the perspectives of its partner governments. While they 
all regarded the first intergovernmental talks as the first step toward conceptualizing a 
weapons system that would provide employment, technology, and security, Spanish 
elites regarded it as something more fundamental. Like Britain seventeen years earlier, 
Madrid was eager to join the European Community and to use high-technology 
defense collaboration as a means to that end. Accession negotiations began in 1979 
and were still ongoing during the 1983 Eurofighter  talks.  Eurofighter  offered the 
Spanish government a vehicle to bolster its Europeanist credentials, a means to 
advertise to its partners throughout the region that Spain was not a dusty, post-
authoritarian backwater, but a potentially capable and dependable member of the 
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European Community. Moreover, Eurofighter was to be a signal to the Spanish public 
and to the larger world that Spain was firmly intent upon joining modernity and 
breaking what Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez called the country’s “psychology of 
isolation.”
20 
Of course, Spain’s interests were also rooted in the tangible. Following the 
democratic transition in 1977, successive Spanish administrations sought to restructure 
and modernize the whole of its national defense industrial base. They viewed cross-
border cooperation as the shortest path to this goal, and thus, as Jordi Molas-Gallart 
notes, Spanish participation in European and trans-Atlantic co development programs 
surged from zero to 20 in less than ten years: 
The Spanish attitude has been described as a ‘panic to miss a single 
cooperative weapons system’. . .It is common in Spain to use the 
metaphor of the ‘new technologies train’ allegedly moving swiftly 
through Europe, and which the Spanish military industry cannot afford 
to miss.
21  
The effect of the Eurofighter program promised to be substantial upon Madrid’s 
resources and ambitions. It was projected to consume upwards to 65 percent of all 
national defense research and development funding into the early 1990s. Development 
and production would demand the construction and expansion of industrial facilities. 
Jet engine production, for example, which had ceased in Spain in the 1950s, would 
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reemerge through the Spanish work-share support for the plane’s powerplant. The 
defense industrial base as a whole would enjoy a “qualitative leap” both in its 
competence and its relative position.
22 The allure of producing a state-of-the-art 
weapons system that Madrid embraced the project without any pressing military 
requirement, or even the ability to fully internalize and conduct the work.
23 
 
France.  French aims in the Eurofighter negotiations were considerably more complex 
than those of Madrid. Like Spain, France had no pressing need for a fighter-
interceptor, given that it was set to deploy it’s latest Mirage variant, the Mirage 2000, 
in 1984. That said, the opportunity to participate in the Eurofighter program offered 
France the opportunity to reassert itself in regional armaments cooperation and to 
address its special grievances that had arisen nearly twenty years earlier with the 
Tornado program. 
The French defense establishment had never supported the idea of its European 
allies engaging in any intra-regional defense aerospace collaboration in which France 
did not play a role, and Tornado represented a direct challenge to French strategic 
goals in Europe and to long-term French aims to impose its will in future collaborative 
projects. Successive French governments saw France as the natural leader of the 
European Community and labored to ensure that the evolution of European integration 
remained compatible with France’s “fundamental interests.”
24 A key component of 
this effort involved harnessing German political and economic support, manifest in 
German subservience to Paris in European institutions and in the development of a 
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thriving Franco-German armaments collaboration. This latter feature was particularly 
significant because—owing to defense production’s special excluded status within 
Community policy-making—procurement cooperation could move forward even if 
interstate collaboration were faltering in other areas. Indeed, the French establishment 
used its cross-border defense industrial ties as proof of “broader European 
cooperation,” and as a surrogate for the absence of  “actual military cooperation.”
25 
  Tornado had threatened this calculus. It was the largest intra-European 
procurement collaboration of its time, and not only was Paris not involved, its ham-
fisted attempt to break the consortium by offering Germany and Italy co-production of 
its Mirage 3G in 1969 had been damned by one German defense industrialist as an 
“example of national egotism.”
26 French exclusion and loss of potential markets for its 
technology, however, paled in comparison to Tornado’s  lasting industrial effects. 
Jonathan Tucker, in his analysis of the Franco-German Alpha-Jet program, noted that 
French paternalism in their collaborative ventures—and moreover, German acceptance 
of it—was only possible when France enjoyed favorable asymmetries between itself 
and its prospective partners. France’s post-war reconstruction of its defense industrial 
base had left it with a set of design and production capabilities that were among the 
most comprehensive in Western Europe. For example, the firm Dassault—France’s 
national fixed-wing aircraft champion—was arguably Europe’s technology leader in 
fighter systems.
27 Dassault exploited the gap in experience between itself and its 
German counterpart Dornier to demand both project leadership and the right to 
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produce a disproportionate percentage of Alpha-Jet’s high technology, “value-added” 
systems.
28 
  Dassault’s corporate position—supported by the French state—held that 
program equality would be inappropriate given France’s technological lead. Dassault 
also argued that because its partners would function as de facto sub-contractors, there 
would also be no need for any kind of ornate international management agency.
29 In 
the late 1960s, Bonn could—grudgingly—accept these limitations. By the early 1980s, 
however, its own capabilities had been significantly enhanced from the legacy of 
technology transfer from its prior and ongoing collaborations. More important, the 
managerial and design responsibilities that it received via Tornado demonstrated 
conclusively that German engineers could operate on the same level as any 
prospective European partner. In other words, membership in Tornado contributed to 
German self-perceptions as a mature and competent aerospace country whose 
requirements had value and who could contribute as an equal to even the most 
complicated undertaking. This newfound confidence made Germany less willing to 
submit France’s peculiar model of armament’s collaboration. 
Indeed, this last point is probably Tornado’s greatest legacy and one that would 
plague the French defense establishment through the 1980s. Tornado demonstrated 
that “leader-less” consortia could successfully engage in ab initio procurement 
collaboration. For French elites, the idea of diminishing sovereignty and sacrificing 
programmatic control was at the time an anathema. One French defense analyst said of 
Tornado: 
 
                                                 
28 For example, the cockpit, forward fuselage, and landing gear. See Tucker, “Partners and Rivals,” 109. 
29 Ibid. 186 
 
It is stupid to put two or three countries together during the 
development stage of an aircraft. A successful aircraft is the product of 
one [national] team. . .[Cooperation] is a way to hide mistakes. What is 
worse, it could be killing the [European aerospace] industry by 
introducing a socialist, non-competitive, non-private enterprise 
system.
30 
In its relative success, Tornado helped change what Tucker has called the “mode of 
collaboration,” by both enriching its weaker members and leading them to aspire for a 
model of partnership that was more compatible to their national interests.
31 
  The question confronting France in late 1983 was how it might prevent a 
repeat of its Tornado fiasco and assume a prominent role in the successor program, 
while at the same time coming to terms with the new defense industrial reality. 
Unfortunately, Paris failed to do either. Indeed, France’s initial response to the 
industry-led, multi-national Agile Combat Aircraft effort in 1982 was to launch its 
own national concept demonstrator, the Avion de Combat Experimental (ACX) 
project, and then to try to lure Germany away from its other partners. While this effort 
failed and led Paris to join the five-country talks a year later, it was emblematic of the 
limits of French cooperation. France’s inability to adapt and pursue true partnership 
would ensure that Eurofighter would begin badly. 
 
The (Future) European Fighter Aircraft—Past as Prologue 
The Future European Fighter Aircraft project began as a five-nation concept 
development effort in late 1983. By September 1985, and the signing of the first MoU, 
the name had changed to just European Fighter Aircraft (EFA), and the number of 
program participants had fallen to four. More important, however, those two years had 
witnessed some of the worst interstate bickering in the history of Western European 
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armaments collaboration. Instead of compromise and, at the barest minimum, a 
recognition of shared interest, the politics swirling about the EFA actually led some 
observers to argue that meaningful cooperation for the highest technologies was no 
longer realistically achievable. One senior German industrialist noted, a year before 
the collapse of negotiations, 
We feel that there is certain weariness on all fronts. It is becoming more 
difficult for countries to renounce national advantages. The conviction 
regarding the common usefulness of coping with international 
problems has given way to a sobering that is causing difficulties in all 
projects facing us.
32  
Such sentiments could arise because of the speed and extent with which wholly 
nationalist priorities asserted themselves in the collaboration. During the opening 
talks, Spain, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy were able to sketch out 
basic requirements and national aircraft numbers. Their agreement, entitled the 
“Outline European Staff Target,” called for a twin-engine, single-seat, delta-wing 
aircraft with agile maneuvering and the ability to perform short-distance take-offs and 
landings.
33 The agreement also contained the following non-binding procurement 
goals: 250 aircraft for Germany, 200 for France, 150 for the United Kingdom, and 100 
each for both Italy and Spain.
34 This agreement, however, would be the last unified 
position that the Five took, as disputes erupted across the entire spectrum of 
collaborative activity. 
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Requirements Harmonization. Although the Five could craft a basic outline of the 
type of plane they desired, they could not reach a compromise on the system’s 
operational requirements, or even mission need. While Spain had no discrete 
operational vision—other than simply to embrace the side-benefits from the 
collaboration—the Panavia states needed a relatively heavy (8.5 to 11 tons) air 
superiority aircraft with the endurance and carrying capacity to engage enemy fighters 
at distance. France, on the other hand, enjoyed a surfeit of fighters from its extensive 
inventory of Mirage variants. It required a light-weight (7.5 tons) close-air-support 
plane to replace its aging Jaguar fleet.
35 A lightweight airplane would also have the 
added benefits of possible marinization—for employment on French naval aircraft 
carriers—and would increase the platform’s export potential to the Third World, as the 
lower weight might reduce unit costs.
36  
 
Equity  and Management. The Five never fully reconciled their divergent mission 
needs, but they did reach a loose and fleeting compromise on platform weight: 9.25 
for France and 9.75 tons for the other states. This unstable arrangement—disputes 
over system weight reemerged at times until the end of negotiations—occurred 
because it was rooted in a more essential disagreement between France and partners. 
France’s interest in a lighter platform was as much industrial as it was military. Paris 
regarded jet engine design as a “technology driver” with immediate applicability to the 
civilian economy.
37 Unfortunately, the French engine producer, SNECMA, was a 
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technologically weak firm having no experience producing high-thrust engines and 
being somewhat dependent upon its collaborations with the American firm General 
Electric. It simply did not possess the technological competence to produce a 
powerplant suitable for a plane much in excess of nine tons. Rolls-Royce, on the other 
hand, with its proven partnerships with Germany’s MTU and the Italian Fiat, had 
demonstrated via Tornado that it could produce engines for aircraft of considerable 
weight and complexity. Those firms recommended transporting Tornado’s  Turbo-
Union model to the EFA: management equality with de facto British leadership in 
recognition of Rolls-Royce’s technological ability, albeit with an all-new engine 
design.
38 
Neither SNECMA nor the French state supported this proposal. First, the 
French government wanted the aircraft to showcase French technology and argued that 
the group should use an existing SNECMA design, the M-88 – despite the fact that 
that particular engine could not support its partners’ performance requirements. For its 
part, SNECMA was not opposed to cooperation under equality, but given Paris’ 
insistence on using a national system, the company was content to “wrap itself in the 
tricolor” and oppose collaboration.
39 While the Five ultimately deferred the issue by 
commissioning a number of proposals looking at alternative engines, they never fully 
resolved the basics, leaving open such issues as: the appropriate type of political and 
organizational organization, design leadership, and the physical location of engine 
joint-venture company (The UK rejected the suggestion that the firm be placed in 
Paris while the French were equally adamant that it not be London).
40 
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Paris’ hard-line with SNECMA reflected its overall approach to the EFA: 
control. For example, although a gentleman’s agreement at the start of negotiations 
had slated the French electronics firm Thomson to hold design leadership over the 
EFA’s radar, the French defense establishment argued that the entire platform should 
have a distinctive and overwhelming French signature. For example, under the terms 
of the “Staff Target” agreement, France claimed 25 percent of the total EFA 
production run. French negotiators, however, later demanded that France receive 46 
percent of the work-share during the development phase.
41 Although that number fell 
to 31 percent, after a series of hard negotiations, Paris remained adamant that it 
receive special rights across the board, demanding French nationality for the 
program’s chief engineer and lead firms. Furthermore, France insisted that overall 
design and management responsibility be exclusively French and that of all program 
headquarters be located on French territory.
42 
  France’s peculiar position did not arise from simple arrogance, but rather from 
a combination of political and industrial attitudes that severely constricted the space 
for any kind of cooperative compromise. First, the firm Dassault, which would have 
led the French contribution both on airframe development and systems integration, 
had neither the desire nor the incentive to pursue a truly collaborative program. As 
Andrew Moravcsik notes, Dassault had become France’s monopoly supplier of fighter 
aircraft. It specialized in system design and integration and chose to allocate upwards 
to 75 percent of production to French subcontractors.
43 Its designs found favor not 
only with the French air force, but on the global military aircraft market as well, and 
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Dassault routinely exported upwards of 70 percent of total production through the 
1970s. Consequently,  
Because of its dependence on high value-added design tasks in a single 
sector, any compromise of design leadership by Dassault could not be 
compensated. . . .
44 
Further, because of its technological strength and export ability—which effectively 
subsidized French arms purchases extending production runs and the subsequent 
recouping of development costs—Dassault’s senior leadership opposed cross-border 
cooperation. Moreover, they had never initiated a collaborative program.
45 
Consequently, their corporate position on EFA was remarkably simple:  
   EFA was, at best, a subsidiary concern.
46 Dassault was more interested 
in ensuring that its newly minted Mirage 2000 would not face 
competition from a multinational European fighter. As result, the 
company supported the French government’s argument that the EFA 
should not be a fighter at all, but a ground attack plane.
47 Some British 
analysts contended that Dassault also hoped that a redefined EFA 
would leave the Panavia states with their capabilities shortfalls intact 
and thus make them more receptive to the company’s appeal for co-
production of its ACX program, renamed Rafale. 
   Regardless of what form EFA ultimately took, Dassault must – in the 
words of its president, Benno-Claude Vallieres – “have the leadership.” 
Dassault insisted that, given its background in delta-wing fighter design 
via Mirage, only it could rightfully manage EFA design. Moreover, it 
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wanted to do so directly without any meddling international 
organization, regardless of the latter’s effectiveness.
48  
Dassault never wavered from its contempt of the process that the French defense 
establishment obliged it to embrace in 1983, or even from its disdain for its partners. 
As a German industrialist noted: 
Dassault had by far the most qualified team in the EFA consortium, but 
they were not capable of creating an atmosphere in which everyone felt 
it was our aircraft. It was always a French aircraft.
49 
Dassault lobbied the French government, arguing that failure to mold EFA to serve its 
interests by ensuring a de jure leadership role would lead to the long-term collapse of 
the firm as a technological center of excellence. 
  While this campaign arguably bolstered support for Dassault’s position in the 
French government, Paris ultimately required little cajoling. The French state owned 
46 percent of Dassault and regarded the firm as a strategic asset. The defense ministry 
argued that it would pursue a collaborative strategy in which there would be “no 
victories and no vanquished.”
50 That said, French Defense Minister Charles Hernu 
also stated that Paris must protect its “essential interests” and could not sanction “a 
poorly protected transfer of high-technology” to its European allies.
51 Consequently, 
French negotiators rejected every compromise attempted by the Panavia states. Both 
Britain and Germany were willing concede design leadership as long as program 
management fell to an international management organization operating under the 
principle of state equality. As we noted earlier, they were even willing to permit 
France a workshare 6 percent greater than justified by its production run.  
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  Ultimately, French intransigence and its refusal to embrace limited dependence 
on its partners proved to be too solid. While the Panavia states could yield on some 
points, none of them were willing to sacrifice the principle of equality that they had 
established under Tornado, or their own military requirements to appease French 
industrial maximalism. By late 1985, the defense establishments in these states 
became convinced that despite ongoing talks, Paris no intention of pursuing the 
partnership that they demanded. Indeed, some contended that France was simply 
stalling so that EFA would crumble and ACX/Rafale would become the default 
option.
52 Indeed, one British parliamentarian noted:
  
“. . .The French are out-maneuvering us. People at all levels of industry 
tell me that the French are getting away with murder. I am not prepared 
to tolerate it any longer. I am fed up with urging the project and with 
apparently not getting very far.
53 
The Panavia group issued one last non-negotiable compromise to Paris on 1 August 
1985, affirming that EFA would adhere to their military requirements, and that further 
cooperation could only take place if de jure leadership were invested in an 
international management agency. France subsequently withdrew to pursue Rafale 
development.  
  As an aside, it would be wrong to conclude that the Panavia member states 
were somehow more “European” in their approach to the early Eurofighter 
negotiations. True, they indulged Paris for nearly two years and notionally argued for a 
non-nationalized partnership, but their motives were as rooted in national concerns as 
their erstwhile French allies. First, both Bonn and London coveted the industrial and 
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technological benefits that French membership in EFA would convey. France’s 
production run of 200 aircraft would increase economies of scale and lower unit cost, 
thus lowering the financial burden on the other states. Furthermore, they recognized 
that Dassault’s claim of expertise in delta-wing military aircraft was no idle boast. 
German negotiators, for example, were adamant that any agreement with France 
ensure unimpeded technology transfer.
54 
  Second, Britain and Germany were concerned about their bilateral relations. 
Bonn insisted that France be included in any collaborative venture, if possible, to 
prevent additional damage to its traditionally special relationship with Paris. French 
inclusion would also prevent the need to make the unpalatable choice of harming 
Anglo-German relations by choosing an exclusively Franco-German cooperative 
solution. For its part, Britain’s concerns centered on possible German defection. As 
one source noted, 
. . .The big fear of the British government [was] that the West Germans 
would side with the French for political as opposed to military reasons, 
[and take] the Italians with them.
55  
Consequently, the British moved to placate Bonn by massaging Paris’ ambitions.
56 
Ultimately, Germany placed its military and industrial interests above its political 
relationship with France, and thus both it and United Kingdom could sever their 
tortured attempts at partnership with Paris once they mutually concluded that they had 
exhausted all efforts at accommodation. 
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The Second Juncture: Ongoing controversies and old 
sins revisited, 1987-1996 
  As noted, France was not alone in pursuing a national agenda in shaping 
Eurofighter and its departure from the European Fighter Aircraft negotiations did not 
mark the end of nationalist excess. Instead, the pursuit of national prerogatives by the 
remaining states simply assumed different forms. Within a year of the Panavia group 
ultimatum and the French withdrawal, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, and Germany 
signed the first EFA MoU in October 1986, committing them to begin development on 
the fighter-interceptor specifications that had been drafted during the early EFA talks.  
At that time, they also took steps beyond codifying a common requirement by 
establishing a framework for institutional control, and addressing equity concerns. 
While no binding production goals were set, the Four established an initial cost-
share/work-share for the development phase of 33 percent for both the United 
Kingdom and Germany (250 aircraft), 21 percent for Italy (165 aircraft) and 13 
percent for Spain (100 aircraft). The Eurofighter, however, quickly became a victim of 
circumstance: the end of the Cold War, changing state priorities in high technology, 
and the budgetary pressures generated by European integration, which reduced 
military spending in order to meet established convergence criteria for monetary 
union. These phenomena led to shifts in state interests that threw Eurofighter into near 
perpetual crisis throughout the following decade. These shifts are visible in the 
institutionalization process, as well as in the requirements harmonization and equity 
issues. 
Management  
    The success of Tornado as a model inspired the Panavia states to recreate its 
organizational structure and apply it to their new collaboration. Madrid, who 
announced its intention to join the reduced EFA consortium in September 1985, did 196 
 
not object to this arrangement as it extended a degree of managerial equality that the 
Spanish had never enjoyed in any of their past collaborations within NATO. 
Consequently, the Four moved to establish a mirror EFA administrative system in the 
summer of 1986. At its apex, stood the NATO European Fighter Aircraft Management 
Organization (NEFMO). Like its Tornado predecessor, it consisted of representatives 
from the national defense ministries, plus an observer from the office of NATO’s 
Secretary General. It convened semi-annually, and provided the program’s political 
authority and an institutionalized forum for the states to address any particularly 
contentious disputes. Below NEFMO, sat the NATO European Fighter Aircraft 
Management Agency (NEFMA). NEFMA was a permanently staffed agency, 
collocated in the in the same offices in Munich as Tornado’s  NAMMA. Like 
NAMMA, it was nationally staffed with personnel numbers determined by state cost-
share allocations. The states empowered NEFMA to provide “day-to-day management 
and control” of the project on their behalf, as well as “letting prime contracts,” and 
coordinating the “working methods” of the four national procurement agencies.
57 
  On the industrial side, the nations created two joint-venture companies: 
Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH, responsible for the airframe and systems 
integrations; and Eurojet Engine GmbH, responsible for engine development and 
production. Each company was also located in Munich and thus subject to German 
law.
58 Each functioned as prime contractors within its specific area responsibility and 
was responsible for “overall management and co-ordination of the development” 
phases of the program. Like Tornado’s Panavia and Turbo Union, these firms were 
essentially shell companies that provided permanent fora for the leading national 
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producers—now referred to as Eurofighter Partner Companies—to coordinate their 
activities, albeit as de jure subcontractors. As noted earlier, the national champions 
involved in development and production were unchanged between the Tornado joint-
venture companies and those for Eurofighter,  with the exception of Spanish 
participation and some name changes among the core six. British Aerospace, Spain’s 
CASA, MBB (later Daimler-Benz Aerospace, or DASA), and Aeritalia (later Alenia) 
cooperated through Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug. Eurojet’s constituent firms were Rolls-
Royce, Italy’s Fiat Avio, Spain’s SENER, and MTU (later merging into DASA). 
 
Lessons Unlearned. That the Eurofighter  states would embrace an organizational 
model with some proven value is unsurprising. Unfortunately, they not only replicated 
its faults, they also failed to build on its strengths. For example, as noted in the 
preceding chapter, interactions in Panavia generated a sense of common purpose and 
trust that allowed the industrial companies to move ahead of their governments and 
seek greater efficiencies in system support and maintenance. In the mid-1980s, many 
assumed that this lesson had not only been internalized, but was readily reproducible. 
One British industrialist with experience in Panavia noted two decades of cooperation 
had yielded a constant din of “information exchange and dialogue” among the national 
champions.
59 People throughout their respective national companies had come to 
know their counterparts in the partner firms, through a contact network that had been 
created in late 1960s, but was beginning to blossom in the late 1980s as a sense of 
community developed.  
Nonetheless, while Panavia and those branches responsible for Tornado in the 
national partner companies “took for granted” the mechanics of cooperation – “how to 
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communicate,” compromise, and secure agreements—that knowledge proved to be 
remarkably shallow. The “personal factor” that Tornado operators exalted did not 
extend beyond their narrow domain. Stated differently, while the Panavia companies 
developed loose connections at a macro-level, in which they could recognize the 
benefits of cooperation and initiate new partnerships, they did little to institutionalize 
the micro-level knowledge that is required for effective execution.
60 Consequently, by 
the time of their EFA partnership—as one senior British Aerospace manager noted – 
“we had no taken no real notice [of these lessons] and we had compounded the 
problems that we had seen the first time around."
61 Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug 
personnel have had to rely on their Panavia colleagues in Munich, as well as Tornado 
specialists located in their home firms, to learn how better to operate within the 
organization, as well as interact with the parent companies.
62 
  One problem that Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug and Eurojet have had to contend 
with that Panavia and Turbo-Union did not has been the pressing need to control cost. 
From the outset, Germany—and to a lesser degree, the other member states of the 
consortium—have worried about the project’s cost, first the notional total system cost 
and later the spiraling development costs. Program delays and problems in refining 
new technologies led to cost increases as high as 106 percent in certain major 
subsystems by the mid-1990s.
63 In Tornado, the political need to press forward with 
the project outweighed wasteful industrial practices. Eurofighter, however,  did not 
enjoy any overriding political objectives, “Europe” or otherwise. Consequently, the 
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states called upon both joint venture companies to contain cost escalation. But, they 
did not empower either company fully to “impose its authority,” and Eurofighter 
Jagdflugzeug in particular was compelled to reach back and rely on the national prime 
contractors to manage suppliers and cut costs within their particular countries. 
  The added demands on the Eurofighter holding companies made visible the 
limits of the willingness of the member governments to diminish their control, or that 
of their national champions, to a potentially efficiency-seeking transnational body—
even when they themselves create and task such an organization. That said, much of 
the holding companies’ difficulties have arisen from a very fastidious—and state-
sanctioned—application of le juste retour. The Eurofighter program is replete with 
instances in which one national company was initially delegated design responsibility 
for a major system, and yet another firm from one of the other member states was 
given so-called “equipment design responsibility” for managing the supply of sub-
systems comprising the system. The economic waste implicit in such an organization, 
and the joint venture firms’ inability to ensure accountability, ultimately forced the 
states to rationalize systems design and equipment design, so that by the mid-1990s 
single companies held full responsibility for the systems that they managed on behalf 
of a given holding company.  
  Whereas the member governments were willing to make some management 
fixes at the industrial level—and then simply to clarify and restore the authority of 
their own firms—no amount of economic or political pressure would lead them to 
reform  Eurofighter’s political administration. NEFMA embodies all of its 
predecessor’s limitations – a fact made clear by inconsistent demands placed upon it 
by the member governments. Although NEFMA was established to provide routine 
management and program control, its authority was always tightly limited by the 
states. For example, each national defense ministry established a Eurofighter project 200 
 
office, ostensibly to provide an interface between the ministry and the national 
parliament to channel information and secure national funding allocations.
64 The 
project office also worked to assist NEFMA when called upon by providing technical 
expertise. In practice, however, the project offices have eclipsed NEFMA, providing 
de facto political guidance to the program. These offices took the lead in both 
identifying problems in the cooperative process, as well as proposing solutions, while 
NEFMA routinely deferred to them, to other national authorities, even to industry.
65 
The result has been that NEFMA’s residual authority has been greatly compromised, 
as the British National Audit Office commented: 
This perception is re-enforced by the strength within the Eurofighter 
and Eurojet consortia of the national partner companies with whom 
national project offices negotiate directly without recourse to formal 
contractual interface between NEFMA and Eurofighter and Eurojet.
66 
  The unwillingness of the national governments to surrender some portion of 
their authority to NEFMA is arguably best symbolized by their reluctance to permit 
the agency to execute the one innovation that they entrusted it to perform: limited 
competitive tendering. In 1987, the member governments established workshare goals 
while also pledging to ensure “a balanced spread of technology and a cost effective 
distribution of work.”
67 With the commencement of the Full Development MoU a year 
later, the states also added the caveat that some avionics, armaments, engine 
accessories, miscellaneous aircraft equipment were to be selected in the “most 
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competitive way possible,” while nonetheless adhering to “overall” workshare 
targets.
68 Under this formulation, expensive, value-added and “politically sensitive” 
systems like control systems, and principal engine components, were to be immune 
from any and all competitive tendering, with states adhering to familiar juste retour 
principles in these areas in order to maximize their technological and industrial 
returns.
69 Despite what one former British Aerospace Eurofighter  branch manager 
called “clear criteria” based on “unambiguous competition principles,” the 
governments rarely allowed either NEFMA or Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug to make 
cost/value judgments regarding specific suppliers.
70 Instead, the states entered into the 
MoU fully cognizant of their ability to “get a little more,” knowing that the 
governments would impose “politically correct” solutions in which national firms 
would either be designated to fulfill the contract, or more likely, form cross-border 
consortia of sub-contractors and tertiary suppliers.
71 
The states took care to maximize their own technological and industrial side-
benefits in their Eurofighter partnership, so much so that they were unwilling to take 
marginal steps to “rationalize development and production” of marginal sub-systems 
in the project – and this despite building pressures to seek to better economies in both 
development and production.
72  Yet, as we will now see, these pressures were so acute 
that Eurofighter routinely went to brink of dissolution as the member governments 
argued not only about “what to build” and “how to build,” but “whether to build,” 
nevertheless, national interests prevailed over efficiency in management decisions. 
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Requirements Harmonization 
  The form and function of Eurofighter has been a point of contention in the 
program throughout most of its existence, from inception right through to the start of 
production funding in 1996. As originally conceived by the Tornado states, the 
European Fighter Aircraft was to be an air-superiority platform, capable of both 
beyond-visual-range attacks and short-range interceptions. Moreover, the platform was 
also to have a secondary air-to-ground role given the appropriate weapons fit. The 
national defense establishments were united in a common fixation upon the threat 
poised by Soviet Mig-29 Fulcrums  and Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker  fighters, whose 
technology either rivaled or outmatched anything that NATO Europe could field in the 
late 1980s.
73 For the first four years following France’s withdrawal from the project, 
this view held and provided a solid military rationale for proceeding forward with 
collaboration. Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms, however, followed by the dissolution of 
the Warsaw Pact, and ultimately the collapse of the Soviet Union itself, totally 
undermined this justification. Instead of confronting a well-armed, security-obsessed 
superpower and its satellites, between 1989 and 1991, the Eurofighter  consortium 
faced a NATO Central Front pushed eastward by Bonn’s absorption of the German 
Democratic Republic and a Russian Federation that could no longer afford to operate 
its existing Mig-29s and SU-27s, much less produce new ones.
74 
  This strategic shift produced a profound psychological shock for the allies, and 
one felt most acutely in Bonn.
75 The other national governments could legitimately 
continue to envision a role for Eurofighter: the United Kingdom maintained a global 
concept of operations (CONOPs) and argued that an air-superiority platform remained 
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a valid requirement in the face of the potential threat posed by Third World air forces 
equipped with not only Soviet technology, but also French and American aircraft as 
well; and Italy and Spain had more tangible needs as they found themselves on what 
had become NATO’s new frontline confronting a restive and politically unstable 
Mahgreb.
76 Germany, on the other hand, lacked any pressing military reason to 
modernize its air force capabilities, given the absence of any realistic air threat its 
territory and its lack of an “out-of-area” component in its national security policy.
77 
The crisis, however, extended far beyond simple security arguments and order-of-
battle calculation. The collapse of a real military threat fed into more fundamental 
questions that were emergent in the late 1980s and early 1990s about the shape and 
direction of Germany’s defense policy. 
 
Bonn as Spoiler – The “New” European Fighter Aircraft Crisis. Defense 
procurement in Germany in the post-war period involved balancing elite visions of 
reestablishing Germany as a “normal” state with the pervasive anti-militarism in the 
larger German society. Armaments collaboration provided a means to make 
procurement more palatable, as well as to promote intra-regional rapprochement and 
ensure that Bonn could fulfill its defense obligations along the Central Front. With the 
Cold War ending and Europe moving toward economic and monetary union, there was 
no longer any countervailing political pressures to make—as Carl-Ludwig Thiele, 
senior member of the German Free Democratic Party once commented—“[German] 
taxpayers realize that the Federal Republic of Germany has to measure up to 
international standards when it comes to sticking to the treaties it makes.”
78    
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  To many Germans—even some within the defense establishment—the 
European fighter aircraft simply was no longer relevant in the new strategic 
environment, and made further irrelevant by the high (and rising) costs of the 
project.
79 One DASA executive remarked:  
There are fundamental differences between the Tornado  and EFA 
situations. We now have no obvious threat from the East, so there is no 
publicly perceived need for advanced weapons systems as the EFA. 
Secondly, we haven’t been in such a critical financial situation for a 
long time.
80 
Indeed, the end of the Cold War meant that Germany had to “exchange military 
insecurity for financial liability.”
81 First, German reunification meant that Bonn had to 
devote significant outlays toward regional development and welfare spending in the 
new eastern Länder. Second, the end of “hostilities” heightened expectations that Bonn 
might strive for some sort of “peace dividend,” and public supported the radical drop 
in procurement spending—which fell 50 percent between 1991 and 1995. 
 While  Eurofighter undoubtedly competed with public expenditures in all of the 
member states only Germany witnessed any kind of significant public debate, more 
importantly public opposition, about the rightness of the project.
82 This opposition 
peaked in 1992 when, following increasing German dissatisfaction with rising 
program costs, Volker Rühe became defense minister in Bonn in January 1992 and 
almost immediately launched a sustained attack against the EFA program. Rühe, 
supported by the public, the media, the opposition Social Democrats, and the ruling 
coalition’s minority Free Democrats, argued that Germany could no longer afford the 
program and would withdraw from the production phase.
83 Rühe’s principal concern 
                                                 
79 Pia Christina Wood, “The Never-ending Story,” 60. 
80 “Decisions, decisions,” Flight International, 27 May 1992. 
81 Boseley and White, “Portillo backs Eurofighter,” The Guardian, 3 September 1996. 
82 Voß and Brzoska, Eurofighter 2000, 14 
83 Pia Christina Wood, “The Never-ending story,” 60. 205 
 
lay in containing unit costs which in some estimates for EFA ranged as high at 150 
million deutsch marks.
84 Rühe asserted that Germany would not support a program 
with unit costs higher than 100 million DM.  He recommended that the consortium 
abandon the several billion dollars in research and development that they had invested 
since the ACA and instead procure a less expensive and technologically less complex 
aircraft that he dubbed the “New European Fighter Aircraft” (NEFA). NEFA’s cost-
savings were to derive from a 4-5 percent reduction in capability from the EFA 
baseline, principally by sacrificing avionics and incorporating a less capable, single 
engine powerplant.
85 
  Rühe assumed—wrongly—that Spain and Italy shared his disenchantment with 
EFA, and that possibly even Britain might be persuaded to recognize that the project 
posed too great a financial burden. As he noted to the British media:  
I must explain it to my people in Dresden. I would like to know how 
my British colleague will be able to explain it to his miners. I don’t 
think the streets of Birmingham are plated with gold and silver and that 
they can afford everything the military would like them to have.
86 
Neither the Britain or the other allies, however, were willing to abandon their chosen 
(and common) requirements and certainly not to abandon their research and 
development investment. They were, however, willing to compromise. First, they 
agreed to permit both Bonn and Madrid a lower production allocation, 140 and 87 
units respectively, as opposed to the 250 planes and 100 planes that they had 
tentatively established in 1986-87. Second, they reformed the logistical support system 
to achieve an 11 million DM cost saving. Third, and significantly, they consented to 
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nationalized variants of the platform. While none of these national “fits” involved 
anything as radical as the divide between the Tornado’s ADV and IDS variants, they 
basically involved states adopting non-standard defensive aids avionics packages for 
their planes and opting out of the development of those systems employed by the other 
partners. 
  After rigorous negotiations throughout the remainder of 1992, Bonn ultimately 
chose to remain in the program.   The project was officially renamed Eurofighter 
2000, and the Germans agreed to continue in project development. German Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl proclaimed that:  
A common European solution to the EFA question is a precondition for 
our future development in Europe and for our aircraft industry. We 
found that the project was too expensive in its general configuration 
and we made great savings. Now, new calculations are available and I 
am certain that we have a sensible result. We wish to have a common 
European solution.
87 
While Bonn welcomed the concessions, remaining in the program ultimately hinged 
on concerns over the industrial penalty that they would likely pay through a unilateral 
withdrawal, as well as a desire to preserve Germany’s status in Europe. Some analyses 
suggested that Germany stood to lose as many as 20,000 jobs should it terminate its 
Eurofighter work without a replacement. Given that the national German economy had 
been in recession in the early 1990s, loss of those jobs was politically untenable.
88  In 
addition, DASA pressed the government that withdrawal might severely affect its 
ability to form future industrial partnerships in Europe. Such concerns were well 
founded, as German opposition to the project led some to believe that Germany was 
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abandoning the “common interests” that it had established in Tornado and had initially 
reaffirmed in Eurofighter. British Aerospace’s president, John Weston, noted: 
We are receiving confusing messages from Germany. [Concerning 
EFA] do we need to look elsewhere? . .The question is how are we 
going to maintain European defense forces. . .Partners need to be 
reliable.
89  
DASA criticisms of Bonn’s wavering were even more pointed, with DASA chief Eric 
Riedl commenting: 
How is it possible that Germany assesses threat one way when Italy, 
Spain and the UK see it another? There must be a single, common 
European threat analysis. It cannot be that not only the EFA partners, 
but also the Swiss, the Swedes, the Finns and the French are all basing 
their security on air-based defense, whilst we Germans say that it is not 
necessary. . .It is ironic that, at a time when we are on the threshold of a 
common single market, political union and joint security policies, 
Germany should branch out with its own security policy when, in 
previous decades, it has always been oriented towards European 
security. Look at the Italians. They urgently need EFA. They are 
currently defending a critical area of Europe with Starfighters. What 
will their feelings be if we leave them in the lurch?
90 
Fears of alienating its industrial allies and losing the side-benefits of continued 
cooperation in Eurofighter would continue to influence government calculations 
through to the start of the production phase. The lack of popular support and ongoing 
concerns over the program led to three additional episodes of German waivering 
concerning its planned procurement. Ultimately Germany remained in the program, 
and furthermore, remained mindful of both maximizing its return and ensuring its 
relative position in the collaboration 
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  Equity 
  Despite tensions over requirements and need, the prerogatives of juste retour 
were something that the states could agree upon. Indeed, the same issues that had 
surfaced in Tornado decades earlier were also manifest in Eurofighter.  The 
governments divided the airframe and engine to provide a “fair” distribution of value-
added systems development and production, as well as to conform to cost-share 
allocation. For example, the airframe responsibilities were:
91 
   British Aerospace designed the front fuselage and half of the right 
wing. 
   DASA developed the central fuselage and the central tail. 
   Alenia focused on the left wing and half of the rear fuselage. 
   CASA worked on the other halves of the right wing and the rear 
fuselage. 
Like Tornado, purely national activities were limited to assembly and testing, and the 
nations prohibited duplication of systems production. This clearly Byzantine execution 
of development and production was augmented by the established practice of 
promoting national representation on most sub-systems and minor equipment. For 
example, the electronics for Eurofighter’s control stick consisted of four circuit boards 
made in two continental countries and then sent to the United Kingdom for 
assembly—ostensibly to satisfy single-source production rules.
92 
  While one might expect this kind behavior in a high technology, high-visibility 
program like Eurofighter, the tensions inherent in the program concerning controlling 
costs brought into sharp relief how little the states had progressed since Tornado. For 
example, while Bonn threatened repeatedly to kill the program unless its financial 
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burden was diminished, its response to its requested reduction in unit production was 
to insist DASA nonetheless retain its former work-share allocation. The 1992 
compromise led to a fall in Germany’s work-share from 33 percent to 23 percent. 
Conversely, Britain—as the only partner with the industrial capacity to address the 
shortfall—increased its work-share to 42 percent.
93 As Germany had already made 33 
percent cost-share investment, Bonn demanded that its share of production remain 
unchanged. Barring this, the German government asked the London revise its 
production goals downward to ensure balance and “prevent [German industry] losing 
out.”
94 Eventually, London and Bonn worked out an arrangement in which Germany 
pledged to increase its unit purchases by forty aircraft while Britain lowered its 
production from 250 to 232. The UK would receive an additional billion pounds of 
work and reserved the option to buy an additional 65 planes. This deal set German and 
British workshares at 30 percent and 38 percent, respectively, where they have 
remained into final production.
95 
 
Conclusion 
  A British Aerospace executive, later designated to serve in the senior 
leadership of Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug, once asserted that techno-nationalism was a 
constant in the Eurofighter program. States—naturally, in his view—aspired not only 
to protect their national ambitions, but also to gain the technological return need to 
“remain sexy” for future collaborations.
96 The history of the Eurofighter  certainly 
conformed to this worldview. The program began reflecting some of the worst in 
European cooperative procurement: non-partnership, non-collaboration, and the 
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attempted imposition of a single state’s singular vision and objectives. That said, it 
also began with a modicum of promise as the beneficiary and product of nearly two 
decade of ongoing collaboration in Tornado.  
 Unfortunately,  Eurofighter  demonstrated that—at least in the area of high 
technology procurement—national agendas both lead and distort the collaborative 
process. States can cooperate and engage in the type of compromises necessary to 
prevent a complete rupture in their partnerships—albeit in pursuit of their own narrow 
self-interests and with a willingness to translate inefficiency into national advantage. 
Indeed, we see in Eurofighter a recognition that the process can be improved through 
even limited embrace of commercial reasoning, and yet also the steadfast refusal of 
the governments to depoliticize collaboration and gain the efficiencies that they 
themselves claim to covet.  
  This latter point is significant. As noted, Eurofighter emerged in a period of 
considerable change within Europe and the larger international community. While it 
meandered from inception to initial production, the Cold War ended and the European 
project deepened. While Europeans embraced common passports and eventually a 
common currency, the practice of collaboration did not become easier. At best, it 
remained as baroque as it has been since the late 1960s; at worst, it became more 
difficult as governments were freer to advance their own petty industrial policy 
concerns in the absence of a pressing security rationale. Moreover, progress in 
European integration beyond defense has arguably had the perverse effect of 
weakening a driver for more effective cooperation, as the incentives to use 
collaborative procurement as a demonstration of solidarity, fealty, or just good 
“European-ness” are lessened. Consequently, one does not see the sublimation of 
national agendas in the evolution of Eurofighter. They evolve and even expand, but 
they do not diminish. 211 
 
  My hypothesis presumes the primacy of nationally-oriented state policies in 
high-technology armaments collaboration. Consequently, there is no “puzzle” as to 
why Eurofighter did not evolve to embody more intimate forms of cooperation than 
the  Tornado.  An emergent transnational identity cannot, as one German defense 
official asserted, override “two thousand years of divergence,” and certainly not for 
“artifacts” as central to common visions of statehood as high technology weapons.
97 
What is striking, however, is that these technologies are so ideationally laden that 
Eurofighter  could falter despite advances in both European identity and practice, 
notably monetary union and a common citizenship. 
We will now turn explore the history of low-technology collaboration in 
Europe to discern if states behavior is more “progressed” in that technological domain. 
In the following chapters, we shall look at the so-called Euro-howitzer program in the 
1970s and 1980s and the Anglo-French Reciprocal Purchasing Agreement and there 
we shall determine the true limits of “Europe” in state defense industrial policy. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
The “Euro”-Howitzers 
 
Introduction  
We have examined the politics of high-technology armaments cooperation in 
Western Europe as it has evolved in the region’s successive flagship collaborations: 
Tornado and the Eurofighter. These two high-technology ventures were not simply 
the largest collaborative programs in the European Community from the 1970s on-
ward, they were also the largest armaments projects in terms of the monies invested 
by the partner governments. Given that billions were spent for weapons systems val-
ued for the techno-industrial and status benefits that they conveyed, as well as for 
their military utility, it is unsurprising that their respective developments were tainted 
by economic nationalism. They reflected both the promise and parameters of defense 
industrial collaboration in the Union, as these systems demonstrated the impact of 
conflicting national agendas on states’ willingness to compromise and embrace in-
terdependence. 
The high level of interest in these programs—and others like them, such as Al-
pha-jet, the AFVG, and Puma—reveals a bias that high technologies not only matter 
more to states, but that their joint procurement holds some special significance in in-
ternational and European affairs. As one French Science Minister once quipped in 
1966: “Europe will be made by the atom, space, aeronautical construction, and com-
puters, or it will not be made.”
1 The belief that collaboration in high technology is 
both a driver toward greater integration and reflection of it is both appealing and wide-
spread. To many, the entwining of national defense industrial interests denotes 
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movement toward not only a distinct European “identity” in regional defense affairs, 
but also a step toward the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.
2  While such 
a position may hold some merit—that collaboration however flawed, however dis-
torted by national politics is both symbolically and substantively important—it 
remains to be seen what tangible progress has been made in either defense industrial 
integration or, more broadly, the emergence of a transnational interest guiding state 
action. In a Europe that has been defined by uneven progress first toward a single 
market and later, to economic union, the key to real progress in cooperative procure-
ment—and certainly toward identifying actions indicative of an emergent European 
identity—would be the absence of political sensitivity.  
Are there technologies that impinge less upon the “emotional bond” between 
“defense procurement and national sovereignty,” as a Dutch NATO procurement rep-
resentative once asserted?
3 Recall that a key hypothesis of this dissertation holds that 
state preoccupation with defense industrial activity is partially a function of its techno-
logical sophistication—and the associated perceptions of military utility, economic 
spin-off effects, and prestige benefits. Some armaments are essentially banal; or rather, 
as the British Ministry of Defense has argued of conventional munitions, lack any 
“relevant,” innate “strategic or industrial policy considerations.”
4 In the following 
pages, I assess two additional collaborations between Germany, the United Kingdom, 
and Italy which were at the opposite spectrum of defense industrial activity from high 
                                                 
2 According to research conducted by the United Kingdom’s National Audit Office, the defense minis-
tries of Italy, Germany, and France explicitly emphasized both “the importance of protecting national 
industrial interests and enhancing European political co-operation through co-operative acquisition” by 
the late 1990s. That is, while they saw armaments cooperation promoting European integration, they 
nonetheless, continued to measure cooperative success by the “national industrial benefits” that it gen-
erated. UK National Audit Office, Maximising The Benefits of Defence Equipment Cooperation, 
Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, HC 300, Session 2000-01 (London: HMSO, 2001), 44. 
3 Interview. Bob Reedijk, Dutch NATO Armaments Director Representative (NADREP). Brussels, 1 
July 1996. 
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technology fighter aircraft: the Field Howitzer for the 1970s (FH-70) and  Self-
Propelled Howitzer for the 1970s (SP-70) programs. Peter Levene, a former British 
minister and advocate for increased marketization in regional European defense pro-
curement, once argued that the size and complexity of Tornado and Eurofighter made 
inter-state collaboration “inescapable.”
5  Such technical issues were noticeably absent 
in the howitzer projects. Whereas Tornado and Eurofighter were marvels of late 20
th-
century technology, modern tubed artillery was a Victorian innovation: recoil dampers, 
tempered rifled cylinders, and mechanical ammunition transport systems to convey 
shell from storage areas to their guns were all pioneered before the First World War.
6 
By the 1950s, artillery and conventional ordnance production were arguably the most 
well distributed technical competences in NATO Europe. As C. J. E. Harlow notes, by 
1964 practically every country in the Alliance possessed the ability to cast cannon 
shells or forge mortar tubes without incurring any extraordinary pressures, either fi-
nancial or technical.
7  
Artillery presents us with an excellent technological foil to assess the degree to  
which Europeans structure and execute their cooperation differently between low and 
high technology arms. In FH-70 and SP-70, we have two related weapons systems that 
cost a fraction of the aerospace projects. Indeed, total program costs for both systems 
amounted to £450 million, while UK-only expenditure on Tornado alone approached 
£12 billion.
8 Not only is the core technology mature and thoroughly dispersed, Euro-
pean countries have clearly given lower priority to this area than to more complex 
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technologies.
9 For example, Britain abandoned autarky in artillery in 1960, while other 
countries such as Holland, France, and Italy redirected their defense funding toward 
more prized sectors, like aerospace and electronics.
10  
These countries, and nearly all of their NATO allies, have periodically used the 
establishment of common standards, and even cross-border procurement of whole sys-
tems, to symbolize their willingness to advance NATO procurement through 
standardization and interoperabilility. Similarly, the three states supporting the FH-70 
and SP-70 also sought to make a statement: to show to their other European allies, and 
to the rest of the international community, that their partnership was not limited just to 
advanced aerospace.
11 Unfortunately, this “statement” has come to symbolize the pov-
erty of regional weapons procurement cooperation in Western Europe. The SP-70 has 
been the only intra-regional collaborative project in Europe to fail after entering full 
development. It and its towed cousin, the FH-70, are members of very small set of 
low-technology co-development projects ever attempted in the European Union. Al-
though they were partially initiated serve a “communal function” by demonstrating 
partnership and interdependence, their execution was markedly national, reflecting the 
same state preoccupations with juste retour and nationality of production that charac-
terize high-tech ventures.  
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Background 
  As noted in Chapter 3, states make real distinctions between high- and low-
technology weapons. For most of the last fifty years, countries throughout NATO 
Europe have found less difficulty in embracing a greater measure of dependence on 
munitions and conventional land arms than they have in the high-technology realm. 
This “comfort level” has been manifest in the moves toward NATO standardization 
that have taken place over this period. Instead of common aircraft or tanks, the little 
success the Alliance has had in forging greater commonality among its members has 
been limited to the most mundane elements of their armaments “profiles.” The estab-
lishment of common gun calibers, for example—5.54mm, 7.62mm, 9mm, 105mm, 
120mm, 155mm—has been described by NATO’s former head of armaments planning 
as one of the Alliance’s “unqualified” achievements.
12 This simple, and relatively cost-
less, act did much to improve the logistics burden within NATO, as it ensured 
notionally interchangeable munitions stocks. Interoperable gun standards, in turn, gave 
way to common munitions and even NATO “standard” weapons.  
  One should not confuse the process of standardization with the creation of 
“European” weapons. Instead, NATO—utilizing consensus decision-making—
periodically has established specifications and unique national systems as baselines to 
promote greater interoperability. The Alliance has a long history of selecting national 
systems and recasting them as “NATO” weapons. For example, the United Kingdom’s 
shift from autarky in artillery production in 1960 occurred because it chose to produce 
under license an Italian-designed 105 mm gun that the NATO member governments 
had pegged as the standard in medium artillery. Other countries in the Alliance have 
taken similar steps with other technologies, notably the Belgian-designed SS109 5.56 
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mm ball ammunition and the Italian OTO Melara 76 mm naval gun. Militaries 
throughout NATO have not only embraced the specifications established by these sys-
tems, but in many instances, the technologies themselves, either through licensed 
production or outright cross-border purchase.  
  That said, the “NATO Standard”-model has never moved the Alliance—either 
at the Trans-Atlantic or intra-European levels—any real distance toward defense in-
dustrial integration. Indeed, it has proven to be somewhat illusory. For example, while 
common calibers prevent gross mismatches in ordnance types and thus increase the 
probability that one country can use another’s stocks, exact matches are not guaran-
teed—even when the common caliber is complemented by a supposedly standard 
munition type. As one official in NATO’s Maintenance and Supply Agency 
(NAMSA)—an intergovernmental body chartered to promote collaborative mainte-
nance, calibration, procurement, and technical support—noted, in the absence of any 
supranational authority, member states routinely rejected rationalized purchases of 
common arms and ordnance—that is, cross-border procurement from single-source 
suppliers who are recognized as possessing a competitive advantage in the production 
of a given system.
13 Moreover, they have even ignored some common standards that 
they themselves have established under the veil of national requirements.
14 Conse-
quently, modifications are often required to ensure that the exchanged ordnance 
operates effectively in different nationally designed guns.  
Even when ammunition can be interchanged seamlessly, buyers must also 
grapple with the prospect of vulnerability and dependence on Allies who may not al-
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ways share their interests. In 1990, Britain discovered this fact to its cost after it had 
become partially reliant on Belgian-made 155mm shells to bolster it own national 
holdings. At that time, Brussels opposed Britain’s participation in the 1990-91 interna-
tional coalition to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. The Belgian government, in an 
act that did much to harm intra-regional trust, elected to suspend all arms shipments to 
Britain and its other allies involved in the campaign. Fortunately, Britain was able to 
turn the United States to make up the munitions shortfall.
15 
  Problems of this type are pervasive. For practically every example in which 
states take a non-national approach to their low technology procurement, one can iden-
tify either a counter-example or some qualifying step that the governments may use to 
mitigate their dependence. The OTO Melara 76 mm gun is arguably NATO’s only 
successful case at defense equipment rationalization. Not only have the member 
governments accepted the gun as their “standard,” but they have also accepted the 
sole-source production of this weapon from its Italian manufacturer. Even the United 
States—the Alliance’s defense industrial hegemon and a country that has rarely ac-
cepted any off-the-shelf purchases of any allied arms—chose to buy this weapon for 
use on its Perry-class guided missile frigates. Nonetheless, there remained limits to the 
extent that the United States and its European allies were willing to rely upon foreign 
technology. While they used the naval gun, countries such as Germany also insisted on 
buying their own nationally designed and manufactured ammunition to fire from it.
16   
  In an environment such as this, one cannot definitively predict if European 
states will regard low-technology weapons procurement as different from high tech-
nology. On the one hand, we find that European states have declared an explicit focus 
                                                 
15 Interview. Group Captain David Hecken, Royal Air Force. Brussels. 5 July 1996 
16 Interview. Alessandro Politi. London, 21 May 1996. 219 
   
on protecting “national core competences.”
17 Consequently, a country like Germany 
may indulge in off-the-shelf purchases in some munitions from practically any source, 
as it did from Hungary in 1990, without concern to “political phrases” such as 
“Europe,” according to one German procurement executive—as long as quality and 
cost concerns were met.
18 But the German government also held that there was “no 
different philosophy on how to handle high-tech or low-tech equipment procure-
ment.”
19 Another German procurement official was more blunt in describing Bonn’s 
reluctance to pursue “cross-border” cooperation in the late 1990s: 
Land armaments still carries too much of the sovereignty issue with it, 
and neither our government nor [Britain’s] has reached that point of 
detachment yet.
20 
A British official assigned to NATO was equally dismissive of the potential for 
significant cooperation in the low-technology realm. While one could point to exam-
ples of cross-border procurement, and even limited dependencies in certain items, any 
argument that these items provide a fast road to meaningful defense industrial integra-
tion is “infantile wooly thinking that doesn't stand a moment’s scrutiny.”
21 This 
official argued that the principal barrier to substantive change in this technology do-
main was “historical memory:”  
To the average man on the street, and more importantly to the typical 
parliamentarian whom he elects, the ability to the produce the trivial—
the commonplace—is the essence of national sovereignty and national 
security.  Production of rifle-barrels, munitions, handguns, grey hulled 
ships with ornate gunnery, all the these things are traditional instru-
ments of defense and the traditional symbols of sovereignty. . .no 
British parliamentarian would support the notion that the UK’s next as-
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sault rifle simply be bought off-the-shelf from elsewhere. You cannot 
underestimate the emotional significance of this issue. The knee-jerk 
reaction of most people is to simply not give up this capability.
22 
Attitudes such as these clearly represent a barrier to any sustained shifts toward 
the de-nationalization in low-technology defense procurement. The question remains, 
however, about the significance and nature of the movement that has occurred in this 
domain. The FH-70 and SP-70 projects provide an opportunity to assess the steps 
European states have taken to shape their collaboration in low technology weapons. 
 
The Howitzers 
  FH-70 and SP-70 were Western Europe’s first venture in collaboratively de-
signed and procured tubed artillery. Their inspiration, however, had less to do with the 
“idea” of Europe than with the perennial NATO standardization debate. The specifica-
tions and perceived mission need for these systems grew out of discussions among the 
United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom that began in 1963. These countries 
sought to satisfy NATO Basic Military Requirement 39, which laid out detailed speci-
fication for a family of towed and self-propelled howitzers that would have a burst 
capability (i.e., rapid fire), and a 30 km firing range. The NBMR also called for a new 
family of 155mm ordnance that would provide maximum lethality against armor, dis-
mounted infantry, and enemy artillery batteries.
23 These countries, later joined by Italy 
in 1967, established a “common ballistic” for 155 mm artillery, which they also set as 
their NATO standard.  
The four governments briefly explored initiating a trans-Atlantic program in 
which they would jointly develop a new system to meet their agreed objective. The 
United States soon abandoned these negotiations, however, to singly develop a purely 
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national system, the M198. In 1968, Britain and Germany agreed to develop a joint 
towed gun, the FH-70, with a self-propelled variant to follow once development had 
progressed in the field howitzer.
24 In 1970, after the construction of an initial batch of 
prototypes and the establishment of agreed operational characteristics for the system, 
Italy joined the project as a full partner. Three years later, the three countries signed a 
separate memorandum of understanding committing them to begin development of a 
self-propelled howitzer utilizing the FH-70’s gun as its core. 
 
Harmonizing Requirements – What to build 
  The NATO discussions that began in the early 1960s established base require-
ments for both the towed and self-propelled systems. Indeed, the only point of 
contention among the discussants emerged during the quadrilateral talks in which the 
United States desired a lighter system than that advanced by its European allies—
14600 pounds vice 20000 lbs—in order to maximize air portability.
25 This divergence 
led the United States to split from the other governments. On the European-side, the 
countries shared compatible mission needs. All three countries found themselves fac-
ing replacement cycle pressures to procure new artillery systems. They had acquired 
the bulk of their national holdings in the 1950s and early 1960s. Given technological 
innovation and operational wear, these would have to be replaced, or at least supple-
mented by more modern hardware beginning in the late 1970s and 1980s. This need 
presented the three states with the opportunity to indigenize their artillery forces, or at 
the very least break a cycle of dependence on American technologies that had devel-
oped following the end of the Second World War and the early years of defense 
                                                 
24 R.B. Pengelly, “The U.S. Army’s M198 Towed 155mm Howitzer,” International Defence Review, 
Vol. 7 (1979): 1163. 
25 Ibid. 222 
   
industrial reconstruction in Western Europe. The United Kingdom, for example, 
needed a more modern artillery system to replace its obsolescent mix of towed and 
self-propelled 105 mm and 5.5-inch guns, as well as its inventory of American de-
signed 155mm M109 and 175mm M107 guns. These latter systems would require 
replacement by the end of the century and which no longer satisfied NATO perform-
ance goals for fire, mobility, and reaction time.
26 Germany and Italy also sought to 
replace their American inventories of M109s and M114 towed guns. Requirements 
differences between these countries centered on relatively minor operational issues in 
the FH-70, namely the sighting systems, the appropriate rate of burst fire, and the 
addition of an auxiliary power unit to the FH-70. These issues were readily solved but 
they did lead to delays in development. The SP-70’s requirements, on the other hand, 
remained within the parameters established by the NBMR and largely reflected a de-
sire for a generational upgrade beyond the systems that they then held. As initially 
conceived, the SP-70s specifications would have made it superior to the dominant M-
109 with enhanced range (24km versus 18km) and improved road speed (67 kph ver-
sus 56 kph).
27 
 
Equity – How to build 
  Development and production for both FH-70 and SP-70 followed a modified 
juste retour pattern. Member governments received sub-system design and fabrication 
responsibilities commensurate with their planned production runs. The split on FH-70 
was 36.25/36.25/27.5 for Germany, Britain, and Italy, respectively. Because it began as 
a bilateral program, and had actually progressed into development before Rome joined 
the collaboration, Britain and Germany opted to evenly divide their work shares by 
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allowing Italy to carry 27.5 percent of production work share while reimbursing them 
for 27.5 percent of their already incurred development costs.
28 System responsibilities 
for FH-70 included: 
   UK/Vickers Shipbuilding Group– carriage, traversing gear, high explo-
sive shells, and propelling charges 
   Germany/Rhinemetall GmbH – loading system, auxiliary propulsion 
unit, suspension, sighting computer, smoke and illuminating shells, and 
propelling charges 
   Italy/OTO Melara – gun cradle, recoil system, sights bracket, elevating 
gear, high explosive shells, smoke and illuminating shells, and propel-
ling charges. 
Except for ordnance, there is no evidence that the governments carried the juste retour 
principle to sub-system design, in contrast to their high technology collaborations. 
That is, the participating states did not insist that multinational consortia design and 
fabricate sub-systems. Arguably, this was due to the low cost/low value-added nature 
of the technology and the fact that there were no gains to be made from technology 
transfer between the member states. 
  FH-70 entered production in 1976, the same year as Tornado, and operational 
employment began two years later. SP-70, on the other hand, collapsed in its devel-
opment phase. Its failure emanated from delays rooted in equity tensions between the 
governments. Upon the signing of the initial Memorandum of Understanding in 1973, 
the partner states had many reasons to believe that this follow-on system to FH-70 
would proceed smoothly. Unlike its cousin, SP-70 was established as a German-
dominant program with Bonn receiving a 56 percent work share, followed by Britain 
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at 34 percent and Italy at ten percent.
29 SP-70, however, was to utilize an assortment of 
established technologies that not only reflected the legacy of partnership begun with 
FH-70, but also noted Germany’s position as project leader and primary contributor.  
First, and foremost, the heart of the SP-70 was to be the FH-70’s gun for which there 
were already nearly 2 dozen prototypes undergoing testing at the time. Second, the 
platform chassis, as well as the tracks, suspension, and ventilation and nuclear-
biological-chemical protection systems, were lifted from the German-designed Leop-
ard I main battle tank, in service in both Germany and Italy.
30  Third, the powerplant, 
the MTU MB 8711 diesel engine, and the ZFP 25000 final drive were also German in 
origin, having been developed for the Leopard II tank. Finally, the producing states 
also opted to incorporate transmission components from the German Marder infantry 
combat vehicle.
31 Unfortunately, however, these perceived strengths ultimately proved 
to be illusory.  
Instead of saving both time and money in the development and production of 
the SP-70, reliance upon these existing technologies contributed to the project’s col-
lapse. The developmental strategy confined the partner states to a platform that was 
not flexible enough to readily accommodate the platform-unique sub-systems that the 
members hoped to employ within it. Whereas most western self-propelled howitzer 
systems enjoyed relatively large internal spaces for crew accommodations and gun 
housing at the cost of increased weight and reduced stability, the SP-70s use of exist-
ing German tank designs meant that it would be essentially tank-like with a limited 
turret volume and restricted loading, although it would gain greater stability and pro-
tection from its reduced profile.   
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Once development proceeded toward indigenous systems such as the fire con-
trol system and the ammunition handling system (AHS), however, project engineers 
found themselves in an unenviable position. First, these and other sub-systems pre-
sented significant interface challenges with the main platform and led to successive 
delays and re-engineering efforts. Second, as this slippage pushed the desired in-
service target date from the early 1980s to the early 1990s, system engineers found 
that the SP-70 design lacked the internal volume to support the crew and base func-
tions, and leave room to employ new innovations in guidance systems, fire control 
computers, and automatic gun laying systems.
32  
  While these problems were considerable and could be traced to the logic of 
juste retour that justified the use of German systems as the basis for the SP-70’s hous-
ing and propulsion, it would be wrong to assume from this that the project was simply 
a victim of too much—or more accurately, poorly conceived — sub-system specializa-
tion.  Perversely, the same sub-systems that were problematic fits within the SP-70’s 
hull were themselves manifestation of the same kind of juste retour calculus that had 
distorted collaborative activity in aerospace. SP-70 was more than a rifled tube at-
tached to an already developed tank chassis. It was also a collection of relatively 
sophisticated electronic and mechanical systems that  would allow it to engage targets 
at distance, provide saturating and accurate fires, and relocate quickly as required. 
These sub-systems were to provide SP-70 with a qualitative edge that would made it 
rival any self-propelled artillery platform in either NATO or the Warsaw Pact.
33 As 
such, these technologies transformed SP-70 into something that resisted easy categori-
zation as it was concurrently both a low-technology and high-technology platform, 
albeit with very small overall system cost.  
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  Nonetheless, the promise of technology transfer and the acquisition of proprie-
tary rights to new innovations were irresistible to the partner governments. Whereas 
they had embraced sub-system specialization throughout FH-70, their approach to SP-
70 was to extract as much benefit from the value-added components as possible, with 
procurement decisions following political, i.e., protectionist, concerns instead of effi-
ciency or even engineering ones. For example, the automatic handling system (AHS) 
was arguably the most sophisticated piece of native hardware fitted to the SP-70. It 
consisted of a complex, electro-mechanical ordnance conveyance and control system 
that was superior to that found in other self-propelled howitzers during the 1970s, i.e., 
the US M109 and the French AMX 155GC.
34 The AHS worked by transferring shells 
from a magazine into a loading tray where it positioned them for insertion into the gun 
breech. From there, shells were hydraulically rammed into the gun. A computer con-
trolled this entire process, which was ultimately an ornate series of fully automatic 
vertical and horizontal shell movements.
35  The member governments were keen to 
apportion it into “value packages” in which all three could claim key components such 
as the shell replenishment gear and the magazine. Consequently, although the AHS 
was the responsibility of Royal Ordnance in the United Kingdom, its key constituent 
sub-systems were nationally divided among the other two partner companies, 
Rheinmetall and OTO Melara. The British produced the magazine and the tray, the 
Germans led with the ramming system, and the Italians specialized on the shell trans-
fer arms. System engineers were unable to reconcile these national contributions. 
Persistent incompatibilities between national components in the AHS meant that the 
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system not only failed to satisfy its fire performance requirements, but also had an un-
acceptably failure rate under stress.
36 
  By 1977, the inability of the nations to remedy this issue, coupled to fears that 
the SP-70 would fail to meet its most basic requirement—that the platform would re-
main cheap enough for the member states to produce and employ in quantity—led 
them to attempt to “desophisticate” the system by employing less innovative technol-
ogy in the AHS.
37 In addition, they also recognized that the Byzantine national work-
share arrangement could not work, and they agreed to assign the United Kingdom total 
system responsibility—accompanied by a financial offset to Rome for its sunk devel-
opment expenses.
38 This quickly proved, insufficient, however, as the obligatory U.K. 
redesign of the entire AHS, and subsequent problems integrating this system with rest 
of the platform, effectively extended development for another eight years, pushing the 
planned start of production to 1990 at the earliest.
39 By 1985, member states still had 
not resolved the problems with the AHS interface and its operational performance 
shortcomings. This persistent failure led to growing dissatisfaction among all three 
national defense establishments. As conceived in 1968, SP-70 was to be a relatively 
cheap platform to be introduced by 1981. Instead, recurring technical issues had led to 
ever-receding in-service dates: 1983, 1987, and finally 1990.
40 Moreover, on-going 
development and slipping timelines meant increasing cost—a particularly troublesome 
issue for a program some national officials regarded as a collaborative affectation, or, 
in other words, a collaborative venture that lacked any material drivers, such as tech-
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nological complexity or cost that necessitated some measure of foreign outreach in 
order to offset national shortcomings.
41 
SP-70’s problems arose from national agendas distorting the procurement 
process and imposing inefficiencies. While this was a normal feature of European col-
laboration, unlike Tornado or Eurofighter, each member government possessed the 
ability to build a similar system on its own. In fact, the same year that the governments 
opted to rationalize AHS development, the Italians launched their own national 155 
mm self-propelled howitzer system through OTO Melara, which entered production in 
1982.
42 This reality made the governments reluctant to pour money into the platform 
once the system began to run the risk of becoming obsolete by the time it was intro-
duced.
43 By 1986, all of the states had agreed to cancel the project and within two 
years they were each either developing or producing national systems to satisfy SP-
70’s requirements niche. 
 
Institutionalization – management and control 
  FH-70 and SP-70 utilized relatively simple administrative structures – ones 
that arguably reflected the low significance that the member governments assigned to 
these collaborations. Because the systems were conceived at the same time in 1968 as 
sister programs, Bonn and London adopted a “family of weapons” approach in which 
the countries would alternate as “lead nation:” the United Kingdom for FH-70 and 
                                                 
41 Interview. Anthony Scott. Head of NATO Land Armaments Planning Section. Brussels, 3 July 1996. 
42 See Christopher Foss and Ronald T. Pretty, “OTO Melara OF-40 main battle tank and Palmaria 
155mm self-propelled howitzer,” International Defense Review Vol. 2, no. 3 (1981): 221. 
43 Because of the ordnance handling issue, the SP-70 design did not change to accommodate new inno-
vations in the 1980s in guidance systems, fire control computers, and automatic gun laying systems. 
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Germany for the SP-70. This designation meant that the system program office which 
was located in the defense ministry of the selected country would act as program co-
ordinator responsible for harmonizing the trilateral efforts. The office supplied the 
administrative staff to Joint Management Boards established in each program to pro-
vide political control and harmonize state interests. Further, the office managers would 
also chair these organizations. The lead nation’s program office did not, however, pos-
sess any delegated authority to make binding decisions.
44 
  In practice, decision-making remained consensual and all the partners held 
equal voices in the programs’ management structures. As noted, in both FH-70 and 
SP-70, political guidance lay vested in Joint Management Boards consisting of gen-
eral-officer representatives from the three states who met every six months. Beneath 
the Boards, program offices in each national defense ministry provided day-to-day 
oversight of each system. Given the absence of an international project office, how-
ever, this supervisory function was largely limited to those sub-systems “of the joint 
program(s) allocated to their respective governments.”
45 At the industrial level, the 
governments opted not to create holding companies to serve as prime contractors, but 
instead established “technical project management teams” consisting of representa-
tives from each of the three national partner companies. These teams met infrequently 
and sought to ensure that the individual efforts of the national firms matched each 
other as the programs moved through development, and in the case of FH-70, produc-
tion. 
Subsequent analyses by the British and German governments have contended 
that this austere management system represented a failing in both programs. More-
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over, it arguably contributed to the collapse of  SP-70, as the lack of contractual bonds 
among the partner companies hampered “industrial coordination” and magnified the 
equipment interface problems that plagued the AHS.
46 For our purposes, however, 
they are suggestive of the limits that European countries impose upon their collabora-
tions in a mixed-case such as the SP-70, or more notably, in low technology 
cooperation embodied in the FH-70. Indeed, while the states did not create complex 
ornate administrative structures as they did in their aerospace partnership, nonetheless, 
they were keen to not mitigate their own sovereignty or undermine the independence 
of their national producers. 
 
Conclusion 
  The Euro-howitzer projects demonstrate that European countries did not be-
have in substantively different ways in low-technology collaboration, as compared to 
their high technology partnerships. While I have examined here the FH-70 and SP-70 
as a weapons family, given their common origin and staggered development, in reality, 
they were different systems open to different interpretations regarding the limits of 
state interest in collaborative European defense procurement. In both projects, le juste 
retour and national control remained the defining attributes of state activity. That said, 
in the FH-70 we saw limits to the extent that states were willing to go toward captur-
ing and controlling the procurement process in their collaborations. In this case, the 
member states executed relatively straightforward work-share arrangements with the 
apparent purpose of producing a weapons system as quickly and as cheaply possible. 
The states did not express any particular vision other than satisfying their national re-
quirements. The SP-70, on the other hand, was much closer to what I have established 
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as the model of high-technology cooperation in Europe, in part due to its peculiar na-
ture. As Walter Stone wrote,  
SP medium artillery is a very fine thing, but not if the equipment costs 
more to purchase and maintain than a main battle tank, and this is the 
way the trend seems to be drifting. . .By this time [the 1970s-1980s] 
there should be no problem in designing a piece of ordnance, or a chas-
sis to go underneath it, but it is ancillaries demanded by current 
doctrine which are giving the designers headaches.
47 
The SP-70’s problems were magnified by the incorporation of high-technology sub-
systems that invited state-centric politicalization and inefficiencies as the member 
governments initially tried to maximize their individual gains from the innovation.  
  The history of the SP-70 demonstrated that the line between high technology 
and low technology could be remarkably hard to distinguish. A single value-added 
component, or sub-systems suite, could provoke the same petty behavior that we wit-
nessed in Eurofighter and Tornado. In those projects, however, the states were willing 
to pay almost any price to secure their procurement, arguably because they did not 
have the option of wholly local production. The SP-70, on the other hand, was wholly 
optional as a collaborative venture: each country could go it alone, as indeed they ul-
timately did. The governments did this because although SP-70’s complex sub-
systems arguably made it more a high-technology program than a low-tech one, those 
elements were within the technological and financial capacities of each state. SP-70 
was intended as a demonstration of depth of Anglo-German-Italian partnership and 
secondly as a means of pooling resources and sharing costs. Once the collaborative 
process began to falter as the member states failed to integrate their industrial contri-
butions to the program, and thus could no longer restrict program costs within a 
comfortable threshold, the ideals of alliance fealty, “Europe,” etc. were readily set 
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aside as the governments moved to secure more fiscally sound, non-collaborative pro-
curement options: service life extensions to the M109 in Germany, or the production 
of national self-propelled artillery systems, such as Britain’s AS-90.  
Nonetheless, the question remains as to what can one say about the role of 
European identity in these two cases.  FH-70, like Tornado, was a baseline case, initi-
ated in the late 1960s and brought into production by the mid-1970s. Moreover, its 
formative development had already been completed before the concept of a transna-
tional identity in Europe was even deemed an appropriate social development by 
regional leaders, much less systematically studied. Consequently, one would not ex-
pect any shifts in state collaborative behavior in that platform to reflect identity shifts. 
FH-70, however, did not mirror the pattern found in high-technology projects. While 
the national governments were unwilling to loosen their control over program man-
agement, they did not rigorously pursue juste retour. They divided the platform into 
purely national, single-source sub-systems, which they later integrated. The presence 
of this “innovation” in the absence of an established transnational identity suggests 
that some other factor shaped state decision-making. I suggest that the banality of the 
technology was such that the national governments could enjoy the best of worlds: ro-
bust state involvement and a measure of industrial return without the inefficiencies 
ensured that by the fine divisions of work-share down to the component level. In other 
words, the technology simply was not valuable enough or sufficiently exotic to war-
rant unabashedly petty behavior. 
The same was not true for the SP-70. The addition of a few computer control 
and loading sub-systems was enough to transform an otherwise unchallenging plat-
form based largely on existing technologies into a source of friction as the partner 
states insisted on maximizing their national shares in those key electro-mechanical 
systems. This behavior ultimately led to the collapse of the program as SP-70 clearly 233 
   
lacked any justification, either ideational or material, for the national governments to 
seek timely compromises to move beyond their differences or to set aside their indus-
trial return concerns. First, SP-70 arguably did not enjoy an ideational environment 
that might encourage states to rationalize the program. By the mid-1980s, the exis-
tence of a collective identity in Europe had been well established by polling data, but 
this arguably was not sufficient to impede state-centric behavior in the program. Sec-
ond, as noted earlier, SP-70 was neither expensive or exotic enough to lock the 
national governments into a collaborative program. 
This “failure” of European identity in low-technology procurement certainly 
poses a challenge to my hypothesis. Nonetheless, one must also consider other forms 
of low-tech cooperation. By its very nature as an inexpensive and technically unchal-
lenging procurement area, co-development of low-technology equipment arguably will 
be rare and collaborations of this type may not be the best measure of transformations 
in state interest and identity. Indeed, FH-70 and SP-70 are thus far (2004) the only 
cases of tubed artillery co-development in Europe. We must still assess under what 
conditions European countries are actually willing to depoliticize their cross-border 
defense procurement. All co-development projects are innately political: involving the 
selection of management structures, mitigating equity concerns, and so on. Perhaps the 
best test for shifting state interest and ideas about the varying importance of different 
level of defense technology lies in those instances in which states truly set aside the 
burdens of nationality—the national local of production and the nationality of produc-
ers—and act on economic logic bounded by their larger political relationships within 
the European or even Trans-Atlantic “communities.” There is a well-established pat-
tern in Europe of simple, cross-border procurement, for example. Although it is 
unregulated and often offset by crude calculations of national interest, it nonetheless 234 
   
occurs. We shall now turn to Europe’s first major effort to promote the market over 
national politics in regional armaments cooperation.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
TRADE, COUNTER-TRADE AND LAST 
BEST HOPES: THE ANGLO-FRENCH 
RECIPROCAL PURCHASING 
AGREEMENT 
 
  The mid-1980s witnessed important transformations in the evolution of the 
European project. Political Europe and Economic Europe enjoyed nothing less than a 
relance following nearly fourteen years of institutional stagnation and inefficacy.1 The 
passage of the Single European Act in 1986, and its enforcment a year later, both 
strengthened and expanded the then-European Community. The Community gained 
new powers to shape regional policy and technological innovation; qualified majority 
voting replaced the universal application of unanimous decision making in all but the 
most nationally sensitive areas of the developing internal market.2 Most striking was 
the empowerment of the European Parliament, which was given added legislative 
competencies to scrutinize and modify proposals emanating from the European Coun-
cil and from the Commission, thus increasing Europe’s democratic legitimacy to a 
level then unmatched in the Community’s history.3  
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  These developments, coupled to the designation of the 1992 deadline for com-
pleting the common market and achieving economic union, generated a sense of hope 
and expectation in European affairs that had not been felt in nearly a generation.4 
While these areas of European integration moved forward, however, the ideal of an 
Armaments Europe remained uncertain, at best. Within the text of the Single European 
Act, its signatories pledged to strengthen their cooperative bonds and reaffirmed their 
collective intent to “maintain the technological and industrial conditions for their se-
curity” both at the national level and, whenever possible, multinationally within 
existing European institutions and organizations.5 To their credit, by 1987 they had 
invested billions of pounds, marks, francs, and lira into collaborative projects such as 
Tornado and the FH-70; and there was every reasonable expectation to assume they 
would continue to spend billions more in future projects. General Alfred Cahen, Sec-
retary-General of the Western European Union, argued that Europe should and would 
move forward in armaments coordination because it had by this time attained a level 
of “like-mindedness” and industrial homogeneity that could permit such an achieve-
ment.6  
  Nonetheless, as we have seen in the preceding chapters, the mid-1980s were 
hardly a high point in European defense industrial collaboration. The bulk of all pro-
curement moneys invariably went to purely national programs. Further, in 1985, the 
Tornado project was nearing the completion of its original production run; the SP-70 
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was locked in a slow death of bureaucratic paralysis, and would soon collapse; and the 
tortured negotiations of the European Fighter Aircraft were also nearing an end, but 
only after they had displayed the worst effects of the persistent nationalisms and petty 
industrial patriotisms that had distorted armaments cooperation for years. Indeed, by 
Summer 1987, a report commissioned by the parliamentary assembly of the Western 
European Union proclaimed that after forty years of defense cooperation,  
the only conclusion that [can be drawn] here is that in the Independent 
European Programme Group as well as in the European Community 
there is obviously still a lack of political will and courage to develop 
the common European technological programmes which are so badly 
needed to prevent Europe becoming increasingly dependent upon the 
United States and Japan in this area.7 
Françios Heisbourg, a French diplomat-cum-industrialist assigned to NATO and later 
the WEU’s International Institute for Strategic Studies, went so far as to argue that the 
“heyday” of European defense industrial collaboration had come to an end. Coopera-
tion would become an unavoidable necessity, but would only become harder over time 
to initiate and organize such that there was “little reason to expect dramatic break-
throughs in this direction.”8 
  While the validity of Heisbourg’s supposition over the long-term has yet to be 
proven, the situation was not completely hopeless in the mid-to-late 1980s. Ongoing 
changes in defense markets at the national, regional, and global levelscoupled to 
attitudinal shifts as the significance of defense technologies to national economies 
evolved within a slowly integrating Europewould pressure governments to shift 
their collaborations in both form and intensity. The end of the Cold War and the result-
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ing collapse of defense budgets would soon move this process even further forward. 
We have seen these pressures and transformations manifest through the evolution of 
the Eurofighter project, as the member states attempted to denationalize their collabo-
rations through the limited use of market principles in the awarding of sub-contractor 
tenders. 
  Europeans have always recognized the existence of other models of coopera-
tion that they might apply to better manage their collaborations. For example, the 
proposals embedded within the European Defense Community treaty demonstrated 
that armaments coordination need not always be innately politicized and economically 
inefficient. Beginning in the mid-1980s, one saw the first ostensibly sincere efforts in 
Western Europe to move beyond the traditional models of co-developement and co-
production; indeed, to move beyond collaboration completely and embrace market 
principles of competitive procurement and trade. The Anglo-French Reciprocal Pur-
chasing Agreement, or RPA, enacted in the Fall of 1987 was the cornerstone of this 
renewed awareness. At the time of its founding, the RPA marked the most comprehen-
sive effort in NATO Europe to liberalize the regional defense equipment market 
through competitive cross-border tendering. It was the model for a subsequent series 
of market-opening, reciprocal trade pacts within the alliance which were intended to 
incrementally rationalize regional defense production through rewarding efficiency 
and providing greater economies of scale. The intent of the creators of the RPA and its 
successors was to affect painlessand therefore politically acceptablechange 
through an explicit emphasis on low-value and unsophisticated defense goods, princi-
pally dual-use, general purpose, and off-the-shelf items.9 
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  This chapter addresses the history and record of the Reciprocal Purchasing 
Agreement. Originally hailed as a milestone in the evolution of defense cooperation, 
one that would finally yield the level of military, economic, and political/symbolic 
benefits that Europeans had coveted to attain from their cooperations for years, the 
RPA’s legacy in no way matched the promise with which it was invested. It floundered 
in an environment in which national political establishments were loathe to exploit 
foreign comparative advantage or to accept the specter of dependence upon foreign 
sources of supply, as well as the risk of techno-industrial specialization that even a re-
stricted liberalization in trade would entail. For the purposes of this thesis, however, 
the practical failings of this Anglo-French pact are important only for their theoretical 
significance. The RPA, perhaps more than any of the defense industrial cases that we 
have reviewed, best demonstrates the limits of a collective European identity in the 
defense sector by showing the degree that European decision-makers have converged, 
and how much they are willing to sacrifice to create a rationalized regional 
procurement regime. 
  In the following sections, I shall discuss the economic and political back-
ground surrounding the Reciprocal Purchasing Agreement. Banality was one of the 
most profound aspects of the RPA. There was little in the agreement that was unique. 
The agreement itself was not even the first attempt between France and the United 
Kingdom to promote and liberalize their cross-border trade. Most of its procedures 
and goals had been promoted in European defense discourse and even institutionalized 
on a bilateral basis elsewhere in the Atlantic Community. The RPA surfaced when it 
did because of a confluence of economic, political and ideational shifts which was al-
luded to earlier. I will first discuss these in greater depth. Second, I will overview the 
Agreement and what it detailed. Third, I will analyze the RPA’s execution and high-
light the foundations of its performance. 240 
 
 
Background 
  Few concepts better define the condition of the European defense market 
through the 1980s than that of “irony”and by the time of the Reciprocal Purchasing 
Agreement, irony was three-fold. First and foremost, in an environment increasingly 
dominated by regional economic integration, the European defense market did not ex-
ist in any real form. Since the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 
1950-51, Western Europe moved haltingly toward the creation of a single market. 
Through a mixed strategy of positive and negative integration, such as harmonizing 
exchange rates and eliminating tariffs on intra-regional trade, Europeans forged a solid 
customs union and by 1985 created the foundation for a common marketa process 
advanced that much further with the passage of the Single European Act. Even by that 
time, the civilian European economy did not enjoy a truly unified market: no common 
currency, the retention of intra-regional non-tariff barriers, little crossborder public 
procurement, and four civilian industrial sectors excluded de facto from Community 
market regulationtelecommunications, transportation, energy and water supply.10 
Nonetheless, the strides outside the defense sector of the European economy far ex-
ceeded anything that had occurred within.  
  Armaments Europe by the mid-1980s was not a market, or a customs union, or 
even a free trade area. It was instead 12 distinct and separate national markets, which 
as a report of NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors noted, were “based 
on national priorities” and intent upon the “protection of national technological and 
industrial bases.”11 Through nearly all of the post-war period, national defense indus-
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tries in Europe have been predominately publicly owned, and as the same NATO re-
ported affirmed, “characterized” by a lack of competitive procurement not only 
between states, but also within national borders. As discussed in chapter 2, European 
decision-makers regarded their defense equipment firms as assets whose techno-
industrial value was as important as their military role. Marketization, at any level, 
threatened to deny governments the ability to use defense procurement as a means to 
channel capital, promote employment, and to create systems of technology innovation 
deemed critical to support their national economies. This desire had been present and 
substantial since the reconstitution of state defense industries in the late 1950s. The 
founding treaty of the European Community, the Treaty of Rome, enshrined defense 
production as a special category of economic activity, inseparable from national inter-
est and state security. Article 223 designated an exhaustive list of primary and dual-
use defense goods for which Community regulations over internal trade and industrial 
policy would not apply. 
  From the institutional beginning of the integration movement in Western 
Europe, member states isolated their defense industries, and using Article 223 as justi-
fication, “systematically protected” their defense from the “europeanizing” pressures 
found within the civilian economy.12 Defense Ministries regarded the outright pur-
chase of foreign arms to be, at best, a “measure of last resort” undertaken under the 
most extreme economic or political constraints.13 Only the smaller allies with their 
restricted defense industries and relatively minuscule defense budgets had little choice 
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but to rely upon the direct purchase of competitively priced foreign weapons. The me-
dium-sized and large states, with home industries to protect and money to spend, 
insisted on maximum domestic production, even when they ostensibly bought existing 
systems from abroad. 
  Europeans sought to limit their intra-regional defense industrial cooperation to 
those partnerships that would provide guaranteed returns to their home industries. 
Through co-development and co-production, they managed internationalization such 
that a minimum of national procurement moneys went beyond state borders. Countries 
sought to share the total costs of development and/or production, but ensured that 
most national funding would go exclusively to national research centers and firms. 
This is not to say, of course, that no defense trade occurred within Europe. Dyadic 
trade throughout NATO Europe ranged from tens of millions to hundreds of millions 
of dollars in a regional defense market spending over $42 billion on weapons by 
1988.14 This figure included the transfers of assemblies and components procured as 
part of the myriad of co-development and co-production programs linking national 
defense industries. Intra-regional trade in complete weapons systems, however, repre-
sented only a small subset of this range—so small that most analyses did not even 
account for it until the late 1970s.15 By comparison, trade between the United States 
and countries like the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy reached into the bil-
lionsthat is, these states purchased billions of dollars worth of equipment from the 
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United States in asymmetrical trade relationships at ratios ranging from 10:1 to 2:1 
annually between the United States and Europe as a whole.16 Indeed, the volume of 
arms transfers between the whole of NATO Europe and the United States was (and 
still is) between four- to eight-times greater than the level of trade within the region.17 
  This often criticized fact of European defense procurement represented the 
second “irony” underlying the so-called European defense market: European states 
enjoyed better defense trade relations with their American allies than with their part-
ners in the Community. For most Europeans, this arose as a by-product of the post-war 
defense industrial ties forged under the Military Assistance Program and other Ameri-
can initiatives to resupply European militaries and to rebuild the region’s defense 
industries. Furthermore, the enormous size of the United States’ defense industry, with 
its economies of scale and technical resources, ensured that the United States could 
supply weapons that were often less expensive and technologically superior than com-
parable systems produced within Europe. Europeans, consequently, were unwilling to 
completely wean themselves from American production for items that were either too 
financially or technically demanding to be met nationally, or when intra-regional in-
dustrial collaboration could not be attained. Even the dominant European 
producer/suppliers, the United Kingdom and France, retained a substantial level of 
dependence upon transatlantic trade. These countries, between 1967 and 1976, im-
ported roughly the same amount from the US as from other NATO states, 96% and 
99% respectively.18  
  Hans Dietrich Gensher, the former German Foreign Minister, once argued that 
such relationships endured because Europeans lacked the courage to embrace more 
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radical methods of rationalizing their collective defense industrial needs, saying “it 
isn’t the Americans who are too strong; it is the Europeans who are too weak.”19 In-
stead of working together and embracing the diversity and national industrial strengths 
within the Community, Europeans devoted most of their energies first to criticizing 
trade imbalances with the United States and later to forging bilateral agreements with 
the US to liberalize procurement rules and regulate cross-country trade. 
   This was the third and final “irony” of the pre-1985 European defense market. 
The first efforts at the promotion of defense trade within Western Europe occurred not 
from European vision, but from American instigation and European particularism.20 
Beginning in 1975, and in response to growing European criticism over the perceived 
closure of the American defense equipment market, the United States signed a series 
of Memoranda of Understanding (MoU), first with Britain and then with the other 
arms-producing states in NATO Europe.21 The MoUs pledged the signatories not to 
discriminate against each other’s defense firms in national procurement contracts and 
to alert the others about bidding opportunities in the home market. Europeans had long 
coveted better symmetry in US-European defense trade. Since the post-war re-
establishment of national defense industrial bases in the 1950s, Europeans had subsi-
dized their domestic armaments production through exports, principally to customers 
in the Third World. These transactions diffused R&D costs, and also ensured longer 
production runs than could be supported through solely domestic consumption. In fact, 
within military aerospace, the exportation of 40% to 50% of total output was not only 
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considered normal, but also necessary to maintain the financial well-being of the firms 
involved.22  
  The American market, consequently, represented an enormous prize to any 
European defense industry that gained better access to it. The United States’ yearly 
military expenditures from 1967 to 1976 were on average 2.5 times greater than all of 
NATO Europe. Moreover, its military requirements often called for high valued-added 
systems. For many European decision-makers, the United States market presented a 
means of advancing their defense firms through orders of quantity and quality impos-
sible to attain in any other market. It is little wonder that European governments 
rejected a United States’ offer in 1984 to sign an “umbrella MoU” that would liberal-
ize trade on an Alliance-wide basis.23  
  Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, Europeans were content to set aside 
any proclaimed fealty to the ideals of Europe and of European cooperation in favor of 
bilateral agreements with an extra-European party, in order to maximize their national 
interests. This dis-integrative behavior was matched, and indeed, compounded by the 
relative disinterest among Europeans themselves to reproduce the United States’ liber-
alization initiative on an intra-regional basis. Before 1975, suggestions to reduce 
impediments to defense trade and promote cross-border procurement were dismissed 
as utopian and not reflecting the reality of Europe’s equipment procurement “regime,” 
in which states increasingly worked together economically and politically, and yet 
continued acquire defense goods on the basis of distinct national requirements.24 D. F. 
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Ingrey, the manager of the International Policy Division in the Procurement Executive 
of the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defense, argued in 1972: 
From the political viewpoint, it appears to me that the concept relies 
upon the achievement of a measure of political unity within Europe 
which certainly does not exist at present.25 
  It seems unlikely that conditions and mindsets would have changed dramati-
cally within four years to permit a cross-border defense trade regime to arise in 
Europe. Nonetheless, explicitly following the American example, the United Kingdom 
launched its own set of bilateral defense trade MoUs, first with France in 1976 and 
latter with the Netherlands. While these were similar in form and function to the trans-
atlantic agreements, they were not extended the same importance and dedication as the 
American MoUs. The US-Europe agreements were at least accompanied by a lessen-
ing asymmetry in defense trade. Between 1976 and 1985, one RAND study noted that 
trade gap between the United States and whole of NATO Europe declined from 5:1 to 
2:1.26 In Europe, on the other hand, the British initiatives were neither reciprocated 
nor earnest. There was no evidence that other European states launched any cross-
border liberalizing reforms of their own. Further, Britain’s efforts were extremely 
circumscribed. The 1976 Anglo-French agreement was little more than a declaration 
of principles, and negotiated in less than half a business day.27 While Britain did not 
strive for an agreement of substance with the French, they did not form a pact with the 
Germans at all. As we have seen, Germany was the United Kingdom’s principal col-
laborative partner by the late 1970s. Yet neither country strove for a more 
institutionalized and rationalized defense industrial base.  
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  While this initial European effort to reform intra-regional defense trade was 
clearly half-hearted, its true efficacy could be judged by its ability to promote actual 
changes in state behavior. In the case of the Anglo-French agreement, it was an un-
mitigated failure. Between 1967 and 1976, the cumulative value of transfers of 
complete weapons systems between the United Kingdom and France was $10 million 
(in 1979 dollars)and this figure was entirely British, as the French purchased noth-
ing from across the Channel during this period.28 As each country’s annual military 
expenditure averaged nearly $11.5 billion over these 10 years, $10 million in trade 
was practically no trade at all. By the early 1980s, Anglo-French trade had improved 
to only approximately $12 million per year, mostly through one-off purchases for 
small, discrete items and for the procurement of spare parts for Anglo-French joint 
ventures dating back to the early-1960s.29 
 
Why the 1987 Reciprocal Purchasing Agreement? 
  As we have seen here and in the preceding chapters, Europeans had little to be 
proud of in their efforts to create a Europeans armaments base, and even less to cheer 
concerning the liberalization of intra-regional trade by the early 1980s. Nonetheless, 
near the end of 1987, Britain and France created a new defense trade agreement, one 
that was quickly praised as a model of defense procurement cooperation within the 
Alliance, and indeed, became a template for the Independent European Programme 
Group’s 1989 European Defense Equipment Market initiativethe first multilateral 
attempt to promote cross-border defense trade on a Europe-wide basis.30 The question 
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arises as to how such a transformation could occur, as well as to its ultimate signifi-
cance. 
  Carol Reed, a defense journalist focusing on European affairs in the 1980s and 
1990s, argues that the Reciprocal Purchasing Agreement with its emphasis on market 
reform was in part a reflection of community-feeling that existed with French and 
British policy-making circles, as well as permeating the region as a whole. “Pan-
European political pressures” generated by the Single European Act and the anticipa-
tion of 1992, nurtured a “no-frontiers” attitude upon European elites that led to a surge 
in civilian commercial activity. The RPA was the first purely military manifestation of 
this phenomenon to occur in Europe.31 Such sentiments may have played a part in 
launching the initiative, and as we shall see, a certain Europeanist rhetoric did sur-
round the early negotiations behind the Agreement, as well post-hoc official 
justifications for its creation and implementation. Nonetheless, far more apparent were 
structural economic forces and shifting national attitudes toward procurement liberali-
zation and competition. 
  Arguably the most pronounced pressure upon European procurement practice 
in the 1980s occurred not from some institutional transformation or ideational shift, 
but rather from the collapse of export markets beginning in 1984. Many of the tradi-
tional buyer states, such as Israel and India, had become, by the 1970s and early 
1980s, arms producers themselves and had begun competing with their former Euro-
pean suppliers in emerging markets. The effects of this new development, coupled to 
constant competition with the United States for many of the same markets, were dra-
matic. European weapons exports reached a post-war high in 1984, totaling 17.4 
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billion ECU in sales.32 Following that year, exports fell steadily and by 1992, were 
40% of their 1984 figure.33 For some countries, the situation was still more traumatic. 
In France, the value of export orders fell by roughly 40% in just two years, between 
1984 and 1986.34 This shock had an immediate impact on both defense industrial turn-
over and employment throughout Europe, leading to a slight but protracted fall in both 
area into the 1990s that accelerated with the collapse of the Soviet threat. 
  For France and the United Kingdom, with their advanced and highly export-
dependent defense industries,35 the shrinking global arms market meant that both 
states had to place either a greater emphasis on domestic sales and as yet untapped ex-
port markets.36 In each country, export sales allowed their defense firms to recoup 
fixed costs and produce lower unit costs yielding an annual savings ranging between 
$844 million and $1 billion.37 The loss of these cost savings placed upward pressure 
upon state defense budgetsa situation that exacerbated the existing effects of cost 
escalation profiled in chapter 2. 
  Both Britain and France regarded this as a major challenge to their defense in-
dustrial well-being. In Britain, equipment expenditure as a percentage of the total 
defense budget increased from 41 percent in 1980-81 to 46 percent in 1983-84.38 
While the system replacement needs of the Falklands War accounted for some of this 
growth, most occurred due to outlays for a number of long-term arms projects reach-
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ing peak levels: the Tornado fighter-bomber, the Nimrod airborne early warning air-
craft, and the Ptarmigan tactical communication system, among others. The British 
defense establishment quickly became concerned about the potential for a “funding 
gap” in the late 1980s and 1990s as the equipment budget threatened to consume mon-
eys earmarked to supply other security needs. Simply increasing the defense budget 
was not a politically acceptable solution, given the recessionary UK economy of the 
period, as well as elite fears that defense procurement had begun to divert manufactur-
ing output from the civilian economy.39 The UK Ministry of Defense either had to 
contain these costs, or face the prospects of canceling weapons programs, or reducing 
personnel and salary levels, or curtailing some defense roles, e.g., the withdrawal of 
landforces from Germany or the termination of the naval air arm. 
  The British Government chose to apply Thatcherite, neo-liberal ideals con-
cerning market-based reform. Peter Levene, Chief of Defense Procurement in the 
Ministry of Defense (MoD), enacted the so-called Levene Reforms in 1984 that: com-
pelled defense firms to compete for R&D and production contracts; placed the 
responsibility of controlling cost with the industry through fixed-cost contracts; and 
strengthened government oversight of the procurement process with successive pay-
ments dependent upon the completion of each phase of research and development. 
These initiatives have been credited with controlling defense equipment costs and en-
suring “value for money” in procurement. Indeed, the value of contracts awarded 
through competition doubled from 1979 to the 1986, and produced an average 20 per-
cent savings in project costs compared to pre-reform practice.40 MoD custom 
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restricted almost all of this competition to domestic suppliers, with approximately 10 
percent of the value of British procurement sourced abroad by 1985. Levene argued, 
however, that these savings could be expanded by extending competitive tendering 
policies internationally. Specifically, he stressed within European circles that, while 
defense industrial competition at the national level had relieved the “financial bonds” 
facing the UK, its adoption at the regional level would not only maximize Britain’s 
opportunity to stretch its procurement pounds, but “at the same time competition 
[would be] the obvious trigger for rationalization and strengthening of the European 
defense industrial base.”41 
  At first glance, France seemed an unlikely candidate to answer such a call. Of 
all the large- and medium-sized national arms producers, France historically has 
placed the greatest emphasis on its national independence and the pursuit of national 
autarky in international procurement collaboration. Most principal French defense 
firms were state-owned, and as a consequence the French procurement agency, the 
Délégation Général pour l’Armament (DGA), has had little experience in and less 
tolerance for the practice of free competition in contract tendering. Nonetheless, the 
same pressures that sparked concern in London, were no less felt in Paris. France held 
a larger share of the world export market and suffered proportionately more as those 
markets began to contract in the mid-1980s. Further, France also overextended itself 
with a number of costly, high-technology procurements projects, such as the Helios I 
observation satellite and the Rafale fighter. In particular, France’s traditional procure-
ment policies were becoming untenable in the absence of annual defense budget 
increases or production run extensions. Years of sluggish economic growth, persistent 
budget deficits, and of course, increasing weapons cost ran against established desires 
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to sustain a broad-based defense industrial base capable of fielding every category of 
weapon system found in superpower arsenals.42  
  French officials did pursue limited attempts at reform: the “encouragement of 
competitive tendering,” limited privatization, and a general “tightening of procure-
ment procedures.”43 None of these initiatives were embraced with the same passion as 
their British counterparts.44 Statist traditions proved to be a considerable barrier to 
change, as well as the fear that other advanced defense industrial states might success-
fully exploit a liberalized, internal French defense market. Nonetheless, the French 
appeared quite keen during this time to pursue greater European armaments coopera-
tion to promote production economies of scale. This, of course, kept with the long-
standing French practice of championing the “indispensability of European coopera-
tion” in armaments  in the words of one French parliamentarian in the late 1970s  
whenever possible.45 By 1986, however, with the election of the conservative govern-
ment of Jacques Chirac, French rhetoric had moved a step further to embrace a 
potential European defense division of labor in the defense field through managed 
trade based on competitive cross-border procurement. 
  Between 1986 and the end of 1987, French and British thinking on the need to 
gain maximum efficiencies in their national procurements converged sufficiently to at 
least make their Reciprocal Purchasing Agreement possible. Indeed, France was the 
first to advocate the establishment of a cross-purchasing scheme in the fall of 1986.46 
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According to André Giraud, the French Defense Minister, France’s desired objective 
was to rely on counter-trade to provide equipment needs in situations where joint de-
velopment was impractical due to low R&D costs and competition between 
contractors might provide substantial cost savings. The intent of the proposed system 
was not to replace traditional interstate weapons collaboration, but to augment it  in 
the words of DGA Chief Jacques Chavalier, to extract “a better defense from a given 
budget.”47 France’s British MoD counterparts were reportedly “enthusiastic” to follow 
the French lead, both to pursue their own organizational, Thatcherite ideological fixa-
tion with market liberalization, and to avoid needless duplication of effort when 
suitable foreign technologies existed for import.48  
  Both sides also perceived themselves to be natural allies for defense trade. 
France and the United Kingdom possessed the largest and most advanced defense in-
dustries in Western Europe. They also had the most comprehensive military 
requirements, e.g., blue-water navies and air-portable artillery. Moreover, as each state 
aspired for a global military posture, they also faced the need for weapons that could 
be deployed in almost every conceivable military theater on the planet, from the Nor-
wegian arctic to tropical Africa. One French industrialist went as far as to assert: 
While we may be trying to work with Germany, if push comes to 
shove, we know that our true European ally in military terms lies across 
the Channel.49 
This commonality in requirements offered the potential for considerable cross-channel 
business, given the depth of each country’s need and the sizable range of products that 
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each could offer the othera potential unmatched by any other possible European 
partner.50 
  
The Agreement 
  The final agreement that Britain and France settled upon in December 1987, 
after a year of negotiations, was at once modest and spectacular. Both states pledged 
to open their procurement processes to the other’s defense firms. Each national de-
fense ministry would submit to the other’s contracts bulletin modeled upon the United 
States’ Commerce Business Daily.51 Foreign companies would be allowed to compete 
against each other and against home country firms for those production contracts val-
ued between $2 million and $80 million dollars (in 1990 dollars) and for development 
contracts between $2 million and $20 million. All bids falling within these specified 
limits were to be guaranteed “full and impartial consideration regardless of their coun-
try of origin.”52 This meant that French firms, for example, competing for MoD 
contracts would face the same procedural and legal scrutiny as would their British 
counterparts.  
  The only legitimate criteria permitted under the Agreement for awarding con-
tracts were cost-effectiveness and time scale. For example, a proviso of the treaty 
established common Quality Assurance Standards for both the DGA and the UK 
MoD. Under this system, any firm successfully registering with its home defense min-
istry to serve as an equipment supplier, would automatically receive a comparable 
ranking within the other state’s ministry, and therefore not be obliged to “resubmit 
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proof of its technical competence and financial viability with the foreign ministry.”53 
In order to ensure that defense companies could make the most of this new non-
discriminatory environment, the RPA established semi-annual conferences between 
industrial and ministerial representatives to explain differences between national pro-
curement policies and to identify possible cross-Channel bidding opportunities. 
Supporting this entire process, a permanent Joint Anglo-French Committee would 
meet four times a year to oversee the application of the treaty and to review the num-
ber and value of all contracts awarded. The Committee, jointly chaired by the British 
Deputy Undersecretary for Defense Procurement and his immediate DGA counterpart, 
also functioned as an adjudicating body. Given the tendency for defense ministries to 
reflexively support the interests of their national firms, the Committee functioned as a 
“court of appeal” to ensure that all complaints received a fair hearing.54  
  While the Committee sought balance in interstate trade, its full mandate was 
unlike anything ever before attempted in Western Europe. The terms of the RPA stated 
that Britain and France would strive for diffuse reciprocity in their relationship. In-
stead of tackling nascent trade imbalances immediately with counter-purchasing, both 
states were expected to make good faith efforts to achieve a rough symmetry between 
them. Moreover, this balance was not sought on a project-to-project basis, but rather at 
the end of each annual review of the treaty’s progress. This facet of the accord was 
arguably its most outstanding attribute. As previously noted, traditional weapons col-
laboration in Western Europe emphasized immediate and exact reciprocity between 
states, either through the application juste retour in co-development/co-production 
schemes, or through industrial offsets. 
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  The RPA directly prohibited this kind of trade distortion. Cross-purchasing 
was to be just that: a depoliticized trade relationship within proscribed limits. Indeed, 
as DGA Chief Chevalier noted near the end of negotiations for the Agreement, the pri-
mary purpose of the exercise was to reduce unit costs by expanding the “home” 
market for certain technologies, not to increase these costs through political meddling. 
The RPA’s explicit emphasis on diffuse reciprocity reflected the idea that the national 
interests of Britain and France were sufficiently intertwined to permit the non-
discriminatory procurement of low-end defense goods. Moreover, once initiated, trade 
interdependency would become self-sustaining in a long-term procurement relation-
ship. Comparative advantage in certain technologies could conceivably, for example, 
lead to British dependence on French naval mines and French reliance on British air-
plane fuel pods. As neither state would resist such a trend, this mutual dependence 
over many goods, over time, could produce the desired equilibrium in trade. 
  The long-term implications of such practices were significant. Reciprocity 
could give way to denationalization, as national defense establishment became accus-
tomed to employing each other’s equipment. This, in turn, might lead to product 
specialization as patterns of dependence become long-lived. During the final talks for 
the RPA, both Levene and Chevalier asserted that the Agreement would represent the 
tentative advance in this direction through the piecemeal creation of a unified arms 
market for British and French producers. As one DGA official stated: 
[The RPA] has provided industry in both countries with an institutional 
umbrella under which it has been able to establish links and joint pro-
grams with partners across the Channel.55 
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Interstate cooperation, however, would only be the first step. Andre Giraud argued that 
the ideal future was one in which the distinct British and French suppliers would only 
be a transitory feature of an integrated Anglo-French equipment market; the develop-
ment of truly “Franco-British” defense companies would be the optimal endpoint.56 
  The RPA’s founders recognized that neither the defense long-term goals or the 
short-term economic aims would be achieved unless national sensitivities were re-
spected. Consequently, the accord permitted competitive tendering only for low-cost, 
ostensibly banal technologies, such as munitions, spares, small arms, and subsystems. 
Not only had state defense ministries declared these goods non-essential for domestic 
procurement, they were also most amenable to a competitive industrial strategy as this 
segment of the market was characterized by “numerous small or specialized produc-
ers, each selling goods for use in a number of different weapon systems.”57 This 
strategy would offer the best possible combination between the chance of success and 
the opportunity to impose some significant impact on procurement efforts: an empha-
sis upon “the least politically and socially sensitive” items that nonetheless “affects a 
very large proportion of all equipment acquisitions.”58  
  Major weapons systems, on the other hand, were explicitly excluded from the 
RPA’s provisions. The framers intended the accord to be a bridge between the UK and 
France and to strengthen defense ties that had waned since the mid-1970s. They real-
ized, however, that neither state would accept even the shadow of dependence for 
high-value procurements without significant industrial benefitsin effect, imposing a 
significant national footprint akin to the juste retour principle found in other areas of 
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interstate weapons collaboration. The economic justification for this preference was 
straightforward, as both Britain and France had monopoly producers for items such as 
jets, tanks and submarines. For either state to procure such technology from the other 
in a direct purchase, would deny work orders to its own national champion and thus 
endanger that firm’s economic standing. This possibility was recognized as politically 
untenable and was avoided outright under the terms of the RPAthe accord’s framers 
believed this preferable to the spectacle of defense companies bidding for contracts 
that they would not be allowed to win under any circumstances. Consequently, an ad-
ditional function of the semi-annual defense conferences mandated under the RPA was 
to identify high-value projects at an early stage that might be suitable for co-
development/co-production between select Anglo-French firms.59 
  
Results 
  One year after the RPA’s signing ceremony, James Moray Stewart, the UK 
Deputy Undersecretary of State for Defense Procurement, argued that the accord 
marked a major step forward in European armaments cooperation, as well as the be-
ginning of a new era in Anglo-French defense relations. He argued:  
 
. . .each country now sees the other as an integral part of its domestic 
procurement base. As a consequence of the links being built, we hope 
[for] greater industrial cooperation. Certainly, we are seeing French and 
British companies talking to each other much more than they did.60 
True, the RPA represented a novel alternative to the traditional conduct of multina-
tional procurement in Western Europe: It established the principle of competitive 
bidding between NATO Europe’s largest and most autonomous national defense mar-
kets; it extended defense cooperation to low-value, low technology goods; and finally 
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the RPA proclaimed that, at least in one issue-area of traditional state high-politics, 
national interests had converged to the point to facilitate unanticipated levels of coop-
eration. Indeed, the signing of the RPA was itself regarded as a testament to 
transformations in way states identified with each other and with defense technology. 
As one UK MoD official noted in late 1987:   
Two or three years ago, doing this kind of thing with France would 
have been unthinkable. French procurement policy is moving the same 
way as our requirements are. If successful, we may move towards stan-
dardization of equipment.61 
While the RPA certainly established a new dialogue with new rules and approaches for 
multinational procurement in Anglo-French bilateral relations, what matters in the fi-
nal analysis is the transition from discourse to practice. Here, reality clearly did not 
match Undersecretary Stewart’s optimistic assessment. Today, defense representatives 
on both sides of the Channel regard the RPA as a failure: at best, it produced only a 
deeper understanding between the British and French defense establishments; at worst, 
it was a utopian experiment that never had a chance to succeedindeed, it was an ini-
tiative that was never given the opportunity to succeed. 
  Good measures to the success or failure of any trade agreement are its imple-
mentation and performance: were the stipulated rules adhered to and the desired 
results attained.  Hard, quantitative measures on the performance of the Reciprocal 
Purchasing Agreement are not readily available. Information pertaining to sessions of 
the Joint Anglo-French Committee and the ministerial conferences is categorized as 
either confidential or classified, and is thus outside the public domain. Traditional 
state policies stressing secrecy in areas of national security in both France and Britain 
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ensures that most available data is highly impressionistic and qualitative.62 Nonethe-
less, available information indicates the inability of the RPA to promote any 
significant change in procurement behavior. Moreover, the very governments champi-
oning the accord never truly intended to exploit the new possibilities that it presented. 
  First, Anglo-French defense trade between 1988 and 1992 remained insignifi-
cant, with the exact level highly contested.  The UK MoD claimed in 1991 that France 
and Britain had achieved a rough balance in trade since 1987. The MoD stated that 
since that time, the UK bought approximately $200 million dollars in French defense 
goods (in 1990 dollar amounts), whereas France purchased approximately $190 mil-
lion from Britain.63 The British Defense Ministry admitted, however, that it could not 
conclusively link any single instance of procurement to the RPA. Cross-channel, inter-
firm relationships between small and medium-sized companies cooperating as partners 
in small-scale projects emerged in the early 1980sin addition to the long-standing 
intergovernmental agreements to supply spare parts for co-production projects dating 
back to the early 1970s.  These partnerships generated some traffic in components and 
materials, and they continued to have a follow-on effect into the RPA period. In any 
case, French defense transfers from 1988 through late 1991 accounted for only 3 per-
cent of Britain’s defense imports.64 Stated differently, this meant that the direct 
purchase of French defense goods by the United Kingdom amounted to only 0.3 per-
cent of the value of all British military procurements.65  
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  The UK House of Commons Defense Committee believed at the time that the 
reciprocal French figure to be substantially lessand with good reason, as it appears 
that the British MoD embellished France’s trade record.66 Data independently com-
piled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) pertaining to 
weapons-only trade supports British purchasing claims. According to SIPRI, the UK 
bought $171 million (1990 dollars) of conventional weapons systems from France be-
tween 1987 and 1991. The reciprocal French figure, on the other hand, was only $42 
million.67  While SIPRI defense trade statistics are notoriously incomplete, excluding 
categories such as light munitions and dual-use goods, they do point to divergent ideas 
as to how the RPA should operate.  
  Indeed, a common complaint held by British officials was that the French 
never fully adhered to the basic tenets of the Agreement. Whereas Britain consistently 
informed French firms as to bidding opportunities for UK MoD contracts, France was 
not so forthcoming.68 According to UK defense sources, official French Contracts 
Bulletins that were to inform British firms and the MoD of French equipment needs 
were neither timely nor wholly complete. While this obviously did not prevent British 
companies from bidding on what contracts France made available, they did not have 
as many cross-Channel opportunities as the French counterparts.  Additionally, British 
sources claim that the French government did not seriously motivate French firms to 
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consider to UK tender invitations.  By early 1990, for example, the number of French 
companies regularly subscribing to the UK Contract Bulletin was nearly half that of 
their British counterparts who received the equivalent French document, 128 French 
firms versus 244 British companies.69 
  To be fair, the reluctance to aggressively adhere to the Agreement’s mandate 
was not completely one-sided. A 1991 UK National Audit Office (NAO) report ac-
cused the MoD of systematically discriminating against French firms in violation of 
the RPA.  The NAO asserted that the Defense Ministry continued to nurture a “buy 
British” mentality that prompted middle- and junior-level bureaucrats to make “con-
servative assessments” and to therefore not solicit overseas tenders when domestic 
competition was present.70  While similar French critiques of attitudes within France’s 
Délégation Général pour l’Armament are not known to exist, it seems clear from the 
DGA’s procurement practice that it was even more brazen than the British at discrimi-
nating against foreign firms. Bernard Retat, Assistant Armaments Director of the 
DGA’s International Relations Division, arguably reflected the disposition of France’s 
defense establishment when he said in late 1988 that while:  
the tasks of the DGA include the procurement of the best possible mili-
tary material for the French Armed Forces, irrespective of the country 
of origin. . .it happens only very seldom that equipment developed in 
another country is capable of fully meeting these requirements. . .In 
this context, it is only too natural that a national company will be ap-
proached first.71 
While this logic may be valid with regard to strategic bombers or capital ships, it is 
extremely thin when applied to the technologies that were under the RPA’s mandate. 
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Items such as 5.56mm rifle cartridges or 155mm artillery shells are manufactured 
throughout the Alliance to NATO standards pertaining to size, performance, etc. It is 
therefore difficult to believe that one NATO military’s requirement for these items 
could be significantly divergent from another’s. Nonetheless, variants of this thinking 
were well established on both sides of the Channel and used to justify nationalist pro-
curement behaviors. 
  There is also evidence, however, that attitudes toward the RPA involved much 
more than just a pro-national bias. As one French industrialist noted: “It is important 
that such things are created. I am not sure that they work. No one wants or intends 
[for] them to have any real power or significance.”72 A retired UK procurement offi-
cial mirrored this sentiment, noting that for many in the MoD rank-and-file, the RPA 
was regarded as an act of political showmanship and after its signing ceremony, it was 
“mentally filled away” and “never taken seriously.”73 Statements such as these indi-
cate that the grand visions espoused by senior officials as to expansion of home 
markets or the integration of domestic defense bases did not extend to those who 
would implement the treaty and compete within its guidelines. To these people, the 
RPA was just more Euro-symbolism: good for the “cause,” but lacking any real value.   
  Additional information pertaining to the implementation of the RPA after 1991 
is extremely limited. By this time, the accord had been overshadowed by the symbol-
ism of “1992” and the anticipated completion of the Common Market. Moreover, the 
Agreement itself had been made redundant by the 1989 European Defense Equipment 
Market Initiative. Nonetheless, it is known that by the Fall of 1994, then-UK Defense 
Secretary Malcolm Rifkind publicly announced that Britain would no longer seek to 
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link its domestic defense base with those of its European allies.74 Rifkind stated that 
while the UK had opened its market and purchased foreign goods, other Europeans did 
not share Britain’s “open procurement policy.” Britain would consequently privilege 
its domestic defense suppliers to provide its military needs. While the Defense Secre-
tary’s statement undoubtedly pleased anti-Europeanist and protectionist elements 
within British society, it concealed the fact that the UK never truly de-emphasized it 
home producers. Between 1988 and 1991, the UK only purchased an average of $50 
million in French defense goods annuallyand this assumes that the MoD estimate 
that the UK purchased a total $200 million of French goods over this period is correct. 
Given that NATO estimates on the UK’s total weapons expenditure over these four 
years averaged $9.5 billion each year, it is evident that Britain never seriously pursued 
its French option.75  
 
Conclusion 
   Marcel Benichou, of the French DGA, asserted in 1989 that through the ac-
cord, France and the UK were European “pioneers:” 
. . . [whose] experience will be very valuable in easing the opening up 
of national borders throughout the community of the 13 IEPG nations. 
A Europe which is stronger, more homogenous and more firmly welded 
together should result from such a development.76 
Yet by the early 1990s, the RPA failed to significantly affect either French or British 
procurement policies. More importantly, instead of paving the way toward a “Euro-
pean” future and emphasizing the European ideal of integration, the Agreement 
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actually accented the “national sentiments that permeate each country’s national psy-
che.”77 Indeed, whereas both France and the United Kingdom stood to gain 
economically from a properly functioning RPA, neither state was willing to increase 
its dependence on the otherand not even for those defense technologies that they 
themselves declared to be non-essential. 78 
  For both states, the economic rationality of a given procurement mattered less 
than the “nationality” of the item in question. This was the lesson of the RPA. It dem-
onstrated that national identity, and in turn national interest, remains tightly bound to 
the pursuit of the national defense. Despite the lofty rhetoric of Europe and of Euro-
pean cooperation, for the French DGA, the most appropriate means of defending 
France lay with French defense firms producing “French” technologiesranging from 
the simplest mortar tube to most sophisticated tactical missile. The British held com-
parable views as to the symbolic importance of their defense base. The Agreement 
showed that where national prestige and sovereignty are concerned, the social value of 
defense technology can be very difficult to gauge. Indeed, as one British NATO repre-
sentative noted the ability to produce the “trivial” was no less tied to national 
sovereignty than high technology systems. Rifle-barrels and bomb casings, in the 
imaginations of most decision-makers, were regarded as the “traditional instruments” 
of both defense and national sovereignty.”79 
    These technologies therefore possess considerable, albeit, latent emotional 
significance. They are, after all, very old tools of statecraft with histories extending 
back through the World Wars and into the nineteenth century. In terms of historical 
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memory, they can hold as much resonance with the protection of the national commu-
nity as would a variable-geometry fighter-bomber. Consequently, where these 
technologies are concerned, there exists a chasm between what is said and what is 
done. States may declare such items to be mundane and much less valuable than the 
more glamorous systems filling their military inventories. These assertions, however, 
do not necessarily translate into the actual procurement of these technologies from 
one’s allies or even a willingness to abandon automatic state preference for domestic 
supplierseven if this incurs some economic penalty. 
  The RPA shows that French and British decision-makers could not make the 
leap between statement and practice. The implementation of the Agreement also de-
notes the tenuous nature of the collective European identity. A French DGA 
representative argued the accord failed in the absence of necessary “cultural revolu-
tions.”80  First, both countries were unable to frame symbolic value distinctions 
between high- and low-technology goods. A second required cultural transformation 
related to how these states identified with each other as members of the European pro-
ject. Some decision-making circles, certainly in France and arguably in the UK as 
well, mistrusted the RPA because it implied specialization, which is a natural by-
product of marketization. Because a competitive firm would be rewarded with bina-
tional contracts, it could over time possibly become the dominant producer of given 
items for both equipment markets. The same DGA official noted, however, that when 
the possibility existed that such a firm might not be French, “we are not [and were 
never] ready for that step in any armaments area.”81 National specialization, however, 
should not be a concern between two states who regard the other’s interests as insepa-
rable from its ownand certainly not in an issue-area that is presumably of marginal 
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importance to state interests, such as low-end defense procurement. What we see in 
the history of the RPA, however, is that neither France nor Britain wished to heighten 
their interdependence, much less integrate their domestic defense markets through the 
non-discriminatory treatment of each other’s defense firms in certain procurement ar-
eas. Consequently, despite surveys indicating that 54% of French citizens identify as 
Europeans or that 45% of Britons since 1987 favored European initiatives to 
strengthen the common defense, it is clear that these sentiments did not extend deeply 
into the defense procurement field.82 The idea of Europe was used to legitimize the 
RPA, but it did little to influence state behavior and to promote the efficacious imple-
mentation of the treaty. 
  Indeed, while the defense establishments in both France and the UK recog-
nized and appealed to common interests and to converging security identity, these 
were not strong enough to undermine the national “politics of high and low secu-
rity.”83 Defense officials who claimed to promote European interests, invariably 
privileged their own myopic state interests. For these elites, it remained more conven-
ient to talk about Europe than to practice it.  The Anglo-French Reciprocal Purchasing 
Agreement represented a minimalist strategy to exploit “marginal” procurement fields 
where states might safely and beneficially pursue “ideas of a collective European-
ness.” The failed implementation of the Agreement shows us, however, that the most 
salient identity throughout European defense procurement remains national identity 
and that the symbolic value of national defense is still tightly constructed through the 
prism of national interest.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Conclusion 
 
 
In this dissertation, I have attempted to conduct a “hard test” of the role of an 
evolving transnational, European identity in shaping state interest and action in 
Western Europe. I have done this by focusing on an area of state activity—arms 
procurement—that has been innately bound to conceptions of state identity since the 
17
th century. The production and possession of arms does far more than simply 
provide a means of national security or supply industrial and technological benefits to 
countries: armament procurement also defines states as it often denotes modernity, 
sovereignty, efficacy and strength.  I postulated that weapons are a source of status and 
grandeur in an international system in which conceptions of self and of self-interest 
are reinforced by the existence and quality of a country’s defense industrial base. 
Consequently, not only have these technologies been highly coveted by most state 
actors, a consistent theme of state behavior throughout most of the 20
th century has 
been to remain as close to autarky in procurement as a country’s human and material 
resources will permit.1 
There are movements, however, in both national societies and in the relations 
among states that compel us as scholars to question if the old state preoccupations 
with military production remained as immutable and omnipresent at the end of that 
century as they were during its initial decades. Western Europe has been a region in 
transition as it moves closer toward economic union and political confederation under
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an umbrella of interlocking military alliances and the de jure expectation of a common 
defense. It is a region in which multinational arms procurement cooperation has 
generally increased both in complexity and scale over time, with the member 
governments of the European Communities—now the European Union—traditionally 
using such collaboration to spread the costs and the risks of defense technology 
innovation. It is also a region, moreover, which has witnessed the development and 
expansion of a discrete European identity among significant percentages of nearly all 
West European publics. More enticing, however, is the development of a discursive 
tradition among governing elites to justify procurement cooperation in “European” 
terms that elevate the regional good over the welfare of any of its national 
components, e.g., a préférence européene in arms collaboration, or the construction of 
an European aerospace industry that would make Europe a force worthy of respect 
from both allies and adversaries. 
  Attracted by a discourse of collaboration that is implicitly one of self-
redefinition, I have sought to determine if these sentiments serve an instrumental 
function masking self-oriented cooperation, or if some partnerships truly reflect the 
ideational changes shown consistently in over thirty years of polling data since the 
first comprehensive surveys of European attitudes were conducted in the 1972: an 
emergent, and relatively weak, European identity and a stated desire by sizable 
numbers of Europeans who regard their national security as best maintained through 
regional initiatives. 
  As we have seen in the preceding chapters, however, such visionary 
perspectives had little effect in either the motivation or conduct of the leading 
examples of European defense industrial cooperation through nearly the entire latter 
half of the 20
th century. Across the spectrum, from technologies so complex they are 
akin to magic in the popular imagination—as one NATO official noted—to those so  
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mundane that some are little different from their 19
th century predecessors, European 
governments have been doggedly resistant to either assigning the collaborative process 
to the market or withdrawing themselves and substituting for state control that of an 
impartial and empowered international agency.2 That these states would be reluctant to 
deepen their intimacy in this area while concurrently advancing a monetary union and 
even establishing a non-discriminatory regime for cross-border, non-defense 
government procurement would not be a controversial notion to many defense 
analysts. Scholars, such as Philip Gummet and Edward Kolodziej, have long argued 
that procurement cooperation in Europe has always been an exercise in attaining 
national ends through poly-national means. To these individuals, an undeniable reality 
of the European condition has been that member states do not collaborate because 
their elites have suddenly opted to internalize and execute the ideas codified in the 
Union’s founding treaty—the 1951 Treaty of Paris that called upon member 
governments to “substitute for age-old rivalries the merging of their essential 
interests.”3 Instead, the states form and structure their partnerships to satisfy their own 
petty national interests. Behavior that might be construed as other-regarding, or even 
more narrowly as recognition of complex mutual self-interest, is absent. 
  I, however, argued differently, contending that both cooperation and non-
cooperation reflected identity and that in an environment of contested identities, some 
may have tangible effects in some areas and none in others. A European identity might 
be weak and emergent, but defense procurement is not a monolithic activity. At a 
glance, some defense technologies appeared to be more important than others in the 
calculus of state decision-makers. In a region where surveys have shown that support 
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for deepening cooperation and expanded Union competences was greatest in those 
areas of social and political activity that were deemed relatively inconsequential to the 
security and well-being of individuals and their communities, e.g., international 
humanitarian aid and poverty alleviation, I postulated that certain defense technologies 
might be more amenable to “communal” solutions than others.4 My research has 
indicated, however, that such distinctions were not made in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s 
and 1990s, and moreover no radical differences emerged in how states viewed their 
varied collaborations. In the following pages, I shall revisit this hypothesis, which I 
loosely call the Technology-Identity Hypothesis, and summarize the findings of the 
five cases of cooperation that I examined in this dissertation. 
 
The Technology-Identity Hypothesis 
In order to consider the potential role of identity in shaping state interest, and 
subsequently, state behavior, I looked beyond conventional international relations 
approaches, notably Realism and Neoliberalism, which are founded upon on the a 
priori assumption of the “self-interested state.” 5 I embraced a Social Constructivist 
framework that allows one to assess state actions based on the subjective meanings 
that decision-makers hold toward others and toward objects. I contended that this 
concept was crucial in any understanding of procurement cooperation or non-
cooperation in Western Europe, for the following reasons. High-tech military 
hardware, such as main battle tanks or high performance aircraft, is bound to 
conceptions of self that are not conducive to collaboration. This technological domain 
was ideationally special because it presents considerable material and symbolic 
                                                 
4 Stefan Höljelid, “European Integration and the Idea of European Identity: Obstacles and Possibilities,” 
ECPR Joint Sessions/Workshop 19: Identity Politics, 2001, 16. 
5Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what states make of it:  the social construction of power politics," 
International Organization 46 (Spring 1992): 392.  
 
272 
benefits for state actors. An advanced national defense industrial base (DIB) produces 
security, sustained and expanded national systems of innovation, and significantly, 
provides culturally-valued artifacts that became components of national identity and 
vehicles for national prestige.6  
Not all weapons, however, possess the same value on either economic or 
political-symbolic terms. An air-superiority fighter, for example, is a symbol of power 
and an instrument that both demands and supports a sophisticated industrial 
foundation. The same cannot be said, however, for a broad range of military hardware 
based on older technologies, often mass-produced and regarded as quasi-commodities.  
Just as the ability to possess and produce an advanced aircraft provided tangible 
security and economic benefits, so to do low technology weapons like artillery shells. 
The crucial difference, however, is that high tech items also become part of state self-
perception in the international system, and importantly, how that state wants to be 
regarded by others.  I hypothesized that this difference would shape how far states are 
willing to go to monopolize the "sophisticated" compared the "commonplace."    
  As conceived, the ideational value of high technology weapons would likely 
taint efforts at procurement collaboration because these systems should invoke 
myopic, nationalist responses among partners. Low technology armaments, on the 
other hand, should not challenge national identity. These weapons are not symbols of 
national grandeur or of economic sophistication. Consequently, production 
collaboration at this level might reflect the influence of a weaker, cross-cutting 
identity, namely the evolving transnational idea of self in Western Europe. Here, we 
should expect collaborative behaviors that do not reflect orthodox notions of self-
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interest but rather denoted a deliberate minimization of state interference either 
through marketization or the surrender of competence to international organizations. 
In practical terms, such an outcome might occur through:   
   A regime of open, cross-border procurement competition between partners in 
which comparative advantage was at least considered in determining the 
source of supply. 
   Allowing commercial and competence criteria to determine contracts in 
consortia relationships. 
   Empowering international management agencies to function autonomously and 
decisively without state meddling. 
   Permitting a foreign company to operate as the de jure prime contractor 
without need for joint venture legal fictions. 
   Embracing a less exacting juste retour model for consortia, one that forgoes 
state insistence on securing shares of both advanced technology work and 
production work, thus eliminating national participation on all value-added 
systems, as well as duplicate testing and assembly.7 
   The development of defense "Eurocompanies" without "distinctive national 
affiliations."8 
I hypothesized that if any of these events were to occur, they would arguably be the 
products of an ideational shift—an assessment that could be validated by examining 
the behavior and declared rationales of the actors involved.   
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Simply stated, I contended that the development of a collective, European 
identity should produce complementary behaviors within the narrow, yet significant, 
issue area of low-technology defense industrial cooperation. While identity shapes 
behavior, i.e., the form of procurement cooperation, the level of technology involved 
in a given collaborative scheme should determine which identity is most salient to 
state actors at a given time. I recognized that national identities remain the strongest 
ideational factors influencing state decision-making and interest calculations. 
Nonetheless, because low technology weapons production is not enmeshed in notions 
of sovereignty or modernity, a transnational identity should have a greater impact on 
state action and facilitate economically rational interstate procurement arrangements.  
 
 The  Evidence 
Regrettably, while this hypothesis may have had some conceptual appeal, the 
record of European cooperation through the mid- to late-1990s did not support it. In 
assessing the case studies, while collaborative successes and failures were clear, but 
none of the cases exhibited any signs of diminished self-interest at the governmental 
level. 
 
 The High-Technology Dyad: Tornado and Eurofighter 
  The Tornado provided us with a baseline high-technology case. Initiated in 
1968, this program took shape five years before the European Community either 
recognized the development of a European identity or affirmed that such identity 
represented a normative goal that would sustain and expand the European project.9 In 
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the formation of this system, there was no evidence of a European identity shaping and 
moderating state behavior. The participating governments were willing to compromise 
and set aside desirable national goals, such as project leadership, in order to move the 
effort forward. Nonetheless, they created in an organizational framework that ensured 
that all of them retained direct state involvement in the developmental process in order 
to ensure that they could beggar that process to satisfy most of their parochial desires. 
Appeals to Europe mattered only insofar as they ennobled the efforts of the member 
states to promote their own defense aerospace bases without regard to any larger 
regional transformation. While the national industries learned to how cooperate better 
among themselves and developed a significant level of mutual dependence in this one 
project, there is no evidence their governments either acknowledged or welcomed this 
limited intimacy. 
  Arguably, the most damning facet of Tornado lay in that its very beginning 
represented more the weakness of Europe as an ideal than its strength. Recall that the 
project began as much as an effort to attain a “balance of power” within the European 
Community—and thus protect national autonomy—as it was to be a manifestation of 
solidarity and partnership. In the end, Tornado provided both national independence 
and a symbol of European fealty. That said, no one intended it to be an example of 
other-regarding behavior. 
 Similarly,  Eurofighter  betrayed some of the most base and unmistakably 
national instincts of its participant governments. Eurofighter took shape—indeed, it 
has taken flight—at a time when a European identity has not only emerged but also 
has been consciously advanced. While affective support for European integration and 
for the expansion of European policy-making beyond low politics has waxed and 
waned over time, collectively and within individual member states, from 1981 to 
1989, popular support for widening European cooperation surged across the  
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Community and remained more or less stable ever since.10 In spite of this, the first 
three years of Eurofighter presented a picture of national egotism run amok. 
International cooperation to find a successor for Tornado was no one’s first choice, 
and when that option was finally embraced, France campaigned either to dominate the 
program or to suffocate it (and one could argue, both concurrently). Even once that 
irritant was removed, the remaining members of the consortium were quite eager to 
pursue the same policies of state control and political interference that they had 
enjoyed with Tornado.  
Unlike that project, however, the Eurofighter members gave lip-service to 
rationalization and marketization—expressed in this instance as the desire for 
competitive tendering. Nonetheless, the governments continued to default to a “Little 
League-Rules” approach to international procurement in which the states designate the 
national industrial actors who subsequently all get a chance to play regardless of their 
aptitude or cost-effectiveness. Given my hypothesis, such behavior was untroubling. 
Eurofighter and its predecessors were high-technology, high value-added programs 
that were regarded as too important to national military requirements, national 
economies, and national self-perceptions of modernity and competence not to invoke 
nationalist behavior. That these states would pursue their disparate self-interests to the 
extent of imposing higher costs on themselves was to be expected. 
 
                                                 
10 Fluctuations in support notably correlate to the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 and its resulting impact 
on national economies. Additionally, popular uneasiness with the increased competence of European 
institutions following the Maastrict Treaty in 1992 led to momentary dips in average net support for 
unification. Richard Eichenberg and Russell Dalton, “Europeans and the European Community: the 
dynamics of public support for European integration,” International Organization 47 (Autumn 1993): 
519.  
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Low-Technology Dyad: FH-70 and SP-70 
  The Euro-howitzer cases presented me with the opportunity to test if European 
governments actually differentiate between types of defense technology and thus 
possibly permit themselves different approaches in collaborative acquisition. In FH-70 
and SP-70, we saw two related programs that cost a fraction of their aerospace 
counterparts, and consequently did not capture a great deal of government attention or 
oversight. Importantly, each involved technologies that were readily available to the 
participants and could be developed by any one of them alone.  In both projects, the 
governments gave themselves the smallest role in running the programs outside of 
assigning control to an autonomous administrative body. The states created simple 
oversight bodies to ensure that their interests were harmonized and program goals met. 
They subsequently allowed their industries to act in a parallel fashion.  
  Had both cases succeeded, and been equivalent in terms of technology type, 
this facet alone might have been suggestive of differences in the way that states view 
and approach low-end defense goods. While countries were unwilling to set aside 
sovereignty considerations and leave this end of the defense technology spectrum 
either to industry or some international agency, they nonetheless could abstain from 
unmitigated meddling in the developmental process if the technology involved were 
not materially or ideationally “sexy.” The FH-70, for example, which consisted of 
little more than a rifled tube, hydraulic shocks, and wheeled mount, was a singular 
case of European cooperation in which there was true sub-system specialization 
between the producing countries. While it was not possible to rule out that some 
convergence of identity and interest facilitated this behavior, such a option was 
unlikely in the extreme: like Tornado, the FH-70 was a baseline case, commissioned 
and developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s when a transnational European  
 
278 
identity was in embryonic form. A better explanation would be that this phenomenon 
owed more to state disinterest than any kind of communal vision. 
  The lesson of the SP-70, on the other hand, was that the threshold for such 
disinterest was remarkably low. The SP-70 differed from the FH-70 not in the 
organization of its administration, but rather in including a handful of complex electro-
mechanical sub-systems to allow it to fulfill its requirement as survivable, self-
propelled artillery. These sub-systems subsequently became contested technologies, 
with each state demanding its share. Given the program’s administrative minimalism, 
the end-result was that the participating states satisfied their allotted work-shares 
through the construction of components that later resisted integration, owing to the 
lack of meaningful oversight or control at either the political or industrial level. More 
important for my purposes, however, was the timing of the case. Here, I observed a 
mixed-technology case that, like Eurofighter, emerged at a time when expressions of 
European identity had become consistent and substantial. This identity clearly was not 
strong enough to inhibit states from pursuing their own petty interests in this particular 
program. 
 
The Reciprocal Purchasing Agreement 
  The Anglo-French Reciprocal Purchasing Agreement was assumed to be an 
outlier, albeit a very significant one. In it, one saw a deliberate attempt by Europe’s 
two largest defense producers to declare some classes of defense technology as being 
unworthy of any kind of excessive state preoccupation with the nationality of 
production and supply. Further, the Act also codified the belief that the acquisition of 
such goods could be safely attained through managed trade with trusted partners. 
These relationships would reflect and acknowledge comparative advantage, shared 
interests, and mutual dependence. The existence of such a regime, coupled to  
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declaratory policy justifying it in European terms, could provide substantial weight to 
the argument that this was the leading edge of defense industrial integration in the 
European Union and a manifestation of a transnational identity in defense 
procurement. Unfortunately, however, the history of the agreement was one of apathy 
and resistance to any meaningful application of edicts. While both countries embraced 
the rhetoric of Europe, their actions betrayed the unquestioned belief that the 
specialization and the trust that it required was unwarranted, and that the most 
appropriate solution to national military requirements lay with national industry 
producing “national” technology. 
 
Which way forward? 
  While I have falsified my hypothesis—that an integrative European identity is 
manifest in European defense industrial relations and shapes collaborative 
procurement in the European Union — it would wrong to stop here and not to at least 
raise some alternative explanations behind the state projects and initiatives discussed 
in this dissertation. I began this intellectual journey as an effort to test the worthiness 
of a modernist, social constructivist approach to analyze state behavior in an issue-area 
in which it has rarely been applied and in which Realism has held almost hegemonic 
sway. Throughout the preceding chapters, however, I have crafted a narrative that does 
not support either my stated hypothesis or a purely realist account. On the one hand, 
one does see certain realist precepts characterizing state behavior—balancing logics, 
and concerns over sovereignty, vulnerability, and relative gains—as European 
governments remained very concerned about the ends and means of their defense 
industrial partnerships over a thirty-year period. Defense procurement received special 
attention from decision-makers who seemed to covet most technologies. They were 
unwilling to abandon their sovereign rights in design and production, and in nearly  
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every case, they worked to maximize their own industrial and technological returns 
from the process of innovation in order to channel the most benefits into their national 
defense industries.  
That said, I demonstrated in the Tornado and Eurofighter cases, purely self-
regarding behavior has led to unintended consequences. We have seen a creeping 
interdependence in which the national production and life-time support of certain 
high-visibility and high-value weapons systems has become unthinkable—indeed, 
unsupportable—without the assistance of group of trusted international partners.   
Decades of this kind of interaction has produced a situation in which purely national 
programs in certain technology areas are no longer regarded as either feasible or 
desirable by both major and minor European producers alike.11 Moreover, the true 
legacy of these relationships may only become apparent in the intermediate term as 
national responsibilities in the design and assembly of subsystems and components in 
successive projects, like those that I have explored here, leads to a kind of backdoor 
specialization on a national scale. Indeed, as one British Aerospace manager said in 
the late 1990s, the United Kingdom’s reliance on Germany to lead in fuselage design 
for Britain’s two principal military aircraft from 1968 onwards has meant that not only 
have British skills atrophied in that aerospace sub-domain, but that Britain will likely 
have to look again to Germany to support British military requirements once 
Eurofighter completes its operational life sometime near the middle of the 21
st 
century.12  
In the near-term, however, legacy projects such as Eurofighter continue to 
move forward as new collaborative programs emerge in other areas. For example, 
                                                 
11 Jordi Molas-Gallart, “Defense Procurement as an Industrial Policy Tool: The Spanish Experience,” 
Defense and Peace Economics 9 (1998): 74. 
12 Interview, British Aerospace Manager, 19 February 1997.  
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despite the collapse of an existential Soviet threat, and a subsequent wave of budget 
tightening that spread from post-reunification Germany to nearly every state in the 
European Union, Eurofighter has progressed into its production phase with 18 planes 
in service as of early 2004. The desire to maintain this momentum has led the national 
governments to consider a major reformation of Eurofighter GmbH and recast the 
consortium as “a single entity company” that would function legally and practically as 
a true prime contractor.13 Moreover, they have also voiced interest in ending the 
national duplication of testing and assembly facilities and permitting wider 
competition for subcontracts.14 While the exact parameters of this “revitalization” 
effort will not be known for some time, it suggests that the Eurofighter states are 
thinking about moving beyond the self-oriented, state-centric preoccupations that 
typified much of their behavior just a decade earlier. 
Realists, such as Theodore Moran, have argued that cooperation—despite its 
attendant reliance upon “foreign-sourced” technology and the possibility of foreign 
penetration of national defense industries—is preferable to the high costs and 
technological mediocrity of national autarky. None, however, would countenance even 
the specter of specialization that may have emerged in the last twenty years, as well as 
changes such as those we may yet see in Eurofighter  GmbH.15 In any case, 
Eurofighter  may become an additional facet in what has been an ongoing 
transformation in the European defense industrial landscape since 1998. As the 
process and depth of European cooperation has continued to move forward past the 
window of my research, which ended in the late 1990s, the European Union has 
experienced a veritable explosion of cross-border mergers producing permanent Euro-
                                                 
13 Andrew Chutter, “Course Change for Eurofighter,” Defense News, 23 February 2004: 8. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Theodore Moran, “The Globalization of America’s Defense Industries,” International Organization 
15 (Summer 1990): 55, 70.  
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companies such as Thales and the European Aeronautic Defence and Space (EADS) 
consortium, as well as the development of new multinational procurement 
management organizations such as the Organisme Conjoint de Coopération en matière 
d’Armement (OCCAR, or the Joint Armaments Coordinating Organization), and the 
European Union’s European Defense Agency.  In light of these changes, realist logic 
seemingly holds ever diminishing value in explaining the conduct of multinational 
European procurement.  
The real issue before us, however, ultimately is not whether a theoretical 
approach, such as realism, can explain (or not) either present or future European 
behavior. Instead, we must assess what approach best applies to the case histories 
presented in this dissertation, events that began in the late 1960s. I sought to test the 
worthiness of a particular social constructivist argument in an area of interstate 
activity in which the applicability of realist logic is often assumed as a given. I found, 
however, that realism provided a more accurate assessment of the events between 
1967 and 1997 than did my hypothesis. Le juste retour and dogged state control in 
international procurement management organizations were not reflections of 
“community-feeling” and other-regarding behavior. These facets of collaborative 
procurement in Western Europe instead denoted the persistent obsession of national 
governments to prevent their partners from attaining disproportionate gains from 
cooperation and to ensure that they retained political control over that cooperation 
while also channeling as many industrial and technological benefits into their national 
economies as possible. The intent of this behavior was not to promote integration, or 
some rationalized, regional defense industry, but rather to use cooperation as a means 
of establishing and protecting national capabilities.   
While one can acknowledge the value of realism given the evidence presented 
in this dissertation, one must nonetheless take care not to embrace it uncritically.  
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Procurement cooperation in late 20
th century Western Europe projected islands of 
realism in an otherwise increasingly non-realist sea of European cooperation. The 
same governments that built Tornado and the SP-70  prototypes also established 
monetary union, the Single European Act, a European citizenship, and a host of other 
transformations that have advanced European unification. Realism can explain much 
of the politics and policies underlying the aforementioned weapons systems and 
others, but only so far. Emmanuel Adler once said that “one can never tell a realist 
something new—you can only tell him something more.”16 While I do not completely  
share this view, I contend that there has always been something more than state 
fixations on relative gains and autonomy in the area of European collaborative 
procurement. As Norbert Pipperger of the German Bundesministerium der 
Verteidigung asserted in early 1997, cooperation in defense was a “natural” outgrowth 
of the movements that established both “cultural” and economic union in Western 
Europe.17 That said, however, Pipperger also contended that, 
Defense is a national aim and always has been. . . The driver for what is 
happening now is not this European identity that they are talking about.  
It is all wishful thinking. In this sense, we will never be like the US 
[i.e., a unified polity with a definitive national identity]. Two thousand 
years of divergence cannot be pushed aside. A European defense 
identity—or even a political union—of the type found in national 
federations not only is not feasible, people don't want it. Nonetheless, 
there is something distinctly European in what is happening.18 
As I have shown in my case histories, Mitterrand’s “idea of Europe” has played a 
considerable role in rationalizing European defense cooperation. Just as one can 
readily perceive evidence of self-regarding behavior, one can also just as easily 
uncover statements from notables such as Michael Heseltine and Helmut Kohl that 
                                                 
16 Interview. Emmanuel Adler, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, July 1997. 
17 Interview. Norbert Pipperger, Bundesministrium der Verteidigung, London, 21 January 1997. 
18 Ibid.  
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proclaim their actions as serving some larger, regional goal. If identity shift is truly a 
possibility, realism cannot allow us to hypothesize as to the nature of these shifts or to 
their effects. Moreover, it certainly can say nothing about the discursive foundation of 
European collaborative procurement that has made it unique in the international 
system.  
William Keller writes that the international community has been subject to a 
“global military industrial enterprise” since the 1950s that has led to the “insertion” of 
defense technological know-how across the planet and the subsequent diffusion of 
production capabilities.19 Through overlapping processes of direct sales, licensed 
production, and even co-development, some developing countries have become 
industrial competitors of their industrial counterparts. Only in Western Europe, 
however, has this defense “globalization” embraced the languages of identity shift and 
regional integration. Realism can only dismiss this phenomenon. Arguably, one must 
to look to some other analytical toolkit that can address this issue. If neither realism or 
my social constructivist account fully applies to the past situation—to say nothing of 
the changes looming on the horizon during the first decade of this century—then 
what? In the next few pages, I will discuss two alternative approaches that may offer 
some added explanatory leverage.  
First, my inability to sustain my constructivist argument may be simply that: 
my failure is my own and does not diminish the applicability of a constructivist toolkit 
in assessing the history of intra-European collaborative procurement. This alternative 
approach would hold that, at best, the argument that I presented is over-specified. In 
other words, I have implicitly postulated that a transnational European identity must 
inspire and lead to tangible, integrative behavior in multinational procurement 
                                                 
19 William Keller, Arm in Arm (New York: Basic Books, 1995), 10.  
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depending upon technology level. In reality, the effects of that identity may be 
considerably circumscribed. One possibility is immediately evident: a transnational 
European identity exists as a relatively weak part of a hierarchy of identities that 
includes legacy national identities. Given that national identities remain dominant in 
the region, they are more likely to define state interests and motivate action, especially 
in areas that are as emotionally wedded to traditional conceptions of sovereignty and 
statehood as defense procurement. This does not deny the potential for an expanding 
web of armaments collaborations in Europe, both quantitatively and qualitatively. This 
view, however, recognizes that the potency of an European identity is ultimately 
dependent upon its relative status in the minds of state decision-makers and their 
publics, and consequently, its effects may become more pronounced (and 
encompassing) if and when it supplants the myriad of national identities within the 
European Union.   
Second, one might abandon the constructivist enterprise entirely and instead 
look to liberal theories of international relations that take into account the preferences 
of societal actors who translate their desires into state policy through a continuous 
process of bargaining and pressure politics with other sub-national groups and state 
decision-makers.20 While this approach shares realism’s rationalist disdain for issues 
of identity, it does allow one to assess the impact of sub-state groups in shaping 
cooperative procurement. Using this approach, one could hypothesize that given the 
extreme cost-escalation that accompanies generational advances in the weapons 
productions which I highlighted in Chapter 3, coupled to the contraction of export 
markets in the 1970s (which limits the ability of producing states to recoup their 
research and development costs), states face systemic pressures to cooperate. They 
                                                 
20 Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” 
International Organization 51 (Autumn 1997): 518.  
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must, however, structure this cooperation in ways that recognize and mitigate 
“domestic distributional conflicts” likely to arise from foreign entitlements—such as 
the disputes by national firms over intellectual property rights and contracts. 
Consequently, one could envision national producers, for example, pursuing their own 
parochial preferences and pressing state decision makers to preserve juste retour and 
national government oversight of the collaborative process to advance their petty, 
corporate gains.21  
 
A Constructivist reprieve? 
  Mainstream, contemporary constructivist scholars, like Alexander Wendt, 
arguably would insist that the findings of this dissertation in no way refute the 
applicability of social constructivist analyses to the issue of collaborative European 
arms procurement for a number of reasons. First, that a collective European identity, 
as I have defined it, is not manifest in regional defense industrial collaboration does 
not necessarily imply that such activity is ideationally charged and clearly tainted by 
the traditional imperatives of national identity. Identity matters in this area of state 
action, and constructivism can say something as to why it does, how and when. 
Second, while one can infer what form a collective identity might take, one must 
remain exceedingly cautious in ascribing the effects that such an identity may have. 
As Wendt writes, 
. . .[C]ultures have an intrinsically conservative quality which ensures 
that structural change (e.g., the mitigation of sovereignty or 
transcending long-lived antagonisms) will be the exception, not the 
rule. . .Collective identity formation in international politics takes place 
not on a tabula rasa but against a cultural background in which the 
dominant response to changes in the environment has been egoistic, 
whether in the extreme form of enmity or the milder form of rivalry. 
                                                 
21 Ibid, 532.  
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The path from the “here” of self-help to the “there” of collective 
security must tap into and transform that disposition. This is not 
inevitable. Egoism is deeply entrenched in international life, so much 
so that the idea of states becoming “friends” can easily seem naïve. 
Even if the pressure to become friends is strong, as I think it 
increasingly is, egoistic identity commitments might not give way. The 
evolution of identities is a dialectic of actual and possible selves, and 
there are no guarantees that the weight of the past will be overcome.22 
While Wendt arguably means that sometimes identities do not evolve to become more 
other-regarding, I contend that one can take a more nuanced position.  The egoistic 
identity commitments that Wendt describes can co-exist with collective identity 
formation. The development of a European identity does not mean that existing 
national identities automatically become archaic. Those identities are simply too 
entrenched to fade away with fifty years of regional economic integration. Successive 
polling data affirm that both national and European identities concurrently exist in the 
popular imaginations of European societies, albeit within a hierarchy in which loyalty 
to the nation-state almost always exceeds fealty to Europe. Moreover, one should 
recall that Western Europe produced both the Eurofighter and the Euro in the same the 
decade. Egoistic identity commitments clearly are not omnipresent, ideational 
firewalls that impede structural transformation everywhere equally. 
  A more encompassing social constructivist hypothesis than that presented in 
this dissertation might recognize that states have multiple identities each generating its 
own set of interests.  A collective sense of “Europeaness” can exist and delineate a 
range of appropriate state behavior, insofar as they do not challenge core areas of 
national identity, such as the state’s monopoly on violence. When these lines are 
crossed, or at least threatened, then one can expect the prerogatives of national identity 
to play a more determining role in state interest and action. While issues-areas such as 
                                                 
22 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 340.  
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domestic social policy and monetary policy may no longer trigger nationalist, state-
centric responses given the evolutionary advance of a transnational identity, as the 
former head of the Western European Armaments Group Armaments Secretariat 
attached to the Western European Union argued in late 1996, “defense is special.” 23 It 
remains so innately connected to conceptions of the state and what sets states apart 
from other socio-political organizations, that all national governments will remain 
reluctant about deepening their collaborations regardless of platform or technological 
content.24 Consequently, a refined constructivist argument might contend that the most 
relevant questions in European defense should be future oriented, asking when and 
under what conditions should a developing European identity develop a “critical 
mass” sufficient to influence state procurement behavior.  
 
Liberal fantasies 
  Constructivism and realism are not the only means of analyzing the issue of 
European procurement. A Liberal approach, much like that advocated by Andrew 
Moravcsik, at first glance, could also provide some explanatory leverage.  A liberal 
theorist would regard the state-generated inefficiencies and politicalization that has 
characterized regional defense industrial cooperation as a reflection of the desires of 
sub-national actors who have captured state policy-making to serve their petty, 
corporate interests. Those actors, in the context of this study, are principally defense 
firms who actually execute the design and production tasks negotiated by the national 
governments, but conceivably could be any societal stakeholder in the collaborative 
process, e.g., labor unions intent on maximizing domestic employment, municipal or 
                                                 
23 Interview. Pierre Delhotte, Western European Armaments Group, Brussels, 4 July 1996. 
24 Andrew James, “Comparing European Responses to Defense Industry Globalization,” Defense & 
Security Analysis 18 (2002): 131.  
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provincial governments seeking local benefits, or even groups within the state 
bureaucracy. While an assessment of possible impacts of these other actors would 
require a new research effort with a revised set of priorities, the narrative of this 
dissertation obliges me at least to speak to the most conceptually appealing “liberal” 
alternative: a firm-level, political economy approach that consider potential lobbying 
by industrial groups upon national governments. 
  While both constructivists and structural realists find rigor and parsimony in 
abstracting the state as a unitary actor and thus in not assigning any significant causal 
value to the preferences and actions of sub-state actors, none would contend that 
industry is a passive onlooker to international cooperation. As producers of 
technologies deemed critical to the economic and security well-being of the state, their 
desires are likely to weigh heavily in the calculus of state decision-makers, at the very 
least. For liberal scholars, who see the state as a “representative institution” in which 
powerful societal actors can their exert influence and disguise it as the national 
interest, defense producers can lead their national governments in ways that can either 
advance cooperation, or all too frequently undermine it. Indeed, this dissertation’s 
discussion of the Eurofighter program, one sees the firms of one state, France, 
pressing their government to sabotage the collaboration if their interests were  not 
advanced, even as the chairman of the principal aerospace producer in another 
country, Germany, was publicly shaming his government to continue its support of the 
project. A political economy approach would link these events with the positions that 
these two states ultimately embraced. 
  I contend that while such an approach is conceptually appealing, it is 
nonetheless highly problematic. Defense procurement is indeed special, and not 
simply for ideational reasons. As Francois Heisbourg writes, “[t]he defense industry, 
whether American or European, has by definition a relationship with the state unlike  
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that of any other major industrial sector, for the simple reason that the state is the main 
customer.”25 Not only do defense firms operate within monopsony markets, states also 
have final authority over all third-party sales, and hold “golden shares” in that they 
reserve the right to interfere in any corporate activities that relate directly to defense 
production, such as mergers and acquisitions. Moreover, state involvement has not 
been limited to a legal fiction, as every major European government except Bonn has 
dabbled in the public ownership of its key national producers since the end of the 
Second World War at various times. State ownership, manifest either as majority 
shareholding or outright management, ended in Britain in 1979 with the Thatcherite 
economic reforms, but continues to various degrees in France, Italy and Spain.26 
Consequently, in a situation such as this, one must grapple with the delicate question 
of where state preferences end and firm-level preferences begin if corporate chairmen 
and technical designers are also civil servants with direct lines to the ministry of 
defense. A liberal approach applied to the time frame of this dissertation could 
conceivably say more than a constructivist assessment, but it will not necessarily say 
anything new, as it is largely impractical to disentangle state desires from corporate 
interests.   
Conclusion 
  For the sake of completeness, I have outlined two alternative approaches the 
European procurement puzzle. There remains an additional explanation, however, that 
requires some consideration: the constructivist arguments presented in this dissertation 
are valid, but not yet ripe. I have shown that European identity has not been a 
                                                 
25 Francois Heisbourg, “From European Defense Industrial Restructuring to Transatlantic Deal?” CSIS 
Working Paper no. 4, February 2001, 5. 
26 Ibid. Even Dassault’s oft-cited independence was something of a mirage as ownership roughly split 
between the state and the Dassault family.  
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significant factor in shaping collaborative procurement in the European Union. 
Nonetheless, it is possible that my analysis is valid only for a discrete period of time. 
My research ended in the late 1990s, just as a number of noteworthy changes were 
emerging on the European defense industrial scene. These changes reflect industrial 
and political transformations that were unforeseen during the 1990s. It remains to be 
seen, however, if these changes denote the ideational issues that I have discussed in 
this dissertation. The merging national defense producers in aerospace and electronics 
simply may reflect what Trevor Taylor and others have labeled the pull of “Anglo-
Saxon corporate governance under the effect of globalization,” instead of the push of a 
new social identity that compels Europeans to advance new corporate models.27 
Similarly, the institutional developments at the multinational and Union levels to 
better coordinate regional procurement may be little more than “headline grabbers,” as 
Keith Hayward noted, which merely “increase the numbers of [national] bureaucrats 
who clamber over programs and little else.”28 New research is required to determine if 
either situation is true. Nonetheless, the record of the last century is clear: European 
procurement cooperation was unable to escape the bounds of established state identity.  
                                                 
27 Jean-Pierre Maulny, Trevor Taylor, Burkard Schmitt, and Franck-Emmanuel Caillaud, “Abstract of 
the study on ‘Models of strategic and industrial co-operation between arms companies in Europe,’”  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/defence/defence_docs/resume_iris_en.pdf, 25 December 2003. 
28 Interview, Keith Hayward, Staffordshire, UK, 8 January 1997. 292 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
“A Certain Goodwill.” Flight International. 7 December 1967: 927. 
 
“A French Roadblock to Free Trade.” New York Times 31 August 2003: Section 4, 8.  
 
Adler, Emanuel. “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics.” 
European Journal of International Relations 3 (1997): 319-363. 
 
Adler, Emanuel and Michael Barnett. “Governing Anarchy: A Research Agenda for 
the Study of Security Communities.” Ethics and International Affairs 10 
(1996): 63-98. 
 
Agnus, Rae. “The Tornado Project.” International Arms Procurement: New Directions 
ed. Martin Edmonds. New York: Pergamon Press, 1981. 
 
“Air Defence MRCA Goes Ahead.” Flight International 13 March 1976: 632. 
 
Allebeck, Agnès Courades. “The European Community: from the EC to the European 
Union.” Arms Industry Limited. Ed. Herbert Wulf. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993 
 
“Armaments Directors Refine EFA Options.” Aviation Week and Space Technology 
28 May 1984: 18 
 
Ashley, Richard and R.B.J. Walker. “Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissidence in 
International Studies.” Special Issue of International Studies Quarterly 34 
(1990): 259-268. 
 
Assembly of the Western European Union. Proceedings. 25
th Ordinary Session, 2
nd 
Part. Paris: Western European Union, December 1979. 
 
Assembly of the Western European Union. “The European combat aircraft and other 
aeronautical developments.” Document 874. Paris: WEU, 1981. 
 
Assembly of the Western European Union. “The European fighter aircraft for the 
nineties.” Document 1037. Paris: WEU, 1985. 
 
Atkinson, Rick. “As Europe seeks wider NATO role, its armies shrink.” Washington 
Post July 29, 1996: A1. 293 
 
 
“Avionics Management Will Test MRCA Formula.” Aviation Week and Space 
Technology 24 April 1972: 102-105. 
 
“BAe doubts German role in EFA successor.” Flight International 6 November 1991: 
 
Beer, Francis. Integration and Disintegration in NATO. Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press, 1969. 
 
Beaumont, Peter. “Eurofighter’s Crash Landing.” Observer. 13 August 1995, 2. 
 
Benichou, Marcel. “The Development of Anglo-French Relations in Defense 
Equipment.” RUSI Journal (Winter 1989):  55-57. 
 
Bittleston, Martyn. “Co-operation or Competition? Defense Procurement Options for 
the 1990s.” Adelphi Papers 250 London: Institute for Strategic Studies, Spring 
1990. 
 
Bitzinger, Richard A. “Customize Defense Industry Restructuring.” Orbis 38 (Spring 
1994):  
 
Bland, Douglas. Security Under Europe's Flag. Martello Papers 6 (1994) 
 
Bloom, William. Personal Identity, National Identity, and International Relations. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
 
Blunden, Margaret. “Collaboration and Competition in European Weapons 
Procurement: the Issue of Democratic Accountability.” Defence Analysis 5 
(1989): 291-304. 
 
Borrus, Micheal and Zysman, John. “Industrial Competitiveness and American 
National Security.” The Highest Stakes: the Economic Foundations of then 
Next Security System. Eds. Wanye Sandholtz, Michael Borrus, John Zysman, 
Ken Conca, Jay Stowsky, Steven Vogel, and Steve Weber. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992. 
 
Boseley, Sarah and Michael White. “Portillo backs Eurofighter.” Guardian 3 
September 1996: 4. 
 
de Briganti, Giovanni. “Britain, France Move Toward Closer Defense Ties.” Defense 
News 6 ( 13 May 1992): 12 
 
de Briganti, Giovanni. “German Questions Cooperative Programs." Defense News 4 
(2 October 1989): 33. 
 294 
 
“Britain delighted at decision France believes was inevitable.” Financial Times 3 
August 1985: 2 
 
“British Aerospace: Still an Industry to be Reckoned With.” NATO’s Fifteen Nations, 
June-July 1968: 76 
 
“British Firms Urge Fighter Policy.” Aviation Week and Space Technology 4 March 
1985: 24. 
 
“British Study Development Cost Rise.” Aviation Week & Space Technology 2 June 
1969: 125 
 
“Britain’s VG Team.” Flight International 5 October 1967: 557-558. 
 
Brooks, Stephen G. “Dueling Realisms.” International Organization 51 (Summer 
1997): 445-477. 
 
Buchan, David. “Anglo-French weapons deals possible.” Financial Times 19 
September, 1987. 
 
Buchan, David. “Business Meets Bureaucracy.” The Financial Times 30 November 
1987: 10 
 
Buchan, David and George Graham, “France, UK discussing reciprocal navy 
purchases.” Financial Times 26 March 1987:  
 
Callaghan, Thomas. “NATO’s Collection of Forces.” Journal of Defense & 
Diplomacy 5 (1987).  
 
Callaghan, Thomas. US-European Economic Cooperation and Military and Civilian 
Technology. Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1975. 
 
Calleo, David. Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of American Hegemony. 
Brighton, UK: Wheatsheaf, 1987. 
 
Calandri, Elena. “The Western European Union Armaments Pool: France’s Quest for 
Security and European Cooperation in Transition 1951-1955.” Journal of 
European Integration History 1 (1995): 37-63. 
 
Calman, John. “European Co-operation in Defense Technology: The Political Aspect.” 
Defence, Technology and the Western Alliance. No. 1. London: Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 1967.  
 
Cattaway, Andrew. “The Field Artillery Market in the 1990s.” Military Technology 2 
(1990): 43-48. 295 
 
 
Checkel, Jeffery. “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory.” World 
Politics 50 (January 1998): 324-348. 
 
Chuter, Andrew. “Course Change for the Eurofighter.” Defense News 23 February 
2004: 1,8. 
 
Chuter, Andrew. “W. Germany will not back current SP-70 development.” Jane’s 
Defence Weekly 21 December 1985: 1337 
 
Collins, D.C. “The World of Helicopters: Aerospace Survey” Financial Times 4 
September 1972: 15 
 
Coleman, Herbert. “U.K. Stressing Collaborative Efforts.” Aviation Week and Space 
Technology 7 September 1970: 14-15. 
 
Committee appointed by the Minister of Aviation under the Chairmanship of Lord 
Plowden. Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Aircraft Industry. 
London: HMSO, 1965. 
 
“Consortium Fate Linked to MRCA Project.” Aviation Week and Space Technology. 
2 June 1969: 108-114. 
 
“Cooperation in Reserch, Development, and Production of Military Equipment: Study 
of NBMR Procedure.” Report of the Explanatory Group, NATO Unclassified 
Document C-M (66) 33, 8. January 1969. 
 
Corbey, Dorette. “Dialectical functionalism: stagnation as a booster of European 
integration.” International Organization 49 (Spring 1995) 
 
Cornell, Alexander H. International Collaboration in Weapons and Equipment 
Development and Production by NATO Allies: Ten Years Later -- And 
Beyond. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1981. 
 
“Cost of Collaboration.” Flight International 19 September 1968: 427 
 
Cowen-Karp, Regina. Defense Procurement in the Federal Republic of Germany: 
Politics and Organization. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986. 
 
Cox, J. J. G. “The Choice for France—European Defence of Arms Sales.” The Army 
Quarterly and Defence Journal. 117 (January 1987): 25-26. 
 
Crawford, Beverley. “The New Security Dilemma Under International Economic 
Interdependence.” Millennium 23 (1994): 25-55. 
 296 
 
Creasey, Pauline and Simon May. “The Political and Economic Background.” The 
European Armaments Market and Procurement Cooperation. New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1988. 
 
Cross, Kenneth. “MRCA—The Future System of Procurement.”  RUSI Journal 117 
(September 1972): 3-13. 
 
Crossley, R. J. “Collaboration – A Winning Hand or a Busted Flush.” Journal of the 
Royal Artillery CXV (March 1988): 50-55. 
 
“The Daily Telegraph looks at another British defence contract failure with the write-
off a 13 year, £88 million howitzer project.” Daily Telegraph Textline Multiple 
Source Collection (1980-1994). 15 January 1987. 
 
Davidson, Brian. “Is there life after EFA.” Aerospace World (September 1992): 15. 
 
“Decisions, decisions.” Flight International 27 May 1992: 
 
“Defence White Paper: an Interim Statement.” Flight International 29 February 1968: 
288-289 
 
DeGaulle, Charles. War Memoirs: Salvation, 1944-1946. New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1960. 
 
Dekker, Henk. “European Identity: How European Are Young Europeans Expected 
To Be and How European Are They in Fact?” Reconceptualizing Politics, 
Socialization, and Education: International Perspectives for the 21st Century. 
Ed. Russell F. Farnen. Oldenburg: Bibliotheks- und Informationssystem der 
Universitat, 1993. 
 
Deutsch, Karl. Nationalism and Its Alternatives. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 
1969. 
 
Deutsch, Karl et. al. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1957. 
 
Deutsch, Karl. Political Community at the International Level: Problems of 
Measurement and Definition. New York: Doubleday, 1957. 
 
Donne, Michael and David Marsh. “France pushes for leadership.” Financial Times, 9 
July 1984: 2 
 
Donne, Michael. “Peace sortie over European fighter.” Financial Times 30 March 
1985: 6 
 297 
 
Draper, Alan. European Defence Equipment Collaboration: Britain's involvement, 
1957-1987. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988. 
 
“Dutch to Participate in the EFA Project.” Aeronautical Engineering 10 September 
1984: 28. 
 
Economist. “Markets and Maginot Lines.” October 28, 1995 
 
Edgar, Alistair D. “A New European Defense Market: Cooperation, Competitive 
Interdependence, or Divisive Competition,” From Euphoria to Hysteria: 
Western European Security After the Cold War. Ed. David Haglund. Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1993. 
 
Edgar, Alistair. “The MRCA/Tornado: The Politics and Economics of Collaborative 
Procurement.” The Defence Industrial Base and the West. Ed. David C. 
Haglund. London: Routledge, 1989. 
 
Edmonds, Martin. “International Military Equipment Procurement Partnerships: The 
Basic Issues.”  International Arms Procurement: New Directions. Ed. Martin 
Edmonds. New York: Pergamon Press, 1981. 
 
Edmonds, Martin. “United Kingdom National Security and Defence Dependence: The 
Technological Dimension.” Government and Opposition 26 (Autumn 1991): 
 
“EFA Answers.” Flight International 4 November 1992.  http://ezproxy. 
library.cornell.edu:2056/universe/document?_m=424ff80cd376504b18269bdb
bed1df46&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-
zSkVb&_md5=a129864dfe2112acd4410b0715015c03 
 
Eichenberg, Richard and Russell Dalton. “Europeans and the European Community: 
the Dynamics of Public Support for European Integration.” International 
Organization 47 (Autumn 1993): 507-534. 
 
Elzen, Boelie, Bert Enserink and Wim Smit. “Weapons Innovation: Networks and 
Guiding Principles.” Science and Public Policy (June 1990): 171-193. 
 
“Europe.” Flight International 15 July 1971: i. 
 
“European Aerospace Cooperation: Sir George has Other Ideas.” Interavia January 
1974: 35. 
 
“European Aircraft.” Flight 29 May 1969: 851 
 298 
 
European Defence Industries Group. “The European Defence Industry: An Agenda 
Item for the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference.” European Defence 
Industries Group Memorandum. 30 May 1995. 
 
“European Fighter on the Road.” Flight International 8 April 1972: 484a-487. 
 
European Parliament. European Armaments Industry: Research, Technological 
Development and Conversion. Luxembourg: Directorate General for Research, 
1993. 
 
European Parliament. Working Papers 1983-1984 Document 1-455/83. Brussels: 
European Communities, 1983. 
 
Eyre, Dana and Mark C. Suchman. “Military Procurement as Rational Myth: Notes on 
the Social Construction of Weapons Proliferation.” Sociological Forum 7 
(March 1992): 137-161. 
 
Eyre, Dana and Mark Suchmann. “Status, norms, and the proliferation of conventional 
Weapons: An institutional theory approach.” The Culture of National Security: 
Norms and Identity in World Politics. Ed. Peter Katzenstein. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996. 
 
Facer, Roger. “The Alliance and Europe: Part III. Weapons Procurement in Europe  
Capabilities and Choices.” Adelphi Paper 108 London: Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 1975. 
 
Fairhall, David. “Reprieved Fighter Flies Off Course Again.” Guardian 6 January 
1993: 6 
 
Feddersen, Hans B. “The European Defense Firm, National Procurement Policies, and 
the Internationalisation of Arms Production.” The Future of the Defense Firm: 
New Challenges, New Directions Ed. Andrew Latham and Nicholas Hooper. 
Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995. 
 
Feld, Werner J. The Future of European Security and Defence Policy. Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner, 1993. 
 
Finnemore, Martha. National Interests in International Society. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1996. 
 
Fontanel, Jacques and Jean-Paul Hébert. “The End of the ‘French Grandeur Policy.” 
Defense and Peace Economics 8 (1997): 37-55. 
 299 
 
Foss, Christopher and Ronald T. Pretty, “OTO Melara OF-40 main battle tank and 
Palmaria 155mm self-propelled howitzer.” International Defense Review 2 
(1981): 215-223. 
 
Freeman, Kenneth. “Defense Procurement Policy in Europe: Competition, Industrial 
Policy and Restructuring.” RUSI Journal December 1987:  29. 
 
Furdson, Edward. The European Defense Community: A History. New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1980. 
 
“The Future Challenge: Aiming for a European Armaments Industry.” Military 
Technology (November 1988): 39. 
 
“The Future Challenge: Aiming for a European Armaments Industry.” Military 
Technology (November 1988): 42. 
 
“Future of European Collaboration.” Flight International 26 September 1968: 474. 
 
Garnham, David. The Politics of European Defence Cooperation: Germany, France, 
Britain, and America. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988. 
 
Geisenheyner, Stefan. “A giant finding its purpose.” Flight International 5 August 
1971: 213. 
 
Gellner, Ernst. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983. 
 
“Germany accused of cheek after questioning payment for aircraft.” The Herald 
(Glasgow) 21 October 1992: 3. 
 
Gessert, Robert, et. al., “The Impact on the Rationalization of European Defense 
Industry of Alternative US Approaches to Transatlantic Defense Cooperation.” 
Vol. 1. Washington D.C.: General Research Corporation, April 1979.  
 
Gessert, Robert, et. al. “The Impact on the Rationalization of European Defense 
Industry of Alternative US Approaches to Transatlantic Defense Cooperation.” 
Vol. 2. McLean, VA: General Research Corporation, April 1979.   
 
Giddens, Anthony. The Nation-State and Violence. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1987. 
 
Gilman, William. “First UK AWACs Rolls Out: Younger Refutes “Fortress Europe.” 
Armed Forces Journal International 126 (August 1989): 44 
 
Gilman, William. “Three out of Four MPs Support Favoritism for UK Defense 
Industries.” Armed Forces Journal International (January 1989): 35 300 
 
 
Gilpin, Robert. War and Change in World Politics. London: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981. 
 
Goffman, Erving. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York: Anchor 
books, 1959. 
 
Goodman, Elliot R. “France and Arms for the Atlantic Alliance: The Standardization-
Interoperability Problem.” Orbis (Fall 1980). 
 
Goodwin, Geoffrey. “The Erosion of External Sovereignty,” in Between Sovereignty 
and Integration. Ed. Ghita Ionescu. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975. 
 
Gray, Bernard. “Defense buying will stay British, says Rifkind.” Financial Times 28 
September 1994. 
 
Greenwood, A. “MCRA—The Future System of Military Procurement.”  RUSI 117 
(September, 1972): 3-13. 
 
Greenwood, David. “Collaborative Arms Acquisitions in Western Europe, Inhibitions 
and Constraints.” International Arms Procurement: New Directions. Ed. Martin 
Edmonds. New York: Pergamon Press, 1981. 
   
Greico, Joeseph. “Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The 
Limits of Neo-liberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory.” 
Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate. Ed. David 
Baldwin. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. 
 
Guay, Terence. At Arm’s Length: The European Union and Europe’s Defence 
Industry. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998. 
 
Haas, Ernst. Beyond the Nation-State. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964. 
 
Haas, Ernst. The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory. Berkley: Institute for 
International Studies, 1975 
 
Haeglin, Björn. "International Cooperation in Conventional Weapons Acquisition." 
Paper presented at the RISA Conference, Durham, 15-17 December 1977. 
 
Hagen, Lawerence. Twisting Arms: Political, Military, and Economic Aspects of 
Arms Cooperation in the Atlantic Alliance. Kingston: Queens Centre for 
International Relations, 1980. 
 301 
 
Haglund, David G. and Marc Busch. "'Techno-Nationalism' and the Contemporary 
Debate over the American Defense Industrial Base." The Defense Industrial 
Base and the West. Ed. David G. Haglund. London: Routledge, 1989. 
 
Handley, David. “Public Opinion and European Integration: The Crisis of the 1970s.” 
European Journal of Political Research 9 (1981): 340-352 
 
 
Harlow, C.J.E. “The European Armaments Base: A Survey. Part 2: National 
Procurement Policies.” Defence, Technology, and the Western Alliance, No. 2, 
Part 2. London, The Institute for Strategic Studies, July 1967. 
 
Hansen, Roger D. “European Integration: Forward March, Parade Rest, or 
Dismissed?” International Organization  27 (Spring 1973): 225-254. 
 
Hartley, Keith. The Economics of Defence Policy. London: Brasseys, 1991. 
 
Hartley, Keith. NATO Arms Co-operation: A Study in Economics and Politics. 
London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983. 
 
Hartley, Keith. “Public Procurement and Competiveness: A Community Market for 
Military Hardware and Technology.” Journal of Common Market Studies 
XXV (March 1987): 237-247 
 
Hayward, Keith. The World Aerospace Industry: Collaboration and Competition. 
London: Duckworth and the Royal United Services Institute, 1994. 
 
Heath, B.O. “The MRCA Project.” The Aeronautical Journal of the Royal 
Aeronautical Society 74 (June 1970): 444-455. 
 
Heath, B.O. “MRCA Tornado:  Achievement by International Collaboration,” 
Aeronautical Journal (September 1979): 329-343. 
 
Hedertoft, Ulf. “The State of Sovereignty in Europe.” in National Cultures and 
European Integration. Ed. Staffan Zetterholm. Oxford, UK: Berg, 1994. 
 
Heine, Egon W. “MRCA, EFA. und PAH 2: Lernprozeß im Management 
internationaler Großprojeckte.” Europaische Wehrkunde 38 (May 1989): 316-
325 
 
Heisbourg, François. “A European Defense Industry: Dream or Reality?” NATOs 
Sixteen Nations (Dec. 1988 - Jan. 1989): 25-26. 
 
Heisbourg, François. “From European Defense Industrial Restructuring to 
Transatlantic Deal?” CSIS Working Paper no. 4. February 2001. 302 
 
 
Heisbourg, François. “Public Policy and the Creation of a European Arms Market.” in 
The European Armaments Market and Procurement Cooperation. Eds. Pauline 
Creasey and Simon May. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988. 
 
Heseltine, Michael. “I am fighting for Europe.” Military Technology IX (1985): 74 
 
Hill, Christopher and William Wallace. “Introduction: actors and actions.” The Actors 
in Europe’s Foreign Policy. Ed. Christopher Hill. London: Routledge, 1996. 
 
Höljelid, Stefan. “European Integration and the Idea of European Identity: Obstacles 
and Possibilities,” ECPR Joint Sessions/Workshop 19: Identity Politics, 2001. 
 
Hoffman, Stanley. “Europe’s Identity Crisis Revisited.” Daedalus 123 (Spring 1994): 
1-21. 
 
Hoffman, Stanley. “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case 
of Western Europe.” Daedalus (Summer 1996): 862-915. 
 
Hoffman, Stanley. “Reflections of the Nation-State in Western Europe.” Journal of 
Common Market Studies 21 (1982): 1-37 
 
Hoffman, Stanley. “The European Community and 1992.” Foreign Affairs 68 (Fall 
1989): 27-47. 
 
Hopf, Ted. “The Promise of Constructivism.” International Security 23 (Summer 
1998): 171-200. 
 
Housego, David. “UK and France plan arms link.” Financial Times 18 March, 1987. 
 
Howard, Michael. “War and the Nation-State.” Daedalus 108 (1979): 101-110. 
 
http://www.eurofighter.starstreak.net/Eurofighter/history.html, 18 August 2003. 
 
http://www.namsa.nato.int/home/namsa_e.htm, 31 August 2003. 
 
Hufbauer, Gary. “An Overview.” Europe 1992: An American Perspective. Ed. Gary 
Hufbauer. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1990. 
 
Ifestos, Panayiotis. European Political Cooperation: Towards a Framework of 
Supranational Diplomacy. Avebury: Gower Publishing Company, 1987. 
 
Independent European Programme Group. Towards a Stronger Europe. Volume 2. 
Brussels: IPEG, 1989. 
 303 
 
Ingrey, D.F. “The Philosophy of International Equipment Collaboration.” Weapons 
Procurement, Defense Management and International Collaboration. London: 
Royal United Services Institute, October 1972. 
 
Interview. Pierre Delhotte. Western European Armaments Group. Brussels. 4 July 
1996. 
 
Interview. French Defense Official. London. 20 December, 1996. 
 
Interview. Dr. Henry Gaffney. Former Assistant Director of the Defense Security 
Assistance Agency. Washington DC, 9 February 2004. 
 
Interview. Group Captain David Hecken, Royal Air Force . Brussels. 5 July 1996. 
 
Interview. Keith Hayward. Staffordshire, UK. 8 January 1997. 
 
Interview. Multiple Anonymous British Aerospace Officials. St. Annes-on-Sea, UK. 
19 February 1997. 
 
Interview. NATO Official. Brussels. 10 July, 1996. 
 
Interview. Multiple Northrop-Grumman Europe Officals. Brussels. Summer 1996. 
 
Interview. Official in the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense. London.  28 
November 1996. 
 
Interview. Official with Aerospatiale. London. 3 March 1997. 
 
Interview. Official in NATO Secretariat. Brussels. 9 July 1996. 
 
Interview. J. Pijls, Royal Dutch Navy. London. 16 December 1996. 
 
Interview. Norbert Pipperger. Bundesministrium der Verteidigung. London, 21 
January 1997. 
 
Interview. Alessandro Politi. London. 21 May 1996. 
 
Interview. Bob Reedijk, Dutch NATO Armaments Director Representative 
(NADREP). Brussels, 1 July 1996. 
 
Interview. Anthony Scott. Head of NATO Land Armaments Planning Section. 
Brussels, 3 July 1996. 
 
Interview. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence Reciprocal Purchasing Agreement 
managers. Abbey Wood, United Kingdom. May 1996. 304 
 
 
Interview. United States Army officer representing the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
Brussels. 3 July, 1996. 
 
Interview. Heinz Wolf, German National Armaments Defense Representative to 
NATO. Brussels, 2 July 1996. 
 
Ireland, Timothy P. Creating the Entangling Alliance. The Origins of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981. 
 
Isnard, Jacques and Lesley Bedford. “France looks for co-operation with UK, USA.” 
Jane’s Defense Weekly 19 September, 1997: 568. 
 
James, Andrew. “Comparing European Responses to Defense Industry Globalization.” 
Defense & Security Analysis 18 (2002): 123-143. 
 
James, Robert Rhodes. Standardization and Common Production of Weapons in 
NATO. London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967. 
 
Jepperson, Ronald L., Alexander Wendt, and Peter Katzenstein. “Norms, Identity, and 
Culture in National Security.” The Culture of National Security. Ed. Peter 
Katzenstein. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996. 
 
Joffe, Josef. “Europe's American Pacifier.” Foreign Policy 54 (Spring 1984):  
 
Johnson, Paul Martin. “Burden-sharing and Defence Cooperation: West German 
Security Policy in the Seventies.” PhD Thesis. University of Virginia. May 
1976. 
 
Jopp, Marthias, Reinhardt Rummel, and Peter Schmidt, Integration and Security in 
Western Europe. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991. 
 
Kaldor, Mary. The Baroque Arsenal. New York: Hill and Wang, 1981. 
 
Kaldor, Mary. European Defence Industries -- National and International Implications  
ISIO Monograph Series 1, no. 8 (1972).   
 
Kaldor, Mary. “Introduction.” The European Rupture: The Defense Sector in 
Transition. Ed. Mary Kaldor and Geneviève Schméder. Tokyo: United Nations 
University Press, 1997. 
 
Kapstein, Ethan Barnaby. “International Collaboration in Armaments Production: A 
Second-Best Solution.” Political Science Quarterly 106 (1991-92): 657-675. 
 305 
 
Katzenstein, Peter. “Introduction.” The Culture of National Security ed. Peter 
Katzenstein. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996. 
 
Keane, John. “Questions for Europe.”  in The Idea of Europe: Problems of National 
and Transnational Identity. Eds. Brian Nelson, David Roberts and Walter Veit. 
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992. 
 
Keller, William. Arm in Arm. New York: Basic Books, 1995. 
 
Keohane, Keohane. “Institutionalist Theory, Realist Challenge.” in Neorealism and 
Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. David Baldwin. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1993. 
   
Keohane, Robert. “Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond,” in 
Neorealism and its Critics, ed. Robert Keohane. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1986. 
 
Kolcum, Edward H. “Multi-Role Fighter Design Accord Reached.” Aviation Week 
and Space Technology 7 April 1969: 23-24. 
 
Kolcum, Edward. “Specialization Marks Engine Consortiums.” Aviation Week and 
Space Technology 7 September 1970: 69-75. 
 
Kolodziej, Edward. “Europe as a Global Power: Implications of Making and 
Marketing Arms in France.” Journal of International Affairs (1987): 385-421. 
 
Kolodziej, Edward. Making and Marketing Arms. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1987. 
 
Knorr, Klaus and Frank N. Trager. Economic Issues and National Security. Lawrence, 
KA: Allen Press, 1977. 
 
Kowert, Paul and Jeffery Legro. “Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical 
Reprise.” The Culture of National Security. Ed. Peter Katzenstein. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996. 
 
Laffan, Brigid. Integration and Co-operation in Europe. London: Routledge, 1992. 
 
Laffan, Brigid. “The Politics of Identity and Political Order in Europe.” Journal of 
Common Market Studies 34 (March 1996): 81-102 
 
Lambert, Mark. “Germany stays in Aerospace.” Flight International 14 February 1976: 
368 
 306 
 
Latham, Andrew. “Conflict and Competition over the NATO Defence Industrial Base: 
The Case of the European Figher Aircraft.” in The Defence Industrial Base and 
the West. Ed. David G. Haglund. London: Routledge, 1989. 
 
Layton, Chris. “The High-Tech Triangle.” Partners and Rivals in Western Europe: 
Britain, France and Germany. Ed. Roger Morgan and Caroline Bray. Gower: 
London, 1986. 
 
Lee, Gordon and Jim Meacham. “On a swing-wing and prayer.” The Economist 17 
December 1977: 31. 
 
Leheny, David. Tours of duty: The Evolution of Japan's Outbound Tourism Policy. 
PhD Manuscript. May 1998. 
 
Levene, Peter. “European defense research and procurement after 1992.” NATO’s 
Sixteen Nation’s (December 1989): 75   
 
Lindberg, Leon and Stuart Scheingold. Europe’s Would-Be Polity: The Patterns of 
Change in the European Community. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 
1970. 
 
Lindberg, Leon. “Integration as a Source of Stress on the European Community 
System.” International Organization 20 (Spring 1966): 233-265. 
 
Lodge, Juliet. “The European Parliamentfrom ‘assembly’ to co-legislature: 
changing the institutional dynamics.” The European Community and the 
Challenge of the Future. Ed. Juliet Lodge. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989. 
 
Lorell, Mark. Multinational Development of Large Aircraft: The European 
Experience. R-2596-DR&E.  Santa Monica, RAND, July 1980. 
 
Lorenz, Andrew. “German U-turn will rescue EFA.” Sunday Times 15 November 
1992. http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document. . .  
 
Luckham, Robin. “Armament Culture.”  Alternatives 10 (Summer 1994): 1-44. 
 
“Luftwaffe Emphasizing Flexible Response During 1970s.” Aviation Week & Space 
Technology 24 April 1972: 44-47. 
 
de Luis, Juan. “Spanish Views on the Future of West European Security and Defence 
Cooperation.” In the Midst of Change: On the Development of West European 
Security and Defense Cooperation. Ed. Peter Schmidt. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
1992. 
 307 
 
Manigart, Philippe  and Marlier, Eric. “European Public Opinion on the Future of Its 
Security.” Armed Forces and Society 19 (Spring 1993): 335-352. 
 
Marsh, David. “Why the obstacles are looming even larger.” Financial Times 30 May 
1985: 26 
  
Martin, Lisa. “Interests, Power and Multilateralism.” International Organization 46 
(Autumn 1992): 765-792. 
 
Maulny, Jean-Pierre, Trevor Taylor, Burkard Schmitt, and Franck-Emmanuel 
Caillaud, “Abstract of the study on ‘Models of strategic and industrial co-
operation between arms companies in Europe.”                      
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/defence/defence_docs/resume_iris_en.pdf    
25 December 2003. 
 
McVitie, Doug. “Single Market Faces Roadblocks,” Defense News 9 March 1992: 20 
 
Mercer, Jonathan. “Anarchy and Identity.” International Organization 49 (Spring 
1995) 
 
Mearsheimer, John. “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War.” 
International Security 15 (1990): 5-56. 
 
Mearsheimer, John. “The False Promise of International Institutions.” International 
Security 19 (Winter 1994/95): 5-49. 
 
Meyer, John “The World Polity and the Authority of the Nation-State.” Studies of the 
World System. Ed. Albert Bergensen. New York: Academic Press, 1980. 
 
Milward, Alan. The European Rescue of the Nation-State. Berkley: University of 
California Press, 1992. 
 
Molas-Gallart, Jordi. “Defense Procurement as an Industrial Policy Tool: The Spanish 
Experience.” Defense and Peace Economics. 9 (1998): 63-81. 
 
Molas-Gallart, Jordi. “Missile Systems: ‘Flexible Modularity’ and Incremental 
Technological Change in Military Production.” Defense and Peace Economics  
6 (1995): 141-158. 
 
Molas-Gallart, Jordi. “Spanish Participation in the International Development and 
Production of Arms Systems.” Defense Analysis 6 (1990): 351-365. 
 
Moodie, Michael. Defense Technology and the Atlantic Alliance: Competition or 
Collaboration. Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1977. 
 308 
 
Moran, Theodore. “The Globalization of America's Defense Industries.” International 
Security 15 (Summer 1990): 57-99  
 
Moravcsik, Andrew. “Armaments Among Allies: European Weapons Collaboration, 
1975-1985.” Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and 
Domestic Politics. Ed. Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. 
Putnam. Berkley: University of California Press, 1993. 
 
Moravcsik, Andrew. “Arms and Autarky in Modern European History.” Daedalus, 
120 (Fall 1991): 23-45. 
 
Moravcsik, Andrew. “A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach to the EC.”  in 
Economic and Political Integration in Europe: Internal Dynamic and Global 
Context. Eds. Simon Bulmet and Andrew Scott. Oxford, UK: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1994. 
 
Moravcsik, Andrew. “Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and 
Conventional Statecraft in the European Community.” International 
Organization 45 (Winter 1991): 19-56. 
 
Moravcsik, Andrew. “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist Approach.” Journal of Common Market Studies 31 
(December 1993): 473-523. 
 
Moravcsik, Andrew. “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International 
Politics.” International Organization 51 (Autumn 1997): 513-553. 
 
Moravcsik, Andrew. “The European Armaments Industry at the Crossroads.” Survival 
33 (1992): 65-85. 
 
Morganthau, Hans. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 5th 
Ed. New York: A. Knopf, 1978.  
 
“Mr. Healey Under Fire.” Flight International 20 July 1969: 89 
 
“MRCA Moves to Prototype Phase.” Aviation Week and Space Technology 20 July 
1970: 15. 
 
“MRCA Moves into Design Phase.” Aviation Week and Space Technology 7 
September 1970: 37-39. 
 
“MRCA: Now There Are Three.” Flight International 7 August 1969: 221 
 
“MRCA: Project Definition.” Flight International 27 May 1969: 848 
 309 
 
“Multi-role Fighter Design Accord Reached.” Aviation Week and Space Technology 7 
April 1969: 23. 
 
Nau, Henry. “Identity and International Politics: An Alternative to Neorealism.” Paper 
presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, September 2-5, 1993. 
 
Niemzig, Ingo. “The SP-70-1.” NATO’s Fifteen Nations (Oct.-Nov. 1981): 82-90. 
 
North Atlantic Assembly, Defense and Security Committee. Interim Report of the 
Sub-Committee on Conventional Defense: New Patterns of European Security 
Collaboration. Brussels: NATO, October 1989.   
 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO 
Defense. Brussels: NATO, annual. 
 
Nye, Joseph. Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization. 
Boston: Little-Brown, 1971. 
 
Nye, Joseph and Keohane, Robert. “International Interdependence and Integration.” in 
Handbook of Political Science  6 (Andover, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975) 
 
O'Connell, Robert. “Putting Weapons in Perspective.” Armed Forces and Society 9 
(Spring 1983): 441-454. 
 
Owen, Kenneth. “Nine firms aim for European fighter deal.” Aerospace America 
March 1984: 26 
 
Pengelly, R.B. “The U.S. Army’s M198 Towed 155mm Howitzer.” International 
Defence Review 7 (1979):  1163-1168. 
 
Pettijohn, William and Jacob Stockfish. Methodology to Quantify the Potential Net 
Economic Consequences of Increased NATO Commonality, Standardization 
and Specialization. Rockville, MD: The Vertex Corporation, 1978. 
 
Pierson, Paul. “The Path to European Integration: A Historical-Institutionalist 
Analysis.” European Integration and Supranational Governance. Ed. Wayne 
Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. 
 
Pipers, Alfred. “Putting Fouchet Back in the Bottle.” National Foreign Policies and 
European Political Cooperation. Ed. Christopher Hill. London: RIIA/Urwin 
and Allen, 1984. 
 
“Political, Economic Shifts Hamper NATO.” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 19 
March 1973: 20-21. 310 
 
 
“Politics and the Eurofighter 2000.” Military Technology February 1994: 65 
 
Price, Alfred. Panavia Tornado: Spearhead of NATO. London: Ian Allen, Ltd., 1988. 
 
Price, Richard and Nina Tannenwald. “Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and 
Chemical Weapons Taboos.” The Culture of National Security: Norms and 
Identity in World Politics. Ed. Peter J. Katzenstein. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996. 
 
Quaroni, Pietro. “European Integration: An Italian View.” Survival  XX (December 
1970): 401-405. 
 
Reed, Carol. “The Anglo-French Connection: The Reciprocal Purchasing Agreement.” 
Defense (November/December 1989): 851-853 
 
Reif, Karlheinz. “Cultural Convergence and Cultural Diversity as Factors in European 
Identity.” European Identity and the Search for Legitimacy. Ed. Soledad 
Garcia. London: Pinter, 1993. 
 
Report by the Conference of National Armaments Directors on an Initial Investigation 
of the Feasibility of Improving the Conditions of Defense Trade Between 
Allies. C-M(91)47. Brussels: North Atlantic Council, 21 June 1991. 
 
Report of the Netherlands Advisory Council on Defense Affairs. European Co-
operation on Defense Equipment. The Hague: Adviesraad Defensie 
Aangelegenheden, 1978. 
 
Reppy, Judith and Gummett, Philip. “Economic and Technological Issues in the 
NATO Alliance.” Evolving European Defense Policies. Ed. Catherine 
McArdie Kelleher and Gale A. Mattox. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and 
Company, 1988. 
 
Risse, Thomas. “Identity Politics in the European Union: The Case of Economic and 
Monetary Union,” in Petri Minkkinen und Heikki Patomäki (Hrsg.), The 
Politics of Economic and Monetary Union. Helsinki: Finnish Institute of 
International Affairs, 1997. 
 
Rich, Michael, et. al. Multinational Coproduction of Military Aerospace Systems. R-
2861-AF. Santa Monica: RAND, October 1981. 
 
Rosamond, Ben. “Mapping the European Condition: The Theory of Integration and 
the Integration of Theory.” European Journal of International Relations 1 
(1995): 391-408. 
 311 
 
Rosen, Steven. Summer Workshop on Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy. 
Cornell University. 22 July, 1998. 
 
Rudney, Robert. “French 1987-1991 Programming Law: An End to French 
Independence?” Armed Forces Journal International 125 (January 1988): 30 
 
Sandholtz, Wayne. High-Tech Europe: The Politics of International Cooperation. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992. 
 
Sandler, Todd and Keith Hartley. The Economics of Defense. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995. 
 
Schaffer, Steven. “Linking Arms: Weapons Cooperation in NATO.” International 
Arms Procurement: New Direction. Ed. Martin Edmonds. New York: 
Pergamon Press, 1981. 
 
Schulte, Heinz. “Political agenda is behind split.” Jane’s Defense Weekly 15 August 
1992: 26. 
 
Segal, David, Mady Segal, and Dana Eyre. “The Social Construction of Peacekeeping 
in America.” Sociological Forum 7 (March 1992): 121-136. 
 
de Septmontagne, Jean-Mari. “In Favor of Cooperation but Development of Engine 
Begun Unilaterally.” NATO’s Fifteen Nations 2 (1979): 96 
 
Silvesteri, Stefano. “After EFA, Integrated Defense.” Sole 24 Ore. Milan, Italy. 3 
September 1996. Translated by the Federal Broadcast Information Service, 
FBIS-WEU-96-173 
 
Simpson, John and Frank Gregory. “West European Collaboration in Weapons 
Procurement.” Orbis 16 (Summer 1972): 435-461. 
 
Sinnott, Richard. “Bringing Public Opinion Back In.” Public Opinion and 
Internationalized Governance. Ed. Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott. 
Oxford University Press: New York, 1995. 
 
Sköns, Elisabeth. “Western Europe: Internationalization.”Arms Industry Limited Ed. 
Herbert Wulf. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. 
 
“SP 70 – the $400 million fiasco.” Defense Attaché No. 1 (1987): 9-16. 
 
Smith, Anthony. “National Identity and the Idea of European Unity.” International 
Affairs 68 (1992): 55-76. 
 
Smith, Mark. “Entente more cordiale.” The Engineer 265 (17 September, 1987): 22. 312 
 
 
Stein, Arthur. “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Archaic World.” 
International Regimes. Ed. Stephen Krasner. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1983. 
 
Steinberg, Arthur B. The Transformation of the European Defence Industry. Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 1992. 
 
Sternberg, Ernest. Photonic Technology and Industrial Policy. Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1992. 
 
Stewart, James Moray. “The European DefensePrinciples and Policies.” NATO’s 
Sixteen Nation’s (Dec. 1989/Jan. 1990): 19-21. 
 
Stone, Walter. “Current Trends in Artillery.” Defense (November 1985): 510-513. 
 
Taylor, Paul. The Limits of European Integration. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1983. 
 
Taylor, Philip. “Weapons standardization in NATO: collective security or economic 
competition.” International Organization 36 (Spring 1982): 95-112. 
 
Taylor, Trevor. “Defence industries in international relations.”  Review of 
International Studies 16 (1990): 59-73. 
 
Taylor, Trevor. Defence, Technology and International Integration. New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1982. 
 
Taylor, Trevor. “West European defence industrial issues for the 1990s.” Defence 
Economics 4 (1993): 113-121. 
 
Taylor, Trevor. “West European security and defence cooperation: Maastricht and 
beyond.”  International Affairs 70 (January 1994): 1-16. 
 
Tigner, Brooks. “Inertia Stalls European Consolidation Efforts.” Defense News 20-26 
July 1998: 22. 
 
Tilly, Charles. Coercion, Capital, and European States 990-1990. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1990.  
 
Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe. “Neo-Functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete?  A 
Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC.” Millennium 20 
(1991): 1-21. 
 313 
 
Tsakaloyannis, Panos. The European Union as a Security Community: Problems and 
Prospects. 1 Aufl. Ed. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1996. 
 
Tucker, Gardiner. “Standardization and the Joint Defense.” NATO Review  (January 
1975): 
 
Tucker, Jonathan B. “Partners and Rivals: A Model of International Collaboration in 
Advanced Technology.” International Organization 45 (Winter 1991): 83-120. 
 
Tusa, Francis. “France Leans Toward the UK.” Armed Forces Journal International 
129 (October 1992): 48 
 
“UK stressing collaborative efforts.” Aviation Week and Space Technology 7 
September 1970: 14. 
 
“UK/France talks on off-the shelf buying.” Jane’s Defense Weekly 26 September 
1987: 703 
 
United Kingdom House of Commons, Defense Committee. Anglo/French Defense 
Cooperation. London: HMSO, HC 91, 1991. 
 
United Kingdom House of Commons Defense Committee and Trade and Industry 
Committee. Aspects of Defence Procurement and Industrial Policy. First 
Report. London: HMSO, 1995. 
 
United Kingdom House of Commons. Defence Committee. European Fighter Aircraft, 
Session 1991-92, Sixth Report. London: HMSO, 1992. 
 
United Kingdom House of Commons. “International Collaborative Projects for 
Defence Equipments: Estimating, Monitoring, and Control of Procurement 
Expenditure.” Committee of Public Accounts, Minutes of Evidence, Session 
1984-1985. London: HMSO, 3 December 1984. 
 
United Kingdom House of Commons. “The European Fighter Aircraft.” Committee of 
Public Accounts, 14
th Report, Minutes of Evidence, Session 1990-91. London: 
HMSO, 1991. 
 
United Kingdom National Audit Office. Maximising The Benefits of Defence 
Equipment Cooperation. Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General. HC 
300, Session 2000-01. London: HMSO, 2001. 
 
United Kingdom National Audit Office. Ministry of Defence: Collaborative Projects. 
Report to the Comptroller and Auditor General. London: HMSO, 1991. 
 314 
 
United Kingdom National Audit Office. Ministry of Defence: Eurofighter 2000. 
London: HMSO, 1995. 
 
United States General Accounting Office. Report to the Secretary of Defense. Defense 
Trade: European Initiatives to Integrate the Defense Market. GAO/NSIAD-98-
6, October 1997. 
 
United States Congress, Congressional Research Service. NATO Standardization: 
Political, Economic, and Military Issues for Congress. Washington D.C., 29 
March 1977.  
 
United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. Lessons in Restructing 
Defense Industry: The French Experience  Background Paper. OTA-BP-
ISC-96. Washington DC: US. GPO, June 1992.   
 
United States Senate. Hearings before the Special Committee on Conventional Forces 
and Alliance Defense of the Committee of the Armed Services Alliance and 
Defense Capabilities in Europe. 100th Congress. HASC no. 100-504: 4 
August; 7, 20 October; 3, 17 November 1987. 
 
“The US-German V/STOL Tactical Fighter Programme.” Interavia 5 (1967): 778-780. 
 
Vernon, Raymond and Kapstein, Ethan. “National Needs, Global Resources.” 
Daedalus 120 (Fall 1991): 1-22. 
 
Voβ, Werner and Michael Brzoska. Eurofighter 2000: Consequences and Alternatives- 
Brief 5. (Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion, February 1996. 
 
Wæver, Ole. “European Security Identities.” Journal of Common Market Studies 34 
(March 1996): 103-132. 
 
Wæver, Ole, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, and Pierre Lemaitre. Identity, Migration 
and the New Security Agenda in Europe. London: Pinter Publishers, 1993. 
 
Walker, R.B.J. “Culture, Discourse, Insecurity.” Alternatives XI (1986): 485-504. 
 
Walker, William. “The Multi-role combat aircraft (MRCA): a case study in European 
collaboration.”  Research Policy 2 (1974): 280-305. 
 
Walker William and Philip Gummett. “Britain and the European Armaments Market,” 
International Affairs 65 (Summer 1989): 419-442. 
 
Walker, William and Philip Gummett. “Future Options for the European Defence 
Market.” Seminar Paper, April 29-30, 1993. 
 315 
 
Walker, William and Philip Gummett. “Nationalism, Internationalism and the Future 
of the European Defence Market.” Chaillot Paper of the Institute for Strategic 
Studies. Western European Union. 1993. 
Walker, William and Susan Willet. “Restructuring the European Defense Industrial 
Base.” Defense Economics 4 (1993): 141-160. 
 
Walt, Stephen. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987. 
 
Waltz, Kenneth. “Laws and Theories.” Neorealism and its Critics. Ed. Robert 
Keohane. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.  
 
Waltz, Kenneth. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 
1979. 
 
Warren, Kenneth. “Why Britain should stand alone again; European Aircraft 
Collaboration.” The Financial Times 15 August 1984: 11. 
 
Webb, Simon. NATO and 1992. Defense Acquisition and Free Markets. R-3758-FF. 
Santa Monica, CA: RAND, July 1989. 
 
Wendt, Alexander. “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of 
Power Politics.”  International Organization 46 (Spring 1992): 391-425. 
 
Wendt, Alexander. “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” 
American Political Science Review 88 (June 1994): 384-396. 
 
Wendt, Alexander. “Constructing International Politics.”  International Security  20 
(Summer 1995): 71-81. 
 
Wendt, Alexander. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999. 
 
Wendt, Alexander and Barnett, Michael. “Dependent state formation and Third World 
militarism.” Review of International Studies 19 (1993): 321-347. 
 
Wendt, Alexander. “Identity and Structural Change in International Politics.” The 
Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory Ed. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich 
Kratochwil. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995. 
 
Western European Union, ”Document 1119.” Proceedings: Assembly Documents. 
33rd Ordinary Session, 2nd Part. Paris: Western European Union, December 
1988. 
 
Western European Union, Proceedings: Minutes - Official Reports of Debates. 34th 
Ordinary Session, 2nd Part. Paris: Western European Union, December 1988. 316 
 
 
“. . .While industry sounds a warning.” Flight International. 5 June 1976: 1478 
 
Williams, Geoffrey. “The Strategy of the TSR-2.” International Journal XXV 
(Autumn 1970): 726-744. 
 
Williams, Michael C. “Identity and the Politics of Security.” European Journal of 
International Relations 4 (1998): 207-228. 
 
Williams, Roger. European Technology: The Politics of Collaboration. London: 
Croom Helm, 1973. 
 
Wilson, Thomas M. “An Anthropology of the European Community.” Cultural 
Change and The New Europe. Eds. Thomas M. Wilson and M. Estellie Smith. 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993. 
 
Wood, Pia Christina. “The Never-ending Story: Germany, Great Britain, and the 
Politics of the Eurofighter.” International Military Aerospace Collaboration. 
Ed. Pia Christina Wood and David S. Sorenson. Brookfield, VT: Ashgate 
Publishing Company, 2000. 
 
Wörner, Manfred.” Armed Forces Journal International 123 August 1985: 58. 
 
Wright, Vincent. “Explaining Relance:  European Integration as Model, Myth and 
Instrument.” The European Community after 1992: A New Role in World 
Politics. Ed. Armand Clesse and Raymond Vernon. Baden-Baden: Namos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1991. 
 
Wyatt-Walter, Holly. The European Community and the Security Dilemma, 1979-92. 
New York : St. Martin's Press, 1997. 
 
Wyllie, James H. European Security in the New Political Environment : An Analysis 
of the Relationships between National Interests, International Institutions and 
the Great Powers in Post Cold War European Security Arrangements. London ; 
New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1996. 
 